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The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union 
(EU) has often been characterised by legal scholars as an 
intergovernmental ‘pillar’ within the constitutional structure of the EU, 
distinct from the type of law and legal processes common to other 
dimensions of the European integration process. The perceived 
limitations caused by the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP have 
contributed to the widespread view that it is largely ineffective in meeting 
its goals. This thesis analyses the CFSP by characterising it as a system of 
governance. Building on the language and meanings of ‘governance’, an 
institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis is developed. 
Using this framework helps to show that characterising the CFSP in this 
way demonstrates how its (legal) effects go beyond the instruments 
provided for in the Treaty on European Union. The CFSP as a system of 
governance can be seen to influence other Union-level instruments, tools 
and policies in which the EU’s foreign policy goals are pursued. The case is 
made that the CFSP can be understood as an integral part of the 
constitutional order of the EU and legal analysis need not be limited to 
the competences and instruments found in the Treaty.  
The thesis uses the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EuroMed) to 
demonstrate how the EU’s foreign policy goals are pursued. Although 
EuroMed was not formally created by a CFSP instrument, analysis of its 
institutional framework and operation shows that it bears close affinity 
with the CFSP goals, both globally and towards the Mediterranean. 
EuroMed can also be seen as a system of governance, in which the EU 
institutions act as strong, central actors which enable foreign policy goals 
to be pursued within an institutionalised framework. As a policy area 
within EuroMed, the broad issues of migration are examined against the 
background of growing EU competence in migration law and policy. The 
analysis demonstrates that migration issues have come to the forefront in 
EuroMed, which is increasingly used as a means by which foreign policy 
and security goals can be pursued by the EU under the guise of a 
‘partnership’ with Mediterranean states. Applying the institutional 
constructivist framework of legal analysis to the CFSP shows that, as a 
system of governance, it has strong effects on other policy-making spheres 
within the EU, and these effects can justifiably be termed as ‘legal’. As 
such, the CFSP should therefore not be regarded as a policy which is 
limited in its usefulness but one which can be seen to fulfil its goals 
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Legal and political developments are stated as at 30 September 2008. 
 
At the time of writing, most EU Member States had ratified the Treaty of 
Lisbon. However, following the ‘no’ vote in the referendum on ratification 
held in Ireland on 12 June 2008, entry into force of the Treaty (originally 
foreseen for 1 January 2009) will be delayed. As it is possible that changes 
to the text of the Treaty may be made, references to the consolidated 
versions of the Treaties including the amendments by the Treaty of Lisbon 
are treated here as conditional on the current text of the Treaty eventually 
coming into force. Unless indicated otherwise, references to Treaty 
articles elsewhere in this thesis do not take into account amendments by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. References to the consolidated versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(the former EC Treaty) are those published in the Official Journal on 9 
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The Member States shall support the Union’s 
external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity.1 
 
What did the acronym [CFSP], for which I had 
consumed so many airline cashew nuts, mean – 
and what impact might it have had on the lives 
of British or European citizens?2 
The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1992 represented a major step for the 
European Union (EU) and its constitutional arrangements. The policy 
marked a significant leap forwards in attempts to move beyond the EU’s 
minor political role in international political affairs when compared to its 
growing economic power. The time, it seemed, had come for the EU to 
mature beyond economic cooperation between Member States and seek to 
take its place in the post-Cold War international environment alongside 
the only remaining superpower, the United States.  
The TEU represented, for the first time, the elevation of dispositions 
on foreign policy to the heart of the Union’s constitutional arrangements. 
The CFSP provisions in the TEU were, however, the product of a gradual 
process of increasingly regular foreign policy discussions between the 
Member States since as far back as 1970.3 The CFSP was the successor to 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), a discussion forum for the Member 
States on external affairs and foreign policy, which operated outside the 
formal competence of the EC Treaty. EPC was given Treaty recognition in 
                                                   
1
 Article 11(2) TEU. 
2
 Chris Patten, former Commissioner for External Relations, 1999-2004. C Patten, Not 
Quite the Diplomat (Penguin, London 2005). 
3
 The Council, meeting in Luxembourg on 27 October 1970 approved the Report of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the Member States on the question of political integration 
(the Davignon report), which proposed six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Ministers of 
the Member States along with the Commission to discuss foreign policy issues. 
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the Single European Act 1986,4 but no competence was granted to the 
Community institutions to propose or carry out foreign policy measures. 
This can be contrasted with the foreign trade policy of the EC/EU which, 
through the Common Commercial Policy as set out in Article 133 EC, had 
long since been within the competence of the Community.  
The legal provisions of the CFSP were placed within a single 
institutional framework for the Union at the heart of its Treaty-based 
constitutional arrangements for the first time in 1992. However, the 
institutional competences, legal instruments and constitutional 
principles which had become the hallmarks of the European integration 
process were not applicable to the CFSP provisions. These include the 
power of initiative of the Commission in proposing legislative measures, 
the binding and enforceable characteristics of regulations and directives 
and the supremacy of EC law over national law as established by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).5 By consequence, the CFSP immediately 
came to be viewed as a distinct ‘pillar’ in the constitutional structure of 
the EU.6  
The signing of the TEU and the furnishing of the CFSP with specific 
instruments to put it into practice (Common Positions and Joint Actions)7 
came during a time of great change in the global international order. The 
focus of much of this change was the demise of the Soviet Union and fall of 
the ‘iron curtain’ in Europe. Within a short period of time, countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, which prior to 1989 had almost no relations 
with the Community, were expressing their desire to become future 
Member States. With the EU and its achievements also becoming an 
increasing focus of international attention due to the moves towards 
                                                   
4
 Articles 1, 3(2) and 30 SEA. 
5
 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
6
 B de Witte, 'The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple 
or French Gothic Cathedral?' in T Heukels, N Blokker and M Brus (eds) The European 
Union after Amsterdam (Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht 1998).  
7
 As defined in Articles 13-15 TEU. A provision on Common Strategies was added by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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completion of the Single Market and the future plans for Economic and 
Monetary Union, the opportunity (and some would say the obligation) for 
Europe to seek a political role to match its growing economic power was 
certainly present. 
Since the entry into force of the TEU, most commentators agree that 
the CFSP has not fulfilled the goals set out in the Treaty. The initial 
enthusiasm for a ‘mature’ EU to assert itself internationally in the post-
Cold War environment was quickly lost in the 1990s. Popular perception 
of the EU is not that of a major foreign policy actor able to respond 
effectively to the major issues in world affairs whether in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Iraq, nor to define its relationship with allies such 
as the United States, nor even to back up words with actions. The 
declaration of independence in February 2008 by Kosovo exposed 
fundamental differences between Member States in their approaches to 
recognition or not of its statehood: whilst it is not the EU’s role to 
recognise new states, the terms of the Treaty (for example, Article 16 TEU)8 
suggest that the normal course of action would be for the Member States 
to act in a unified fashion, rather than an ‘agreement to disagree’ as was 
evident from the text of the Council conclusions.9 
In the absence of the binding legislative measures common to other 
policy spheres of the EU, the achievement of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy appears to many as a distant, impossible or irrelevant goal. 
Member States have resisted pooling sovereignty in the CFSP to a much 
greater extent than many other areas, even those which are considered 
‘sensitive’ due to their closeness to the heart of state sovereignty, such as 
migration policy.10 Member States have, as previously noted, pooled 
                                                   
8
 ‘Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter 
of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union’s 
influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent 
action’. 
9
 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Kosovo, 2951st External 
Relations Council meeting, 18 February 2008.  
10
 This is explored further in chapter five. 
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sovereignty in areas of external relations as the existence of the Common 
Commercial Policy demonstrates. This highlights the reticence to pool 
sovereignty in the explicit areas of foreign and security policy. The 
Constitutional Treaty and Treaty of Lisbon continue this trend: the ‘pillar’ 
structure is no longer an accurate description of the EU’s constitutional 
order, but the CFSP remains outside the scope of the main supranational 
EU institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice) and firmly 
in the hands of the Council, and therefore the Member States. 
Two interrelated issues have arisen in analysis of the CFSP since its 
inception. The first relates to the constitutional structure of the EU and 
the view that since the TEU clearly distinguishes the CFSP from the 
‘Community’ or ‘first’ pillar, the foreign policy of the EU is sealed within 
its own pillar and immune (or protected, according to the language of 
some national government ministers) from the ‘spillover’ processes from 
the more extensive Community competences. A focus on the pillars as the 
constitutional structure of the EU is attractive in understanding the 
formal mechanics of EU decision-making and the legal effects of the 
provisions and institutional competences. However, it also has the result 
of creating intellectual barriers to understanding the CFSP as an integral 
part of the constitutional order of the EU that has a role to play beyond 
the competence-based instruments. In treating the CFSP as the 
intergovernmental second pillar, its ‘otherness’, in legal terms, means that 
it has often been seen as merely a supplement to the ‘real’ law found in the 
first pillar.  
The second issue is how to evaluate the relative success or failure of 
the CFSP. Given that the structure of the international relations system 
continued to be based around the characteristics of the Westphalian state, 
it is tempting to compare the CFSP with the foreign policy of a nation 
state. When divisions or disagreements appear over the response to an 
international issue between two or more Member States, the CFSP is often 
immediately characterised as a ‘failure’ because it appears that the Treaty 
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provisions are ineffective in ensuring that the Member States speak with 
one voice. Yet, the EU is not a nation state and is not fully endowed with 
many of the traditional instruments used in foreign policy or diplomacy, 
including the lack of its own military force. It is not a member of most 
international organisations, including the United Nations and does not 
have an executive capable of making foreign policy decisions in a unified 
manner: instead, decisions and courses of action to follow are the product 
of agreements between 27 Member States. Although the Union does have 
some of the traditional instruments associated with the conduct of foreign 
policy, these are deliberately not given the commonly used terms. For 
example, the Union maintains representative offices in more third states 
around the world than most of its Member States, but these are officially 
called delegations, not embassies, even though many of the basic functions 
of the delegations (with the exception of consular and visa services) are 
the same as for embassies. The ‘face’ of the CFSP is not a foreign minister, 
as is the case for a nation state, but a high representative. Similarly, the 
External Action Service proposed in the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Treaty of Lisbon to support the Union’s work is essentially a diplomatic 
service, but it is not termed as such. What this demonstrates is that the 
CFSP shares similarities with state-based foreign policies but remains 
deliberately different. The CFSP is a common policy, which may or may be 
or become a unified policy, and it does not replace the foreign policy-
making powers of the Member States. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to address these two issues head-
on by analysing the respective Treaty-based competences of the EU 
institutions, or to suggest how or why the CFSP can be improved in terms 
of its success. This has already been researched in detail during the 
lifetime of the CFSP.11 Instead, against the background of these issues, this 
thesis looks beyond the Treaty-based competences of the institutions to 
                                                   
11
 Chapter two explores the literature and research undertaken on the CFSP related 
issues in the EU’s external relations. 
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the operation of the EU’s foreign policy, in order to better understand how 
the CFSP works. The thesis makes the case that the CFSP contributes to a 
system of governance both within the EU and within its sphere of external 
relations. This is achieved by placing the CFSP within an institutional 
constructivist framework of legal analysis, which helps to see the policy 
less as a traditional manifestation of a state-like foreign policy and more 
as a means by which the EU’s goals can be articulated and put into 
practice through other means. The argument is made that far from 
representing a failure in the EU’s attempt to gain a greater international 
role, the CFSP creates an institutional environment in which the EU 
Member States become used to dealing collectively with the outside world 
through a common frame. The CFSP exists in, and contributes to, a social 
reality in which non-the CFSP instruments are used to fulfil foreign policy 
goals. The scope of the research, therefore, goes beyond the institutional 
practices and competences in the CFSP stricto sensu. The case study of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and the issue of migration as a 
substantive law and policy making sphere, demonstrates the way in which 
a system of governance has been created in the external sphere and this is 
traceable to the existence of the CFSP in the constitutional order of the 
Union. 
Before outlining the hypothesis, research questions, methodology 
and chapters of the thesis in detail, it is first necessary to use the legal 
framework of the CFSP, and the context in which it was created, as a point 
of departure. Attention is also paid to the development of the CFSP, 
including the changes proposed by the Constitutional Treaty and Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
The CFSP: objectives and operation 
The terms of the TEU are wide-ranging in scope of their subject area. The 
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CFSP is designed to cover ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’12 
including ‘all questions relating to the security of the Union’.13 The 
objectives of the CFSP are articulated in Article 11(1) TEU and were 
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1998. The objectives are;  
to safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests, independence and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter,14 
to strengthen the security of the Union in all 
ways, 
to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in according with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those 
on external borders,15 
to promote international cooperation, 
to develop and consolidate democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
Despite the reference to ‘all areas’ of foreign policy, the Article 11 
objectives for the CFSP emphasise cooperation, respect for international 
law and the spreading of democracy. These objectives form the backbone 
of what has been termed the ‘soft power’, ‘civilian power’ and ‘normative 
power’ characteristics associated with the foreign policy of the EU since 
the development of EPC during the 1970s.16 The addition of the objective 
on security in relation to external borders is significant for the purposes 
                                                   
12
 Article 11(1) TEU. 
13
 Article 17(1) TEU. 
14
 The word ‘and integrity’ were inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 1(10). 
15
 The words ‘including those on external borders’ were inserted by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, Article 1(10). 
16
 ‘Civilian power Europe’ is most associated with Duchêne and, more recently, 
‘normative power Europe’ with Manners: F Duchêne, 'Europe's Role in World Peace' in R 
Mayne (ed) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (Fontana, London 1972); I 
Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?' (2002) 40 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 235. 
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of this thesis, in the context of migration issues within the CFSP.17 
 The means by which the process of defining and implementing a 
CFSP for the Union according to the objectives listed above were 
deliberately distinct from those found in Article 249 EC (regulations, 
directives and decisions) and the supranational institutions at the heart 
of the Community, the Commission, Court of Justice and Parliament. 
These institutions were given little or no formal role in the CFSP. 
Subsequent Treaty amendments have not moved the CFSP to a position 
where it can formally be seen as a supranational policy. The TEU created 
the CFSP legal instruments at the disposal of the Council, with the 
obligation on the Member States to support the policy ‘actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’.18 The CFSP is 
discussed at the monthly Council meetings in the General Affairs 
configuration, which since 2002 has become the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council (GAERC). The participants are the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the 
Council/High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission. GAERC is 
chaired by the Member State holding the Council Presidency, and 
ministers holding portfolios including defence, trade and overseas aid 
attend when necessary. Opinions on the CFSP are drawn up by the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), which mirrors but is separate to 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). GAERC 
meetings, however, deal with the CFSP as well as other external policies 
including the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), commercial 
policies and development aid. 
No enforcement mechanisms were provided for, either in the TEU or 
since, to ensure Member State compliance with the Treaty provisions or 
legal instruments. The instruments at the disposal of the Council, Joint 
Actions and Common Positions, were neither fully defined by the TEU nor 
                                                   
17
 This is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
18
 Article 11(2) TEU. 
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inspired by established legal instruments in domestic, EC or international 
law.19 This is also the case for Common Strategies, introduced into the 
TEU by the Treaty of Amsterdam.20  
Common Strategies guide the implementation of Joint Actions and 
Common Positions, but the latter are not dependent on a Common 
Strategy already being in place. They do not appear regularly, and in fact 
only three have been adopted since the Treaty of Amsterdam: on Russia,21 
Ukraine22 and the Mediterranean Region.23 Joint Actions and Common 
Positions taken on the basis of a Common Strategy are adopted by 
qualified majority in the Council,24 as an exception to the usual rule of 
unanimity.25 Since there have only been three Common Strategies 
adopted, this provision has not been extensively used and has been 
limited in its application to technical matters.26 
By contrast, Joint Actions are adopted more regularly and ‘address 
specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be 
required’.27 They include, for example, sending missions to third states, 
such as the Union police mission sent to Afghanistan in 200728 and the 
mission to support security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau in 2008.29 
Missions with the purpose of monitoring elections have also been sent on 
the basis of Joint Actions.30 EU special representatives to troubled third 
                                                   
19
 P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional 
Foundations (OUP, Oxford 2004) 896. 
20
 Article 1(10) TEU (as amended). 
21
 Council Common Strategy (CFSP) 1999/414 on Russia [1999] OJ L157/1. 
22
 Council Common Strategy (CFSP) 1999/877 on Ukraine [1999] OJ L331/1. 
23
 Council Common Strategy (CFSP) 2000/458 on the Mediterranean Region [2000] OJ 
L183. 
24
 Article 23(2) TEU. 
25
 Article 23(1) TEU. 
26
 I Pernice and D Thym, 'A New Institutional Balance for European Foreign Policy?' 
(2003) 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 369, 375. 
27
 Article 14(1) TEU. 
28
 Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP on the establishment of the European Union 
Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) [2007] OJ L139/33.  
29
 Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP on the European Union mission in support of 
security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [2008] OJ L40/11. 
30
 For example, to Nigeria: Council Joint Action on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union in support of the democratic process in Nigeria [1998] OJ L358/2. 
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states or regions receive their mandate from a Joint Action.31 Joint 
Actions have also been used to create bodies such as the EU Institute for 
Security Studies32 and the EU Security and Defence College.33 Joint 
Actions are not, therefore, limited to ‘technical’ issues but have been used 
for a variety of purposes. They commit the Member States ‘in the positions 
they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’34 but no enforcement 
mechanisms are provided for at Union level. 
Common Positions are also adopted regularly and often implement 
UN Security Council resolutions, such as restrictive measures on third 
states. By way of example, in February and March 2008 there were 
Common Positions adopted or renewed in relation to third states as 
diverse as Zimbabwe,35 Liberia,36 the Transnistrian Region of Moldova37 
and Iraq.38 The Treaty is less detailed on the scope of Common Positions, 
and their differentiation from Joint Actions is not clearly defined.39  
By far the most regular expression of the CFSP is through the 
Declarations issued by the Presidency. There is no Treaty basis for the 
issuing of Declarations, but they are issued on an almost daily basis.40 
They frequently appear when condemning violence and appealing for calm 
in troubled regions,41 and also to express concern on issues such as the use 
                                                   
31
 For example, Council Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP appointing a European Union Special 
Representative in Kosovo [2008] OJ L42/92. 
32
 Council Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union 
Institute for Security Studies [2001] OJ L200/1. 
33
 Council Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP establishing a European Security and Defence 
College [2005] OJ L194/15. 
34
 Article 14(3) TEU. 
35
 Council Common Position 2008/135/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against 
Zimbabwe [2008] OJ L43/39.  
36
 Council Common Position 2008/109/CFSP concerning restrictive measures imposed 
against Liberia [2008] OJ L38/26. 
37
 Council Common Position 2008/160/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the 
leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova [2008] OJ L51/23. 
38
 Council Common Position 2008/186/CFSP amending Common Position 2003/495/CFSP 
on Iraq [2008] OJ 59/31. 
39
 Eeckhout (n 19) 403. 
40
 During the first three months of 2008, a total of 45 Declarations were issued by the 
Council Presidency (Slovenia). 
41
 For one of many examples, Council of the EU, ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf 
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of the death penalty in third countries.42 These examples demonstrate 
that the Council and its Presidency are very active in terms of the CFSP 
output and the scope of the CFSP instruments covers all regions across 
the globe. It has also become commonplace for non-Member States 
including Iceland, Norway, the candidate states, and some states in the 
EU’s neighbourhood to align themselves with the Declarations. This gives 
the impression of a European foreign policy which is led by, but not 
exclusive to, EU Member States. 
The reticence on the part of Member States to pool foreign policy-
making sovereignty is masked by two features of the Treaty provisions on 
the CFSP. First, the Union is ‘served by a single institutional framework’.43 
Although, as already noted, the competences of the institutions vary 
between the CFSP and the ‘first’ pillar, this provision suggests that the 
CFSP cannot be seen as wholly separate from those articles which deal 
with the external sphere, such as commercial and development policy, 
where the Commission has a more central role.44 The quote at the 
beginning of this Introduction by Chris Patten indicates that as a 
Commissioner, he spent a great deal of his time involved in the CFSP.45 
The same Treaty article which lays down the existence of the single 
institutional framework goes on to state the obligation for the Union to 
‘ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole’ and this task 
falls jointly to the Commission and Council.46 The ECJ has held that where 
there is overlap in first and second pillar competences, the first pillar 
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 Article 3(2) TEU. 
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competences must be used.47 Second, the Treaty speaks in very broad and 
general terms of the EU asserting its identity on the international scene,48 
and covering ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’.49 It is not therefore 
designed merely to supplement and support the external aspects of the 
competences the Community enjoys. These provisions make the CFSP 
appear less like a policy area which was conceived as being completely 
sealed from the institutional operations of other policy areas. 
 It is also useful to note that whilst the ‘intergovernmental’ label 
commonly attached to the CFSP as a pillar of the European Union rather 
than the Community suggests that it is fully excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ, case-law of the Court demonstrates that this is not 
entirely accurate. In Pupino,50 the ECJ was asked by preliminary reference 
to consider the effect of a Framework Decision concluded under Article 34 
TEU. The article is part of the ‘third’ pillar of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation and the subject matter of the Framework Decision was the 
standing and protection of victims in criminal proceedings. Whilst the 
terms of Article 34 EU exclude the possibility of direct effect of 
Framework Decisions, the ECJ stated that as the binding character of 
Framework Decisions (in Article 34(2)(b)) is formulated in identical terms 
to Article 249 EC paragraph 3, there is an obligation on national courts ‘to 
interpret national law in conformity’.51 This obligation is unaffected by the 
less extensive jurisdiction of the ECJ in third pillar matters under Title VI 
of the TEU.52 Even though the third pillar does not have an equivalent of 
Article 10 EC, the principle of loyal cooperation, the ECJ found that non-
application of a ‘general or particular’ principle of cooperation would 
render the Union’s tasks difficult to carry out effectively, and therefore 
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27 
 
national courts must interpret national law ‘as far as possible in the light 
of the wording and purpose of the Framework Decision’.53 
Whilst Pupino concerned third pillar measures, this judgment could 
potentially have strong implications for the legal order in the CFSP too, 
since the ECJ may try to read the obligation on Member States to ‘actively 
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’54 with the 
logic of its decision in Pupino. The point to make at this juncture is that 
measures which are taken within intergovernmental frames should not be 
seen as immune from the legal techniques developed by the court, such as 
indirect effect, which apply in the first pillar.55  
Other recent cases in the ECJ have demonstrated that foreign policy 
is, contrary to traditional assumptions, not contained within diplomatic 
frames but can affect individuals and their rights too. These cases further 
demonstrate the futility of considering foreign policy in isolation from the 
other pillars, and the inherent links between fulfilling the CFSP goals 
through instruments available across the three pillars in addition to the 
mechanism provided for in Article 301 EC.56 In Kadi57 and Yusuf,58 the 
applicants challenged two Regulations made in furtherance of the CFSP 
Common Positions which had been created in order to implement a UN 
Security Council Resolution.59 The measures aimed to freeze the assets of 
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individuals suspected of supporting Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda. Kadi and Yusuf were named as such supporters by the UN Sanction 
Committee in 2001 and subsequently added to the Regulation annex.60 
They unsuccessfully challenged the freezing of their assets in the CFI. The 
Court found that the Regulations could be based on Articles 60, 301 and 
308 EC and it was not possible to review the Regulation with regard to 
compliance with fundamental human rights, since this would indirectly 
constitute a review of the Security Council Resolution.61 The legal basis for 
competence is significant, since the Court refused to endorse the 
Commission’s argument that the fight against international terrorism fell 
within its residual competence of Article 308 in order to achieve a 
Community objective. This, in the view of the Court, would ‘deprive many 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union of their ambit and would be 
inconsistent with the introduction of instruments specific to the CFSP’.62 
Both lodged appeals with the ECJ.63 Advocate General Maduro’s opinion 
on the Kadi case, delivered in January 2008, proposed that the Court 
should set aside the CFI’s decision and annul the Regulations insofar as 
they concern the applicant. The opinion places great emphasis on the 
right of the Community courts to review whether the Regulation complies 
with the respect for the individual’s fundamental rights, and as such the 
Community institutions ‘cannot dispense with proper judicial review 
proceedings when implementing the Security Council resolutions in 
question within the Community legal order’.64 The decision of the ECJ in 
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September 2008 found that the Council was competent to adopt the 
Regulation on the legal basis it did, but that the CFI erred in holding that 
the Community courts had no jurisdiction to review the measure in light 
of the fundamental rights of the applicant. The ECJ set aside the ruling of 
the CFI and set aside the Regulations freezing Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International’s funds on the basis that they constituted unjustified 
restrictions and unacceptable limits on the right to be heard and effective 
judicial review of those rights.65 
The Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran66 judgment 
differed from the CFI Kadi and Yusuf decisions in that the CFSP measures 
challenged by the applicants were ‘autonomous’ and not the product of 
UN Security Council Resolutions. The CFI therefore held that the right to 
a fair hearing and the right to reasons should apply.67 
 Furthermore, the ECJ has ruled on challenges to the CFSP Common 
Positions using the power granted to it under Article 35(6) TEU.68 In Segi69 
and Gestoras Pro Amnistia70 the ECJ dismissed appeals from the CFI 
relating to claims for damages for inclusion on a list of suspected terrorist 
groups. The ECJ did not find any jurisdiction to award damages under 
Title VI of the TEU nor the right to directly or indirectly challenge a 
Common Position. Yet, given the potential effects on third party 
individuals of a CFSP measure, the Court found that: 
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… it has to be possible to make subject to 
review by the Court a Common Position which, 
because of its content, has a scope going 
beyond that assigned by the EU Treaty ... 
Therefore, a national court hearing a dispute 
which indirectly raises the issue of the validity 
or interpretation of a Common Position 
adopted on the basis of Article 34 EU, as is the 
case in this instance for part of Common 
Position 2001/931 ... and which has serious 
doubts whether that Common Position is 
really intended to produce legal effects in 
relation to third parties, would be able, subject 
to the conditions fixed by Article 35 EU, to ask 
the Court to give a preliminary ruling. It would 
then fall to the Court to find, where 
appropriate, that the Common Position is 
intended to produce legal effects in relation to 
third parties, to accord it its true classification 
and to give a preliminary ruling.71 
Taken together, the pillar structure does not separate the EU’s legal 
order into hermetically sealed parts and despite the ‘intergovernmental’ 
characteristics of the CFSP, important consequences on the legal order of 
the Member States may arise, and have effects on individual EU and non-
EU citizens and their rights.72 Constraints, derived from Article 10 EC, do 
exist on the Member States in the exercise of their foreign policies.73 The 
ECJ demonstrated in Pupino that the principle of loyal cooperation 
extends beyond the Community pillar. There seems to be little room for 
doubt, therefore, that if the ECJ is prepared to extend the effect of Article 
10 EC to the third pillar, the CFSP should be immune from a 
reinforcement of the obligation of cooperation, especially since Article 
11(2) TEU expressly includes the obligation for Member States to 
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‘unreservedly’ support the CFSP.74 Gosalbo Bono concludes from this that, 
‘even the sacrosanct Community principles of direct effect and primacy 
over the law of the Member States cannot be said to be completely alien to 
the CFSP legal order’.75 The legal system and relationship between the 
‘pillars’ is more complex than the structure suggests: this forms a 
significant backdrop to themes and hypothesis in this thesis. 
Reforming the CFSP provisions 
With such wide-reaching language of foreign goals framed in general 
terms, the expectations that in the post-Cold War world the EU would be 
equipped to build on the cooperative nature of EPC with concrete actions 
through the use of the CFSP instruments were high. Yet, whilst the 
Council was able to progressively increase declarations on issues across 
the globe, turning words into actions has proved much more difficult. The 
ambitious wording of the CFSP provisions in the TEU was agreed at the 
same time as the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
provisions seemed incapable of forming a common European response to 
the ensuing bloodshed. Whilst it may have been too early to expect, for 
example, humanitarian intervention under an EU banner, the examples of 
the rapid and uncoordinated recognition of the independence of Slovenia 
and Croatia by some Member States in late 1991,76 at the same time as the 
agreement on the wording of the CFSP Treaty dispositions, demonstrated 
that there was a lack of a political will to seriously begin the path towards 
forging a common foreign and security policy according to the spirit of 
Article 11 TEU.  
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 Since the failure to capitalise on the Treaty instruments agreed at 
Maastricht, renewed efforts have been made to address the perceived 
weakness of the lack of visibility of the CFSP. The appointment of the 
Secretary of the Council as the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1998 gave a ‘face’ to the CFSP 
to the wider world and the power to negotiate with third states when 
requested to do so by the Council.77 The High Representative’s role is to 
‘assist’ the Council, distinguishing his role from that of a foreign minister 
of a nation-state. This was an important step in securing visibility for the 
CFSP, and the EU more generally in third states, yet the more obvious step 
to ensuring that the CFSP becomes more effective (creating binding 
obligations with enforcement mechanisms, similar to those in Article 249 
EC) has been resisted. Many Member States, whilst reaffirming in public 
the need for a strong and effective EU on the world stage, have been 
unwilling to pool sovereignty in the same way as in other areas of law and 
policy-making. This was again evident in the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, where unanimous voting was retained on most 
the CFSP issues and remains the general characteristic of the decision-
making process. 
 Debate on the CFSP figured strongly during the negotiations for the 
Constitutional Treaty and, following its abandonment, the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The text of the Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007 
continues to reflect the reticence of some Member States to 
wholeheartedly endorse the CFSP as a fully-fledged part of the EU’s 
supranational legal order, insofar as its intergovernmental characteristics 
are still much in evidence. There were, however, three notable 
developments in relation to proposed amendments to the CFSP which 
merit attention.78 
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The Treaty of Lisbon would reform Article 11 TEU and remove the 
foreign policy objectives, inserting them instead into a new provision 
which applies to all the Union’s external relations, not only the CFSP.79 
The objectives would remain broadly the same, though there is reference 
to the Union’s action on the international scene which shall ‘be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world’.80 These 
principles are democracy, the rule of law, the respect for human rights 
and the principles of equality and solidarity. The article would also insert 
commitments to sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development,81 and ‘the integration of all countries into the world 
economy’82 as objectives, along with the obligation ‘to promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
global governance’.83 
A new Article 47 TEU would state that ‘The Union shall have legal 
personality’ and replace the current Article 281 EC, ‘The Community shall 
have legal personality’. Whilst this might appear as a rather cosmetic 
change of name alone, it has particular significance for the CFSP which 
was not part of the ‘Community’ pillar upon its creation in the TEU. By 
referring only to the EU and its legal order in the Treaty, the ‘pillars’ 
readily identified since 1992 as forming the structure of the EU would 
disappear from view. The most noticeable change is that agreements with 
third states or international organisations will be concluded by the Union, 
rather than the Community. This also explains why the objectives of the 
Union’s external relations cut across the different policy spheres and 
combine political, economic and environmental goals. 
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 This change suggests that the Member States have taken the step at 
Lisbon of agreeing to place the CFSP under the same legal regime as the 
‘internal’ policy-making sphere; that is where binding regulations and 
directives apply, majority voting occurs, and where the Court of Justice 
has extensive jurisdiction. The pooling of sovereignty in foreign policy-
making by the Member States would appear to have taken place. However, 
on closer inspection, the amended Article 24 TEU (ex Article 11) would 
state that: 
The common foreign and security policy is 
subject to specific rules and procedures. It 
shall be defined and implemented by the 
European Council acting unanimously, except 
where the Treaties provide otherwise. The 
adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.84 
 The ‘specific rules’ of the CFSP as mentioned in the above provision 
do not have the same binding characteristics as the regulations, directives 
and decisions of the current Article 249 EC.85 The amended Article 24 TEU 
would make clear that the ‘specific rules’ are not considered to be 
‘legislative acts’ and they appear to lack legally enforceable 
characteristics. The CFSP instruments created at Maastricht and since, 
namely Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions have 
been renamed as ‘decisions defining actions to be undertaken’, ‘positions 
to be taken’ and ‘arrangements for the implementation of the decisions’.86 
Little further clarification is provided by the amendments to the Treaty 
on their future application. 
The principle of the CFSP decision-making remains that of 
unanimity. Qualified majority voting continues to be possible when 
                                                   
84
 Article 24(1) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1(27). 
85
 The Treaty of Lisbon renames the EC Treaty the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’ (TFEU). Article 249 EC, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 
2(235) would become Article 249 TFEU. 
86
 Article 12 TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1(28). 
35 
 
adopting decisions pursuant to a previous European Council decision on 
strategic interests and objectives.87 This provision has been rarely used. 
The same article also allows for qualified majority voting: 
when adopting a decision defining a Union 
action or position, on a proposal which the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy has presented 
following a specific request from the European 
Council, made on its own initiative or that of 
the High Representative.88 
This would appear to open the door a little wider to qualified 
majority voting in the CFSP, since the High Representative would have 
the ability to put forward an issue in the Council, which could then 
specifically request him to present a proposal. Whether this is a useful 
tool at the disposal of the High Representative depends on whether the 
hitherto largely unused the CFSP qualified majority dispositions become 
more habitually used and relied upon. 
The proposed collapse of the pillar structure similarly does not entail 
roles for the Commission, Parliament and ECJ equivalent to those 
currently found in the first (Community) pillar. The current residual 
powers clause, Article 308 EC,89 would contain a new provision specifically 
excluding the use of this Article for the CFSP objectives.90 Putting the 
CFSP into practice would, according to the amended provision, largely 
remain in the hands of the Council, following the decisions on the 
                                                   
87
 Article 31(2) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1(34). 
88
 Article 31(2) TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 1(28). 
89
 If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures. 
90
 Article 352(4) TFEU, as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(289): ‘this Article 
cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and 
security policy and any acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall respect the limits set 
out in Article 40, second paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union’. 
36 
 
‘strategic interests and objectives of the Union’ as taken by the European 
Council.91 The potentially increased role for the High Representative in 
the CFSP is discussed below. The European Parliament would gain a slight 
boost in its ability to scrutinize the CFSP, with the ability to question the 
High Representative as well as the Council on the CFSP matters.92 Its 
views should be ‘duly taken into consideration’ by the High 
Representative and a Parliamentary debate specifically devoted to the 
CFSP would take place twice, rather than just once, a year.93 The ECJ’s 
jurisdiction over the CFSP provisions of the Treaty would continue to be 
excluded,94 although the amended Treaty would allow for the ECJ to be 
the arbiter of disputes over the respective competences of the Union 
institutions and the Member States,95 which is potentially a powerful 
future tool if opportunities for the Court to use the provision arise. In 
general, however, the Treaty does not change the institutional 
competences of the Parliament or Court to a great extent. 
 The Commission’s role in the CFSP would become somewhat 
fuzzier. Under the current Treaty arrangements, it is ‘fully associated’ with 
the representation and implementation of the CFSP according to Articles 
18(4) and 27 TEU. This created only a limited formal role in the CFSP for 
the Commission. The ‘fully associated’ provision would disappear 
following the Lisbon amendments. The Commission’s ability to refer the 
CFSP questions to the Council would remain, but through the High 
Representative of his/her own accord or ‘with the Commission’s 
support’.96 This reflects a modified role of the High Representative, who 
would sit within the Commission, merging the present role with that of 
the current Commissioner for External Relations. It should also help to 
rectify the problem of incoherence between the EU’s external policies and 
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internal policies which have an external dimension. The Commission 
would be charged, under the new Article 10A TEU in the general 
provisions on external action, with ensuring consistency between these 
different policy areas. It would share this responsibility with the Council 
but it would still lack the comprehensive powers to drive the CFSP 
forward as it has done in so many other areas of EU policy-making. The 
creation of a link between the Council and Commission via the High 
Representative follows the logic of recognising the growing synergy 
between external policies and internal policies with external dimension. 
The agreement at Lisbon (and previously in the Constitutional Treaty) on 
the need for this provision reinforces the thrust of this thesis in 
demonstrating the artificial barriers between a strictly intergovernmental 
basis for foreign policy at the EU level and the other law and policy-
making areas which are more readily identifiable as being of a 
‘supranational’ character. 
Aims, methodology, hypothesis and research questions 
Against the background of the Treaty basis of the CFSP, I begin with four 
research assumptions which help to frame the context for the central 
hypothesis. First, the CFSP is a sui generis policy which belongs to a sui 
generis entity. The CFSP exists alongside the national foreign policies of 
the Member States. It shares some similarities with national foreign 
policies, but its decision-making structure and policy instruments are 
substantially and procedurally different from those of a nation state. 
Second, the operational record of the instruments used pursuant to the 
Treaty articles on the CFSP demonstrates that it has not achieved its 
goals, including those set out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European 
Union. Third, the aims and processes associated with the CFSP should be 
seen in the context of gradual European integration, rather than 
concentrating on short term foreign policy objectives. As such, attention 
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should not only be paid to major ‘events’ in international affairs (for 
example, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq or the responses to the 
declaration of independence by Kosovo) or ‘high politics’ but to longer-
term processes. Fourth, due to the sui generis nature of the CFSP, the 
traditional paradigms of legal and political analysis of foreign policy and 
external competences are limited in their suitability for the study of it. 
This means that it is important to avoid seeing the EU, its legal system 
and foreign policy-making sphere, solely through the prism of the nation 
state. The framework for researching the effects of the CFSP must take 
into account its uniqueness. 
 With these research assumptions in mind, the central research 
hypothesis posed in this thesis is:  
 
 Assuming that it is possible to characterise it as a system of 
governance, the CFSP can be seen to have consequences beyond the 
Treaty-based instruments and, as such, it is an integral part of the 
constitutional order of the European Union. 
 
Constructing a theoretical and empirical framework within which 
this hypothesis can be tested requires five research questions to be asked. 
 
 First, what are the characteristics of ‘governance’ and how and why 
is this term appropriate for characterising the CFSP? 
 Second, how does this approach to understanding the CFSP differ 
from a traditional, diplomacy-based foreign policy? What are the 
goals and instruments associated with foreign policy that could be 
expected to be seen within the CFSP? 
 Third, does the use of the terminology of ‘governance’ help to 
explain the institutional development of the CFSP and if so, how?  
 Fourth, what are the legal outcomes in the EU’s external relations, 
which can be traced to the institutional development of the CFSP?  
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 Fifth, how can the relationship between the CFSP and other EU 
policies with an external dimension be characterised, and is this 
relationship evolving or static? 
 
Since the hypothesis and research questions are less concerned with 
measures which carry the formal designation of ‘law’ within the CFSP and 
more with the processes and institutions which have emerged over the 
course of the development of the CFSP, the theoretical framework within 
which these questions are addressed goes beyond the scope of traditional 
frameworks of legal analysis. An interdisciplinary approach is explicitly 
adopted, incorporating scholastic approaches from the disciplines of 
political science and international relations. The central question of 
identifying and understanding ‘governance’ and ‘systems of governance’ in 
the EU and its foreign policy necessitates a fuller definition of these terms. 
Given their contested nature, however, they are not sufficient in their own 
right to place the operational practices of the EU in its foreign policy 
within the scope of theoretical analysis. As such, an institutional 
constructivist framework of legal analysis is developed and used to 
explore and explain how the CFSP works. This draws on a number of 
different theoretical strands, and places the study of institutions and 
institutional behaviour at the heart of the scope of analysis, with 
emphasis on the emergence and place of practices, ideas and identities. 
The institutional theory of law is used in order to characterise how legal 
norms and legal institutions arise from the practices in the EU’s external 
sphere. 
The research for this thesis is based on primary sources, including 
documentation from the EU institutions, Member States and the 
institutions established in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Given the 
importance of institutions and institutional behaviour, the primary 
materials drawn upon include legislative measures (the CFSP and non-the 
CFSP) and also policy-papers, working documents, informal agreements 
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and proposals. Use is also made of material from non-governmental 
organisations. In order to link the development of the CFSP with other 
areas of internal and external governance, the primary materials used in 
the empirical chapters originate from a wide variety of sources and policy-
areas. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with personnel in the 
Council, Commission, European Parliament, Frontex (the EU’s Border 
Management Agency) and Euro-Mediterranean Parliament Assembly 
between 2006 and 2008. Secondary literature was extensively used in the 
development of the theoretical framework (chapter three) and throughout 
the thesis where appropriate. The academic work used is drawn from a 
variety of disciplines, primarily law and political science/international 
relations and also European/EU studies, Mediterranean studies and 
refugee/migration studies. 
Structure of the thesis 
The research questions are explored in seven thematic chapters. Chapter 
one introduces the different uses of the terminology of ‘governance’ and 
its connotations as a description, concept and approach to studying the 
EU. The chapter develops a key subject in the thesis in bridging the divide 
between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ policy-making by identifying common 
themes and challenges in these spheres. The changing nature of 
governance and increasing prevalence of ‘new governance’ and ‘new 
modes of governance’ in policy-making fields are highlighted, and the 
reasons why these are only discussed in relation to ‘internal’ spheres of 
governance are identified. The argument is made that the characteristics 
of ‘governance’ do not prevent the consideration of the CFSP as a form of 
governance, nor as a policy which can only be understood in isolation 
from other areas in which the EU operates. 
 Chapter two contrasts the discussion on ‘governance’ in chapter 
one with a review of the literature on the CFSP by legal scholars and 
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political scientists, including international relations scholars. The review 
demonstrates that legal scholars have tended to focus on the ‘pillar’ 
structure of the Union’s constitutional order and competences of the 
institutions. Since the formal role of institutions such as the Commission, 
Parliament and ECJ is limited, legal scholars have often neglected to go 
beyond the formalism of the Treaty and not treat the CFSP and its outputs 
as ‘law’. The task of examining the CFSP within existing paradigms in the 
international discipline relations has provoked a great deal of literature 
within the field of political science, although not in most cases using the 
language of governance. Leading contemporary works on the CFSP are 
drawn upon so as to set the scene for the elaboration of a theoretical 
framework in chapter three. Particular attention is paid to the works of 
scholars who have begun to develop an ‘external governance’ approach. 
 Chapter three develops the theoretical framework of analysis. In 
addressing the need to bridge the legal/political science and 
external/internal divides identified in chapter one, an institutional 
constructivist approach of legal analysis is adopted, drawing on theories 
of (old and new) institutionalism, the institutional theory of law and 
(social) constructivism. The significance of institutions and institutional 
practices in the theoretical framework is brought to the fore. This 
approach is used in order to identify the practices within the CFSP, the 
social reality it operates in and identifies how, in the case study, the 
theoretical framework offers answers to the research questions in order to 
test the hypothesis. 
Chapter four introduces the case study of the thesis, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, by examining the institutions which have 
developed during its lifetime. This justifies why, on the one hand, 
EuroMed serves as an example of the CFSP in practice even though it was 
not initially the subject of a CFSP instrument and, on the other hand, how 
EuroMed can also be understood as a system of governance. This system of 
governance becomes apparent when the institutional framework and 
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practices arising through it are examined from their multilateral, bilateral 
and unilateral dimensions. The chapter argues that EuroMed can be seen 
as a system of governance, though one which is dominated by strong 
central actors (the EU institutions and Member States) and surrounded by 
a periphery (the Mediterranean Partner States) which has more limited 
input into the Partnership as a system of governance. As such, EuroMed 
can also be seen as a frame for the EU’s foreign policy in the 
Mediterranean region. The more recent proposal for a ‘Mediterranean 
Union’ as a key aim of the French Council Presidency in the latter part of 
2008 is placed within the context of the development of EuroMed. 
The internal/external distinction between spheres of governance, 
which was explored in chapter one, is returned to in chapters 5 and 6, 
which take migration law and policy as a substantive law and policy-
making field with clear internal and external dimensions. Chapter five 
explores the legal and policy measures the EU has taken in relation to 
migration and notes the growing importance and dynamism of the 
external dimension of the EU’s area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
making links with measures taken under the CFSP. Chapter six moves a 
step further and places migration within the context of the EuroMed 
Partnership. The chapter explores the relationship between migration 
governance and the system of governance in EuroMed identified in 
chapter four. Institutional practices and outputs, such as readmission 
agreements, discussion of extra-territorial processing centres for migrants 
and the documentation surrounding them are analysed to see to what 
extent the language reveals how EuroMed is used to fulfil the CFSP goals.  
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by bringing together the various 
strands of the findings and offering answers to the research questions in 
order to test the hypothesis. The theoretical framework is applied to the 
empirical research in order to offer a wider understanding and fuller 
picture of the CFSP as a dynamic and evolving policy. Through the use of 
the case study on migration within the context of EuroMed, generalised 
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conclusions on how the CFSP works in practice are offered. Testing the 
hypothesis reveals that the CFSP, as a system of governance, enjoys 
relationships with other aspects of the EU’s system of governance and 




Chapter 1: Identifying EU Governance: Terminology, Trends 
and Challenges 
The language of ‘governance’ frequently arises in discussions about law 
and politics in society today. These discussions take place in relation to 
nation-states, at the level of regional organisations and at global levels. 
Yet, despite this widespread use, ‘governance’ does not have a settled 
meaning and in many cases is used by scholars and policy-makers as a 
convenient alternative to ‘government’. ‘Governance’ is attractive in this 
way because the term ’government’ is no longer sufficient as a 
characterisation of the interactions between citizens and those exercising 
power and coordinating public resources. ‘Government’ is indicative of an 
organised, executive power at the national or sub-national (‘local 
government’) level, which cannot fully be applied to situations where 
other bodies or institutions have roles to play. 
The use of ‘governance’, including variations such as ‘good’ and ‘new’ 
governance, by scholars and policy-makers in a variety of settings and 
contexts and for different purposes does not as such assist conceptual 
clarification, even when the context is limited to that of the EU. As the 
central theme of this thesis is the characterisation of the CFSP as a system 
of governance, greater explanation of how the term is used here and 
distinguished from other uses is required. This chapter fulfils two tasks 
necessary for setting the context for the development of a theoretical 
framework and the empirical research undertaken in relation to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It first identifies three uses of the term of 
‘governance’ and explains how these are used in this thesis. It 
subsequently explores current themes in the external and internal 
spheres of the EU’s system of governance before identifying bridges 
between the spheres via the common challenges each faces, and the 
relevance of the language of governance in doing so. 
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The uses of ‘governance’ terminology 
The vagueness of the term ‘governance’ is one of its most attractive 
qualities and helps to explain why its use is so frequent and widespread. 
Common to the different interpretations of the meaning of ‘governance’ is 
the idea that the nation state and its law-making powers are not the only 
actors and processes in the citizen’s relationship with public powers. To 
what extent the role of the state has diminished, and what role 
supranational and global actors play in its place is a matter of debate.1 The 
European Union, a non-state actor which has strong law and policy-
making powers, can impact in a significant way on the lives of citizens in 
the EU.2 It has been a major catalyst for the increasingly widespread use of 
‘governance’ in its different forms. The categorisation of the EU as a 
federation, ‘superstate’, international organisation or regional 
organisation is problematic since none of these fully capture the nature of 
the EU: ‘governance’ appears therefore as a label which is sufficiently 
malleable and capable of application to the EU. 
 Characterising the CFSP as a ‘system of governance’ requires 
further attention to be paid to the identification of what this term means 
and how it is used in this thesis. There are three uses of ‘governance’ 
commonly found in academic literature and documentation emerging 
from policy-makers, and identifying these uses here is essential in 
providing some clarity to the way in which later chapters use the term. 
These uses are, first, as a characterisation of a more complex relationship 
between citizens and public powers than allowed for by the use of 
‘government’. The second use is of ‘governance’ as an academic approach 
                                                   
1
 On the context of UK and EU sovereignty: N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, 
State, and Practical Reason (OUP, Oxford 1999) and on the international law context; B 
Fassbender, 'Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law' in N Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transistion (Hart, Oxford 2003).  
2
 The use of ‘citizens in the EU’ rather than ‘EU citizens’ here is deliberate, since the law 
and policy-making powers of the EU may also be felt by non-EU citizens in the Member 




to the study of law and policy-making, and in particular in relation to 
understanding the EU in the way it works and evolves. The third use of 
‘governance’ is in a more ideological or normative way, often exemplified 
by the association of governance with discussion of ‘good’ and ‘new’ 
governance and used in a way to promote certain desirable, democratic 
qualities. 
 ‘Governance’ is often employed as an alternative term to 
‘government’ in instances where the latter term is thought to be 
insufficient or inaccurate. This is the use alluded to above when it was 
noted that in the context of the EU, existing characterisations of law and 
policy-making power are unsuitable. Governance is often employed in this 
way to denote a particular policy sphere, such as migration governance, or 
a territorial space. This category of the use of governance also includes the 
use of ‘global governance’, implying that governance is not merely 
restricted to within nation states3 and exists within an emerging system 
across the globe. The latter is an increasingly recognised phenomenon.4 
 The use of ‘governance’ as a description denotes a more complex 
relationship than that of government and citizen, and may include the 
presence of entities such as agencies, private bodies (especially those 
fulfilling public roles) and supranational or international polities, such as 
the EU. Where the emphasis is on the organisational dimension, a ‘system 
of governance’ is employed as a term to denote an institutional 
arrangement capable of producing legal effects and potentially influencing 
different policy-areas. 
A distinct ‘system of governance’ is an attractive description of the 
EU for two main reasons. First, unlike the discussion of a specific nation-
                                                   
3
 R Wilkinson, 'Global Governance: A Preliminary Interrogation' in R Wilkinson and S 
Hughes (eds) Global Governance: Critical Perspectives (Routledge, London 2002) 2. 
4
 R Higgott and M Ougaard, 'Beyond System and Society - Towards a Global Polity?' in R 
Higgott and M Ougaard (eds) Towards a Global Polity (Routledge, London 2002). The 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance also recognised the role of the EU in 
contributing to global governance; Commission (EC), 'European Governance: A White 
Paper' COM (2001) 428 final, 25 July 2001, 26. 
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state and its government, it is not possible to speak of an EU government, 
yet the EU clearly has law and policy-making powers which are impossible 
to ignore. No analysis of, for example, environmental law in the UK can 
fail to take into account the law and policy stemming from membership of 
the EU5 and this is also true in areas traditionally seen as outside the 
formal Treaty-based competence of the EU, such as healthcare.6 The EU 
cannot be regarded as merely a collection of states who are the only 
significant actors in law and policy-making.7 Governance of the EU, then, 
cannot be equated with a system of governance developed within a single 
state since there are added ‘layers’ in the form of the EU’s institutional 
arrangements.8 Second, the institutional set-up of the EU is unique and 
includes institutions such as the Commission and Court of Justice which 
do not act in the interest of a nation-state, but in the interests of the 
supranational polity as a whole. The system of governance that can be 
perceived at the EU level, including the multitude of actors involved in 
law and policy-making, can also be seen as a system of ‘multi-level 
governance’.9 This also includes the ‘sub-national’ actors, such as regions,10 
interest groups and private persons. The language of governance used in 
this way indicates a move away from ‘the monopoly of traditional politico-
legal institutions’.11  
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 For example, J Scott, EC Environmental Law (Longman, London 1998). 
6
 T Hervey and L Trubek, 'Freedom to Provide Healthcare Services in the EU: an 
Opportunity for "Hybrid Governance"' (2007) 13 Colombia Journal of European Law 513; T 
Hervey, 'The European Union's Governance of Healthcare and the Welfare Modernization 
Agenda' (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 103. 
7
 W Wallace, 'Post-Sovereign Governance' in H Wallace, W Wallace and M Pollack (eds) 
Policy-Making in the European Union (5th edn, OUP, Oxford 2005). 
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 A Gatto, 'Governance in the European Union: A Legal Perspective' (2006) 12 Colombia 
Journal of European Law 487, 490. 
9
 L Hooghe and G Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Rowman & 
Littlefield, Lanham 2001); G Marks and L Hooghe, 'Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level 
Governance' in I Bache and M Flinders (eds) Multi-Level Governance (OUP, Oxford 2004). 
10
 C Jeffery, 'A Regional Rescue of the Nation-State: Changing Regional Perspectives on 
Europe' (2007) University of Edinburgh Europa Institute, Mitchell Working Paper Series 
No. 5/2007 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/32_aregionalrescueofthenationstatechan
gingregionalperspectivesoneurope.pdf> (accessed 25 July 2008). 
11
 G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 
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The second use of ‘governance’ is that of an academic approach to the 
study of governance as a phenomenon. Using ‘governance’ in this way has 
become increasingly widespread, although there is no single or coherent 
theoretical underpinning to a ‘governance’ approach or perspective. 
According to Jachtenfuchs, employing a ‘governance’ perspective to the 
study of the EU as an alternative to classical integration theory has the 
advantage of enlarging the analytical horizon beyond the nation-state. 
This is because studying the coexistence of a supranational system of 
governance at the EU level and national systems of governance in the 
Member States shifts the focus away from the state of anarchy in 
international relations and towards the ‘peaceful, non-violent 
relationships in a horizontally organized environment’.12 The use of 
‘governance’ as an approach can only be successfully undertaken, 
however, if coupled with theoretical approaches (or a combination of 
different approaches) capable of application to the study of the EU. In 
doing so, a broad-based ‘governance approach’ to studying the EU has 
evolved into a strong alternative to classical integration theory, but one 
which complements rather than challenges the more established 
methods.13 It can also be said therefore that ‘governance is a version, a 
modification or a complement of a classic State government rather than 
its successor’.14 The ‘governance approach’ is less concerned with the 
individual EU institutions, but ‘the existing multi-level institutional 
system as a given starting point for analysing the modes and process 
patterns of European policy-making and the interaction of public and 
                                                                                                                                                
Oxford 2006) 2.  
12
 M Jachtenfuchs, 'The Governance Approach to European Integration' (2001) 39 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 245, 257. This point is also demonstrated by the contributors 
to B Kohler-Koch (ed), Linking EU and National Governance (OUP Oxford 2003). 
13
 Jachtenfuchs (n 12) 256 and P Craig, 'The Nature of the Community: Integration, 
Democracy and Legitimacy' in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP, Oxford 1999) 17. 
14
 C Möllers, 'European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept' (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 313, 314. 
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private actors from the subnational to the supranational level’.15 Seeking 
the elements and processes with the systems of governance and 
identifying their influence and importance is a central aim. 
Using the term ‘governance’ as an approach draws on the descriptive, 
first use of the term as identified earlier in this chapter. But it is used in a 
way which analyses how a system of governance works and what effects it 
may have. This can be seen as a two-way process: a governance approach is 
required in order to recognise the existence of a system of governance and, 
conversely, the existence of the constituent parts of a system of 
governance gives rise to the possibilities for further research on the 
effects. Conducting legal study through the use of ‘governance’ recognises 
the importance of phenomena which are not traditionally defined as law 
but which nevertheless may have legal effects or influence. Legal scholars 
have often used the label ‘soft law’ to denote phenomena which affect or 
constrain behaviour but without the formal mechanisms of enforceability. 
Using governance as an approach is often therefore to recognise and 
explain the existence of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. Yet, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ as 
legal terms themselves are not settled and there is considerable debate 
about where the lines are drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ and what should 
not be considered as ‘legal’ at all.  
In the EU context, a distinction can be made between the legally-
binding and enforceable nature of regulations and directives (‘hard’ law), 
and the non-binding nature of recommendations and opinions (‘soft’ law), 
since both of these are defined in the Treaty.16 However, there are also a 
multitude of notices, resolutions, conclusions, guidelines, declarations, 
programmes, codes of practice and so on, which may come under an 
umbrella term of ‘soft’ law because of their (potential) influence in the 
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 F Schimmelfennig and W Wagner, 'External Governance in the European Union' (2004) 
11 Journal of European Public Policy 655, 657. 
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 Article 249 EC. 
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legal sphere.17 There are instances where both binding and non-binding 
provisions have been used within a single policy instrument, making 
agreed definitions and classifications problematic.18 Snyder defines soft 
law as ‘rules of conduct which in principle have no legally binding force 
but which nevertheless may have practical effects’.19 These effects could be 
felt by the Member States, private/legal persons or external actors, 
including third states. This definition opens up the category of rules 
beyond those created through formal, Treaty-based competences. The EU, 
whose institutions rely on and are limited by these competences, can be 
said to employ a ‘softly softly’ approach, whereby outcomes can be 
achieved without the setting of formal legal obligations.20 This elevates 
the importance of the use of what Snyder includes in his definition and 
consideration of provisions capable of producing effects and outcomes in 
such a variety of documentation widens the scope of what can be 
conceived as ‘law’.  
In terms of using the language of governance as an academic 
approach, it would seem logical that in referring to the ‘governance of the 
EU’, both hard and soft legal instruments are included. By bringing into 
this approach less formal instruments and both intended and unintended 
effects, the emphasis on binding rules as the only means by which ‘law’ is 
understood can be avoided. Understanding governance includes these 
routines and practical elements to law and policy-making underlines the 
presence of private actors, the public/private distinction being of limited 
importance in the concept of governance,21 and the moving beyond 
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 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 23. 
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 One example are the Directives on Parental Leave and Part-time Work, where binding 
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looking merely at governmental institutions22 to include informal 
practices such as networking23 and ‘the unintended effects of day-to-day 
routines linking closely the different levels of governance in the EU 
system’.24 This thesis places importance on the place of practices, norms 
and institutions in the CFSP, elements which are often seen as outside the 
scope of traditional legal analysis, but which are claimed in this thesis to 
nevertheless be important in understanding how the CFSP works in 
practice.25 As ‘governance’ does not supply an adequate theoretical 
framework for analysis of the CFSP, in chapter three governance is used as 
a starting point for building an institutional constructivist approach of 
legal analysis. 
The third use of ‘governance’ identified here is when it is used in a 
more ideological or normative way. This suggests that the term 
incorporates, in particular, democratic means of accountability and 
standard-setting for nation-states and polities such as the EU. As such, it 
is an extremely value-based use of the term. Such uses of governance are 
often readily identifiable by the addition of the prefixes of ‘good’ and ‘new’ 
governance’. ‘Good governance’ frequently appears in national and 
international contexts, especially regarding developing countries. The 
promotion of ‘good global governance’ appears as one of the objectives of 
the EU’s external relations in the Treaty of Lisbon,26 and reflects the 
status of good governance as one of the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goals adopted in 2000.27 However, it is not the case that 
good is used as a prefix on every occasion that the term governance is used 
in a way which promotes these characteristics. Even where ‘governance’ 
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appears to be used in a more neutral, descriptive way (as according to the 
first use of governance identified above), its use can come closer to this 
more normative, value-laded sense.28 An example is provided by the 
Commission’s White Paper on Governance, where ‘governance’ (with no 
prefix) is defined as, ‘rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in 
which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence’ 
(emphasis added).29 The characteristics associated with governance given 
by the Commission give the term strong associations with democratic 
processes and, therefore, positive overtones even without its prefix of 
‘good’. This is also reflected in the definition of governance provided by 
the United National Commission for Global Governance, whereby 
‘governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and cooperative action may be taken’.30 For this reason, 
caution must be exercised in using the term where there is no prefix in 
order to ensure that the appropriate descriptive or normative meaning is 
applied. 
In addition to these three uses, further exploration is required of 
’new’ governance, since its widespread use suggest differences from, or at 
least, variations on the uses of governance above. New governance is 
identified as a current theme in the EU’s internal sphere of governance, 
and so it is helpful at this juncture to explain how it is understood here. In 
a similar way to ‘governance’ as a term without an adjective, ‘new’ 
governance has also been used in all of the three fashions outlined above. 
In a descriptive way, new governance implies the use, within a system of 
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governance, of methods and processes which move away from command-
and-control regulation and law-making (‘old’ governance) towards more 
participatory forms of law and policy-making. The common denominator 
is that these methods and processes are not based on binding and 
enforceable pieces of legislation. In the context of the EU, ‘new’ 
governance is used to point to specific new modes of governance 
(including the Open Method of Coordination) and also a means to point to 
the changing nature of law and policy-making. In this descriptive sense, 
therefore, new governance can be used as shorthand to point to rather 
specific methods and processes. Scott and Trubek do not attempt to 
provide a definition of ‘new governance’, but instead use it as a convenient 
label for methods and processes characterised by departures from, and 
alternatives to, the community method.31 ‘Old’ and ‘new’ terms have also 
been used interchangeably with ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law by some legal 
scholars.32 They suggest a list of dimensions which may be present in the 
new modes of governance: participation and power-sharing, multi-level 
integration, diversity and decentralisation, deliberation, flexibility and 
revisability, and experimentation and knowledge creation.33 They also 
note, however, that the challenge presented by the modes of new 
governance is not confined to the EU. It has also arisen in nation states 
against the backdrop of the growth of the administrative or regulatory 
state.34 Caporaso and Wittenbrink note the differences between the new 
modes of governance: policy processes, such as the OMC, policy process 
adjustments, such as gender mainstreaming and policy instruments, such 
as benchmarking, but they also contend that these can be grouped 
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 DM Trubek, P Cottrell and M Nance, '"Soft Law", "Hard Law" and EU Integration' in G de 
Búrca and J Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, Oxford 2006) 
65. 
33
 Scott and Trubek (n 31) 5-6. 
34
 Scott and Trubek (n 31) 8. 
55 
 
together as new modes of governance.35  
In this sense, the difference between the use of ‘new’ governance in 
this third, ideological/normative sense and the first, descriptive sense 
does not appear to be too marked. It is possible to use ‘new’ governance as 
a means to identify and describe methods and processes which depart 
from traditional ones. Yet, the distinction is worth making because ‘new’ 
governance is often used in a way which suggests that how it works is 
more democratic and legitimate. This has been a key concern for the EU in 
terms of the ‘democratic deficit’ it is often accused of suffering from. As 
with ‘good’ governance, ‘new’ governance often carries positive 
connotations, and caution is therefore required when simply using the 
term ‘governance’ without a prefix to indicate if it carries normative 
connotations or not. In order to avoid overly confusing the two, the use of 
‘new modes of governance’ is preferred in this chapter to describe the 
methods and processes within the EU’s system of governance. 
 The use of governance in these three ways is useful in navigating 
through the different uses of the term in the following parts of the 
chapter. In the following sections, the discussion moves to explore some 
of the more substantive issues, trends and themes in the EU’s system of 
governance. In order to transcend the external/internal division in later 
chapters, it is first necessary to maintain a distinction between the 
external and internal dimensions of EU governance.  
Themes in the system of governance in the EU’s external sphere 
The introduction to this thesis gave an overview of the history of the CFSP 
and its place within the Treaty arrangements of the Union. It was noted 
that the CFSP is by no means the only policy at the Community or Union 
levels which concerns the world beyond the territory of the Union. The 
existence of multiple policy frameworks is suggestive of a complex system 
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of governance at the EU level when dealing with the outside world. The 
Common Commercial Policy and the enlargement processes are two 
prominent examples of externally-focussed aspects of the Union’s system 
of governance which fall outside the realm of the CFSP. An ‘external’ 
dimension to policies in the ‘internal’ sphere relating to the area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice is also emerging.36  
 With the increases in EU competence in the external sphere, a 
number of key issues arise in relation to the EU’s system of governance. By 
navigating through these issues, certain trends in the forms of governance 
can be detected. The first is the institutionalisation of governance in the 
external sphere as a means by which external policies are put into 
practice. The second is the operational dimension to the system of 
governance in the external sphere, which is the most visible practical 
expression of the CFSP. The third theme is the evolving nature of the role 
of the EU and the move from ‘civilian power Europe’ towards policies with 
a military, defence and security dimension. These dynamics are significant 
in recognising the changing characteristics of the EU’s system of 
governance. 
Institutionalisation 
The importance of institutions as a basis for a theoretical framework for 
analysis of the CFSP is a key part of the approach in addressing the 
hypothesis and research questions. The creation of institutions is a visible 
feature of the CFSP and the EU’s external policies, bringing into focus a 
key theme in the EU’s sphere of governance. How institutions are 
developed through practices and what this means for understanding the 
CFSP is the focus of chapter three. In this section, the institutionalisation 
is of a ‘narrow’ type, referring only to the explicit creation of institutions 
and structures, rather than the more ‘gradual’ forms, for example, through 
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practices or elite socialisation.37 
The system of governance in the external sphere has gradually 
become institutionalised since the informal practices of EPC were given a 
legal basis in the Single European Act.38 The institutions created include 
the legal instruments and the frameworks for the development of 
relationships outside the EU’s borders. Taken together, these examples of 
institutionalisation contribute to the emergence of a system of 
governance which was not visible when foreign policy cooperation was on 
a strictly-intergovernmental basis only.39 
The TEU created specific instruments for use in the CFSP, Joint 
Actions and Common Positions, which are unique to the CFSP and not 
found in any other national or supranational context. These, along with 
the provision on Common Strategies introduced in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, were examined in the introduction. The most significant 
measure in terms of institutional arrangement was the creation of the 
post of High Representative for the CFSP, responsible to the Council.40 
The post of High Representative for the CFSP is an institution and, in 
providing a ‘face’ for the Union’s foreign policy, demonstrates that the 
Union’s system of governance has incorporated a feature of foreign policy-
making associated with nation states, even though the High 
Representative cannot be accurately called a foreign minister.41 As the 
Treaty of Amsterdam also transferred responsibility for the Petersberg 
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tasks from the Western European Union to the EU, this new post took on 
much greater significance.42 The Petersberg tasks, defined at the 
Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992, include 
humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping and combat forces in crisis 
management tasks and Member States agree to make their military units 
available when necessary in carrying out these tasks. There have also been 
ad hoc ‘special representatives’ with specific temporary mandates, 
including for the African Great Lakes region, the South Caucasus and the 
Middle East peace process43 and the establishment of a Policy Planning 
and Early Warning Unit located within the CFSP secretariat.44 This 
demonstrates that the institutional map of the CFSP is more dynamic and 
complex than its ‘intergovernmental’ label suggest. 
 Institutionalisation in the external sphere can also be seen in the 
creation of frameworks and structures which include non-Member States. 
It is important to note here that this has not been done under the Treaty 
provisions of the CFSP, though these frameworks do demonstrate an 
external dimension to the EU’s system of governance. As one of these 
examples is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which is the case study 
of the thesis and examined in depth in chapter four, it is useful here to 
provide as an example another prominent institutionalised structure, 
namely the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI). 
 The NDI was launched in 1997 as Finland’s first political initiative 
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following its accession to the EU in 1994. The enlargement of the EU to the 
North, which also brought in Sweden,45 occurred during a period where 
the EU’s attention was focussed on the future enlargement to the newly 
democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe. With the EU’s renewed 
interest in the Mediterranean symbolised by the Barcelona Process 1995, a 
policy framework dealing with issues in Europe’s North was the missing 
link. This was especially true given the long border the EU now shared 
with Russia and the independence of the Baltic States, situated between 
the EU’s new Northern Member States and Russia. The NDI was adopted 
by the Council in 1999, and included the EU Member States, with Iceland, 
Norway and Russia and the candidate states (at that time) of Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Two Action Plans for cooperation have been 
approved by the European Council and these ran between 2000-200346 and 
2004-2006.47 Since 2007, the NDI operates on the basis of a permanent 
policy framework.48  
 The purpose of the NDI is to ‘address the specific challenges and 
opportunities arising in those regions and … to strengthen dialogue and 
cooperation between the EU and its Member States, the Northern 
countries associated with the EU under the EEA (Norway and Iceland) and 
the Russian Federation’.49 The EU’s relationship with Russia is the most 
strategically important and most complex. The EU has been supportive of 
the drive for regionalism in the Baltic area50 on the basis of promoting 
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‘soft security’.51 As such, the NDI is incorporated into the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with Russia. A consequence of the 2004 
enlargement has been the surrounding of the Russian enclave of 
Kaliningrad between EU Member States. 
 Unlike the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU has not created 
institutions within the NDI such as a Parliamentary Assembly, but points 
to the use of existing (non-EU) frameworks set up to deal with Northern 
and Baltic issues in the 1990s. These are the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS), the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic 
Council. Cooperation and collaboration between the partners, which 
includes civil society as well as the EU Member States, Russia, Iceland and 
Norway, is stressed but the NDI has not been the subject of a specific 
budget line. In the absence of a strong institutional framework, 
overlapping interests of the regional frameworks noted above, and the 
apparent sidelining of these frameworks in the second Action Plan in 
particular have been criticised.52 
 Nevertheless, the example of the NDI demonstrates the general 
moves towards a broad institutionalisation in the EU’s external sphere of 
governance. As a process of institutionalisation, it represents a long-term 
ambition to extend the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and ensure 
security around its borders beyond straightforward bilateral cooperation 
with third states. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been the 
subject of a greater degree of institutionalisation, to the extent that it too 
can be characterised as a system of governance, with the EU institutions 
as strong central actors. This is the subject of chapter four, but the point 
to make at this juncture is that institutionalisation within the external 
sphere of governance has become more marked and dynamic since the 
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creation of the CFSP within the EU’s constitutional arrangements. 
Overcoming obstacles in operational practices under the CFSP 
Turning to the uses of the instruments provided for in the TEU, it has 
been said that the track-record of the CFSP demonstrates a ‘paradox and 
contradiction at its core’.53 The text of the TEU promised much, and by 
providing specific instruments at the disposal of the Member States in the 
Council, it clearly represented a move away from the previous 
arrangements under EPC of simply producing communiqués on issues, 
without the possibility for any concrete action at the European level.  
The effectiveness of the CFSP was put to the test almost immediately 
by events on the EU’s doorstep, in particular the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
and events further afield, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Despite 
the rhetoric at the time from some Member States at the conclusion of the 
TEU,54 it was clear that a common foreign and security policy was far from 
evident. The EU was unable to coordinate an effective response to events 
on its doorstep in the Balkans, and more recently, serious divisions 
emerged amongst the Member States over military intervention in Iraq in 
2003, where the variations in their conception of foreign intervention 
were very clear. Questions as to whether a common foreign policy would 
indeed ever be possible seemed highly pertinent.55 The meaning of 
‘common’ is paramount: if it is taken to mean that all the Member States 
adhere to a specific course of action and policy towards a third state, then 
it is unlikely to happen in an enlarging EU for a very long time, if ever. 
This can be explained by the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the 
system of governance of the EU, of Treaty provisions relating to the CFSP 
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and the retaining of national foreign policies alongside the CFSP. 
 The blame for failures in EU foreign policy during the 1990s is, 
therefore, usually placed with the Member State governments, since they 
are largely in control of the CFSP through the Council as the dominant 
institution. However, there has also been criticism over the complications 
in understanding how the CFSP instruments and institutional framework 
should be used.56 Hill highlights the problems caused by the ‘whole 
language and architecture of Common Positions, Joint Actions and 
Common Strategies’57 and lack of inclusion of the new Member States into 
an ‘integrating foreign policy vision of enlargement’.58 Nevertheless, even 
without these criticisms and difficulties, institutionalisation cannot 
resolve the most important issues confronting the EU in the absence of 
collective political will on the part of the Member States.59 Even with well-
defined and familiar legal instruments at the disposal of institutions, this 
does not guarantee a meaningful the CFSP. A coherent and effective 
foreign policy is not merely dependent on appropriate structures and 
procedures, but on the political will of the Member States to become more 
aware of the interests they share and participate in the formation of a 
genuine policy.60 This involves overcoming what the first Commission 
President Hallstein termed the ‘traditions and emotions’ of foreign policy, 
an idea which is very much grounded in the Westphalian order of states.61 
 Although it is tempting to focus on the well-documented failures of 
the CFSP, the consequences of its unique nature must also be recalled. The 
provisions in the TEU on instruments available under the CFSP were not 
defined clearly. As such, the way in which they have been utilised in 
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putting the CFSP in operation is telling. Wallace terms this ‘learning by 
doing’.62 The examination of the practice and operation of the CFSP is 
extremely important. Whilst the work achieved ‘on the ground’ in the 
name of the EU is not as extensive as the declaratory texts adopted in the 
Council, a number of operational aspects of the CFSP can be hailed a 
success and deserve attention. 
 One early example of a successful Joint Action following the entry 
into force of the TEU, and in spite of the general failure on the part of the 
EU to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia, was the EU Administration of 
Mostar (EUAM). This began in July 1994 and was a complex operation in 
running an ethnically-divided city ravaged by war.63 This Joint Action was 
deemed a success because of the eventual return of administration of the 
city to local communities.64 Two other successful examples, also in the 
Balkans, were the mediation between the authorities in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albanian rebels in the country, 
resulting in the Ohrid Agreement of 2001 and the Belgrade Agreement 
between Serbia and Montenegro in 2002. Both contributed to the 
avoidance of conflicts and the intervention of the High Representative for 
the CFSP was possible because of the CFSP instruments already in force 
towards these third states. 
 The operational elements to the CFSP ‘in practice’ greatly 
contribute to a clearer picture of the issues relating to the EU’s identity in 
the external sphere. Far from taking the language of the TEU as 
establishing a fully-fledged foreign policy for the EU, it is perhaps better to 
view the CFSP as an ongoing process of overcoming major obstacles. The 
legal instruments created under the CFSP have taken some time before 
their utility can be fully realised, and for this reason, the use of these in 
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response to different situations is of the highest importance. Learning 
from the mistakes and missed opportunities in the Balkans and elsewhere 
is also an essential part of this process. In terms of a form of governance, 
the successes and failures of the CFSP in operation demonstrate where the 
CFSP’s strengths and weaknesses lie. The examples above of successful 
instruments point to the ‘civilian power’ aspects of the CFSP. This has 
long since been seen as a key hallmark of the foreign policy of the EU, to 
which discussion now turns.  
From ‘Civilian power Europe’ to the European Security and Defence 
Policy 
Prior to the establishment of the CFSP, questions about security and 
defence at the European level were dealt with in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). These 
organisations were created for purposes of defence and collective security, 
and not all Member States of the EU are members of NATO and vice versa. 
EPC avoided discussing questions of defence and the mixed pictures of 
membership of the EU, NATO and WEU amongst the Member States, 
including a number of neutral states, meant that security and defence 
implications were not at the heart of the CFSP in its early days. 
 Due to the characteristics of the EU as a non-state actor with no 
military force of its own, the EU’s foreign policy was claimed to bear the 
hallmarks of a ‘civilian power’ with the goal of contributing to global 
peace and stability through non-military means. Duchêne’s 
characterisation of ‘European civilian power’ was made in 1972,65 and 
therefore did not stem from the creation of the CFSP, but the term has 
remained a common characterisation of the EU’s foreign policy to the 
present day. Since the enactment of the TEU, the goals of the CFSP are 
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embedded in the constitutional arrangements of the Union.66 In utilising 
the CFSP instruments for purposes such as humanitarian aid, post-
conflict reconstruction, supporting the peaceful resolution of disputes 
and sending election observers to states restoring democracy, the CFSP 
can be seen as ‘soft power’ in contrast to ‘hard power’ based on military 
strength. A further example of this is the Joint Action enabling EU 
participation in KEDO, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organisation which promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy in North 
Korea through sharing expertise.67 Whilst this is an issue connected with 
security, it does not involve any military or defence angle on the EU’s part. 
Manners has characterised these as examples of ‘normative power 
Europe’68 which gives the system of governance in the EU’s external 
sphere a positive identity, differentiated from that of a nation state since 
the EU is able to focus its attention on matters other than defence.  
This basis for European foreign policy is slowly undergoing change 
and it is now commonly debated as to whether ‘normative power Europe’ 
remains an appropriate description of the EU’s system of governance in 
the external sphere. The original TEU left open the question of if and 
when to form a common EU defence policy.69 A significant step came in 
1998 when the UK and France issued the St Malo declaration calling for an 
EU military dimension outside the NATO framework.70 The European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created following the Cologne 
European Council in 1999 and related to humanitarian, rescue and peace-
making tasks and conflict-management as part of the progressive framing 
of a common defence policy. According to the Treaty of Nice, the EU is 
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responsible for carrying out the Petersberg tasks, previously the 
responsibility of the WEU. These are referred to in Article 17 TEU and 
cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and crisis 
management tasks. 
The evolution of the CFSP from its inception until the present day 
demonstrates a gradual shift away from the notion of ‘civilian power EU’. 
This represented a major decision for the EU, as a ‘harder’ military angle is 
now within its scope. The first military operation was launched by the EU 
in 2003, taking over from NATO as a peace-keeping force in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).71 This has been followed by 
operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo,72 and the 
transition of the stabilisation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO to 
EU command in 2004.73 The European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe 
in a Better World’ was approved by the Council in 2003,74 although as its 
title suggests, the underpinning principles of the ESS can be characterised 
as more globalist and internationalist rather than representing an effort 
to transform the EU into a state-like military actor.75  
 The EU has therefore shown through these missions that have 
become gradually larger in scale and progressively more ambitious, that it 
has ‘the ability to break out of its self-imposed conceptual paralysis 
concerning military operations’.76 It must be underlined here that the 
competences of the EU in the CFSP/ESDP remain limited, and even with 
the military angles within its scope, the emphasis on peace-keeping and 
humanitarian missions means that personnel operating under the EU 
                                                   
71
 Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP [2003] OJ L 76/43. 
72
 Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP [2003] OJ L 147/42. 
73
 Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP [2004] OJ L 252/10. 
74
 Council of the EU, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: The European Security Strategy’, 
12 December 2003 [not published in the official journal].  
75
 A Bergman and J Peterson, 'Security Strategy, ESDP, and Non-Aligned States' in J 
Peterson and R Dannreuther (eds) Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations 
(Routledge, London 2006) 147. 
76
 J Howarth, 'From Security to Defence' in C Hill and M Smith (eds) International 
Relations and the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2005) 194. 
67 
 
banner will not have direct combative roles. In terms of the EU’s system of 
governance, the moves towards discussion and implementation of 
measures in the fields of security and defence demonstrate the gradually 
growing ambition on the part of the EU to move into areas previously fully 
in the realm of the Member States. This is a point which can be made with 
regard to the internal sphere of governance too. 
Themes in the system of governance in the EU’s internal sphere 
The nature of law and integration within the internal sphere of the EU’s 
system of governance has come under increased scrutiny in recent years. 
Successive waves of enlargement have more than doubled the 
membership of the EU in less than 15 years since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, resulting in a larger and more diverse Union. 
Despite significant achievements in European integration, most notably 
the moves towards completion of the single market, the launch of the 
single currency and increased cooperation and competences in the field of 
Justice and Home Affairs, the EU faces fundamental questions relating to 
its law and policy-making, and their connection with national legislatives 
and policy-making processes.  
 One of the key issues facing the EU is how to make the necessary 
changes to law and policy-making in order to keep up with, on the one 
hand, an enlarged and more diverse Union, whilst bearing in mind the 
challenges of globalisation and the economic rise of, in particular, China 
and India. Making institutional changes which are acceptable to the 
citizens of the EU has also become a core issue. The key to integration 
through harmonisation has been the use of regulations and directives, as 
defined by Article 249 EC, and the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy of EC law as laid down by the ECJ. Enforcement of the EC 
Treaty provisions has been key in ensuring compliance by the Member 
States. This is often termed the ‘Classic Community Method’ (CCM) and 
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forms the basis of the traditional model of EU constitutionalism.77 The 
CCM is the main factor in contributing to the emergence of a system of 
(supranational) governance at the EU level. 
In recent years, ‘new’ governance has been increasingly discussed in 
relation to the EU. As identified earlier in this chapter, new governance 
does not have a settled meaning and can be used as a description of modes 
and techniques of governance which have emerged or a means to denote 
certain (usually positive) characteristics. In the following sections, the 
descriptive use of new governance is used in identifying the modes of 
governance emerging at the EU level. This helps to clarify the 
characteristics, methods and hallmarks of new governance visible in 
different internal policy spheres. The purpose therefore in the following 
sections is to explore the ‘phenomenon’78 of new governance, the policy 
areas in which it has been used alongside the Community Method, in 
order to reveal a more general picture of EU governance, bringing out 
themes, issues and challenges. 
The Classic Community Method and ‘new modes of governance’ 
The CCM is built upon the Commission’s exclusive right to initiate 
legislation and policy, with the Council and European Parliament 
exercising legislative functions. Qualified Majority Voting in the Council is 
an essential component in overcoming the difficulties of securing 
unanimity amongst the Member States. The presence of the European 
Court of Justice with the power to rule on the validity of legislative 
measures and infringements by the Member States of Community law is of 
paramount importance. According to the Commission,  
The Community Method guarantees both the 
diversity and effectiveness of the Union. It 
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ensures the fair treatment of all Member States 
from the largest to the smallest. It provides a 
means to arbitrate between different interests 
by passing them through two successive filters: 
the general interest at the level of the 
Commission; and democratic representation, 
European and national, at the level of the 
Council and European Parliament, together 
the Union’s legislature.79 
There is little doubt that the CCM has contributed to successful 
harmonisation of law and legal systems across the EU. It has formed the 
backbone of the integration through law process in the Union and without 
it, it is likely that the EU would not have been able to attain the level of 
integration that it has. However, the CCM as a means by which integration 
goals have been pursued during the history of the EU has been under 
pressure for three main reasons. First, the CCM has undergone changes, 
such as the greater role played by the (directly elected) European 
Parliament in the passage of legislation and the extension of qualified 
majority voting in the Council, but it remains in essence a method 
conceived for a polity of six states. Enlargement to 27 states has posed 
challenges for the effectiveness of legislative measures and the ability of 
the EU institutions to ensure that harmonisation occurs in practice as 
well as on paper. Directives, which require transposition in the Member 
States, are particularly at risk from uneven and insufficient application. 
Second, and in the context of enlargement, the nature of ‘one size fits all’ 
legislative measures applicable to a much more diverse EU has been 
raised. The issue of ensuring that the differences, for example in economic 
and social terms, are respected in the integration process is a apt one. 
Third, the competences of the EU have expanded into new areas where 
binding legislative measures are sometimes not possible or desirable. This 
can be because the goals to be achieved could not easily be obtained 
through regulation, for example in some aspects of social and economic 
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policies, and/or because they are in areas which are ‘sensitive’ in terms of 
their closeness to the heart of state sovereignty, and thus face resistance 
from the Member States. Employment policy is one such example. 
The Open Method of Coordination 
The clearest example of a new mode of governance in operation in the EU 
is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC was explicitly 
recognised as a mode of governance at Lisbon European Council Summit 
in 2000, though its roots in EC/EU policy stretch as far back as 1958.80 The 
OMC is composed of four elements; fixing short, medium and long-term 
goals and guidelines for the Union; benchmarking and using quantitative 
and qualitative indicators as a means of comparing best practice; 
translating the guidelines and goals into national and regional policies 
through specific targets; and using monitoring, evaluation and peer-
review as mutual learning processes.81 These characteristics therefore 
move the EU away from the top-down/command-and-control regulatory 
approach of the CCM, and do not seek to establish a single common 
framework, but instead place the Member States on a path towards 
achieving common objectives while respecting different underlying values 
and arrangements.82 The OMC has been utilised in a number of policy 
areas, which according to de la Porte, are characterised as those in which 
there has been limited regulation (and therefore use of the Community 
Method), these include the information society, research and 
development, education, employment and social exclusion.83  
It is interesting to note, however, that amongst the diverse origins of 
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the inspiration for the OMC, Hodson and Maher identify the monetary 
coordination procedure used in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
process as the model.84 In this situation, Member States wishing to enter 
EMU agreed to adhere to certain benchmarks and policy guidelines: in the 
event of non-compliance, a non-binding recommendation could be made 
by the Council against a Member State. However, although this served as a 
model for the OMC, the situations in which the OMC have been applied, as 
listed above, have not operated within a comparable situation since the 
benchmarks in EMU revolved around a hegemonic force (i.e. the German 
economy), which is not the case for social and employment policy.85 To 
take one example, social exclusion has been the focus of both Armstrong 
and de la Porte’s research into the application of the OMC.86 Tackling 
social exclusion is an example of a policy area generally seen as ‘sensitive’ 
for Member States, and harmonisation measures have been minimal. Non-
binding mechanisms have long-since been used in this area in order to 
encourage Member States to act in a particular way, although the use of 
the OMC is a marked change since it is in effect a ‘generalizable technique 
of governance’, the characteristics of which are examined in the following 
section. 
Characteristics of the new modes of governance and the White 
Paper on Governance 
One of the distinctive features of the OMC which allows Member States to 
fulfil these common objectives is the importance and role of a variety 
range of actors, and in particular ‘social partners’ and ‘civil society’. This is 
also a common feature of other new modes of governance, such as 
mainstreaming and benchmarking, and suits the descriptive use of 
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governance in the EU context as indicative of a wider range of actors 
involved in law and policy-making. Eberlein and Kerwer group the 
characteristics of the new modes of governance as follows: 
new modes of governance depart from the 
Community methods of legislating through the 
use of regulations and directives. They build on 
the participation of private actors in policy 
formation, relying on broad consultation and 
substantive input. Policy-making follows a 
procedural logic in which there is joint target-
setting and peer assessment of national 
performances under broad and unsanctioned 
European guidance.87 
The engagement of non-governmental actors in policy processes is one of 
the strongest characterisations of a ‘system of governance’. The inclusion 
of ‘social partners’ and ‘civil society’ also point to why talking about new 
governance can have ideological and normative connotations. The reasons 
why the Commission has considered new governance are explained in its 
White Paper. Despite the achievements of European integration, which 
has ‘delivered fifty years of stability, peace and economic prosperity’,88 
there is without a doubt the problem that many Europeans do not feel 
involved in, or close to, decision-making at the European level. Questions 
about the relationship between the EU and national policy-making 
processes become highly apt. 
The White Paper identifies areas for action on the part of the 
institutions and Member States with the general aim of rendering 
decision-making clearer to the citizen, who should also be more involved 
(individually or as part of a group) in the formation of law and policy. This 
is especially true since the areas in which the EU institutions, particularly 
the Commission, had a clear mandate to pursue integration (especially the 
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Single Market) have largely been achieved.89 These action points are 
underpinned by five principles of good governance, namely openness, 
participation, accountability, effectives and coherence, therefore making 
the link with the normative connotations of ‘new’ governance.90 New 
governance approaches may offer enough flexibility so that the EU 
institutions are not faced with gridlock or an impossible task of ensuring 
implementation of directives and so on. There has also been the view 
amongst several Member States that the volume of binding legislation has 
become overly burdensome, and that there is a need for a reduction in the 
overall amount of regulations and directives in force. ‘Better regulation’ 
and the readiness to roll-back ‘unnecessary red-tape’ were stated 
objectives of the Barroso Commission upon taking office.91 
As such, decision-making at all levels is the best way of ensuring that 
European citizens feel informed about how the EU and its policies affect 
their lives. Debates about global civil society have reflected similar 
arguments.92 The White Paper speaks in terms of ‘a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue’93 and ‘network led initiatives’94. This would 
assist in adding democratic legitimacy to the Union’s system governance, 
especially if it eventually results in the development of a European civil 
society, beyond the traditional boundaries of the Member States.95 
By stressing the inclusiveness aspects of the new modes of 
governance, the White Paper demonstrates that ‘new’ governance as a 
term can come close to the meaning of ‘good’ governance, which in this 
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scenario may help to legitimize the European integration process in the 
eyes of the citizens of the EU. It is also grounded in the language of 
reforming the European integration process and better engaging with 
citizens. It must also be borne in mind, however, that the Commission has 
an inherent self-interest in presenting the new modes of governance as a 
variation on the CCM (where it enjoys a monopoly on the initiation of 
legislative measures), rather than a more radical departure.96 The White 
Paper was there notable for the importance placed on the continued need 
for the CCM, and the Commission’s own interpretation of the place for the 
new modes of governance has provoked a great deal of debate.97 
Nevertheless, Eberlein and Kerwer warn against being overly sceptical; 
one should not rush to dismiss new modes of 
governance as nothing but a smokescreen for 
the Commission as it attempts to pursue 
revitalised but old-style regulation. Most 
importantly, documents such as the White 
Paper cannot be viewed as authoritative guides 
to the ‘real’ policy approach of key actors such 
as the Commission. They are notoriously 
political, ambiguous, and thus difficult to 
decipher. And they are not reliable guides to a 
complex ‘policy reality’.98 
It may be the case that fewer regulations and directives are made 
than in the past, especially when compared to the period prior to the 
completion of the Single Market, but it should not be taken to mean that 
methods of new governance such as the OMC will always be appropriate as 
alternatives. Similarly, it should not be argued that one form of 
governance is necessarily superior to the other: the binding nature of 
rules and voluntarism of new modes of governance both have their place 
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within the European integration process depending on the aims and 
context. In this respect, discussion of ‘old’ governance (meaning the CCM) 
and ‘new’ governance (including the OMC) can be misleading. The 
important point to draw from this discussion for the purposes of this 
chapter is that the system of governance in the Union is more complex 
than the provisions laid down by the Treaty would suggest. Even a narrow 
view of the new modes of governance as limited to very specific 
instruments, such as the OMC, shows that understanding the ‘law’ in the 
internal sphere must take account of a greater variety of actors involved 
in the processes and the effects of measures which may not have explicitly 
stated binding characteristics. 
Overcoming the external/internal division 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that a ‘system of governance’ is an 
appropriate characterisation of the EU, since its institutional 
arrangements and policy-making structures are unique, complex and 
materially different from those of a nation state. As the preceding part 
shows, the traditional community method of governance in the EU has 
been joined by a number of new modes of governance, which share similar 
characteristics and which are playing an increasingly prominent role. 
The new modes of governance have, however, only been discussed as 
a current theme within the internal sphere of the EU’s system of 
governance. The examples of where specific new modes of governance, 
such as the OMC, have been used do not obviously apply in the Union’s 
external sphere. This includes migration, the subject of chapter five, since 
the OMC has only been used in the integration dimension of migrants, 
which cannot be accurately characterised as an external dimension to the 
sphere of governance. Considering that the new modes of governance have 
been used in areas ‘sensitive’ to Member States’ sovereignty, the lack of the 
new modes of governance in foreign policy may seem surprising: foreign 
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policy is clearly an area which lies at the core of a state’s identity, and 
even more specifically, in the domain of the executive. Parliamentary and 
judicial control of foreign policy has traditionally been limited in nation 
states. Thus, many Member State governments are extremely wary of 
ceding any decision-making authority to the EU institutions, even though 
their support for a ‘strong’ EU as an international actor is often voiced.  
The apparent lack of the presence of new modes of governance in the 
CFSP is indicative of a wider reticence to use either the language of 
governance in relation to the external sphere. There are two reasons 
which help to explain why this is so. 
The first reason is that distinguishing the ‘old’ mode of governance 
(CCM) from the new modes of governance would seem not to apply to the 
CFSP, since it was never subject to the Community method, but had a 
decision-making process more readily seen as intergovernmental, separate 
from the ‘hard’ legal order of the Community. It is clear that when dealing 
with what is ‘external’, whether this is on the part of a nation-state or the 
EU, the language employed is that of foreign, external or international 
relations, foreign policy, trade links and so on. Hence, the CFSP is 
therefore seen more as a manifestation of a state-like foreign-policy. The 
characterisation post-1992 of the CFSP as an intergovernmental ‘pillar’ 
underlines the place of the Member States as the only significant actors in 
a forum where the supranational EU institutions seem to be excluded. The 
emphasis on a system of governance as being inclusive of a wider range of 
actors is often a means by which the role of civil society and experts is 
recognised.99 This would not seem to be applicable to the CFSP, when seen 
in the light of the foreign policies of nation states more generally.  
The second, and related, reason is that the institutions themselves 
seldom use the language of governance in relation to the external sphere. 
Returning to the White Paper, there is little evidence to demonstrate this 
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aside from one reference to the EU’s contribution to global governance: 
in applying the principles of good governance 
to the EU’s global responsibility, the Union 
should be more accessible to governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders from other 
parts of the world. … The Union should take 
the global dimension into account in assessing 
the impact of policies, in establishing 
guidelines for the use of expertise, and through 
a more pro-active approach to international 
networks.100 
The last part of this quote does, nevertheless, reveal that parallels 
can be drawn between the Union’s internal system of governance and the 
external sphere: the institutionalised networks including the EuroMed 
Partnership and Northern Dimension Initiative are examples of how this 
has been put into practice. Therefore, whilst it may seem that a division 
exists between the spheres of governance, in fact the external sphere 
already demonstrates some of the hallmarks of the system of governance 
in the internal sphere. Using the terminology of governance has a 
different focus to that of foreign policy, where the internal/external divide 
seems to be much clearer. With the importance of institutions and 
institutionalisation in mind, attention is not fixed solely on what are 
often termed ‘high politics’ issues, but longer-term process and multi-
layered relationships.101 
Bridging the internal/external division by using the language of 
governance also helps to clarify the role of the Union’s common 
institutional framework. This resonates with a governance approach 
(according to the second meaning) where the institutional framework is 
taken as a starting point for analysing the methods, process and effects of 
the system of governance. This can take account of, for example, the role 
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of the Commission being more important in the CFSP than suggested by 
the Treaty, which in Tonra’s words did not ‘follow the intergovernmental 
script’.102 
Furthermore, by identifying and examining the current themes in 
the spheres of governance, whether in policies which can be characterised 
as generally internal or external, a number of key challenges to the EU and 
its legal and policy framework arise. The three most significant are the 
challenges of effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy. These questions 
have frequently arisen during the existence of the EU. As the competences 
of the EU have grown in both established and new policy areas,103 and as 
the EU has faced several popular setbacks in the form of negative 
referenda results since the TEU,104 these questions have become more 
pertinent. Revealing these common challenges again serves to 
demonstrate that the CFSP should not be considered as inherently 
separate from the ‘governance’ increasingly spoken of in relation to the 
‘internal’ sphere.  
 Across the different policy areas, whether these are characterised as 
more internal or external, questions of effectiveness are constantly raised. 
These questions can pertain to the institutional decision-making 
processes and to decisions themselves. Due to the evolving nature of the 
EU, which is particularly evident through enlargement, criticism is often 
made of the constitutional structure of an integration project that began 
with six Member States. Leaving aside the important questions of 
effectiveness in terms of terms of democratic input (explored below in 
relation to accountability), the most significant questions for the 
governance of the EU are the following: how can effectiveness be 
measured? Can the laws and policies be (more) effective and if so, how can 
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they be seen to be effective by the Member States and their populations, 
and external actors? 
 As noted above in relation to the discussion on old and new 
governance, the CCM has been under pressure in recent years. Although 
the binding nature of treaty provisions, regulations and directives has 
been instrumental in integration, the greater number of Member States 
and their increasingly diverse nature, in terms of size, economic 
development and geography raises the issue of a ‘one size fits all’ approach 
and if greater flexibility is needed. The difficulties of enforcement and 
ensuring proper transposition on legal instruments has become a major 
preoccupation of the Commission, which has complained about the lack of 
resources available to pursue Member States in breach of their obligation. 
A haphazard application of EU law would undermine its effectiveness. 
 These are some of the practical reasons why the new modes of 
governance have emerged during the past decade, and these reasons 
explain the emphasis which has been placed upon them. In the context of 
an enlarged EU, some Member States have questioned the need for 
command-and-control regulation, and have argued for a more flexible 
approach to ensuring effectiveness. These arguments are particularly in 
evidence in areas where Member States guard national sovereignty very 
closely, such as employment policy. The new modes of governance are 
notable for their lack of legal enforceability, though they carry the dual 
risks of uncertainty of how to measure their effectiveness, and the limited 
means by which their aims can be enforced if necessary. 
  The CFSP has been subject to intense criticism since its inception. 
The main reason for this has been the paradox that is seemingly inherent 
in the CFSP: the Member States have made a commitment to establish a 
common foreign policy but the same states seem to be too easily divided on 
important international issues. The CFSP in particular was heavily 
criticised for failing to ensure a common European response to the break-
up of Yugoslavia, or issues further away, such as in Rwanda. Even with a 
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number of successful operations completed and renewed enthusiasm for a 
security and defence dimension to the EU, the divisions of Member States 
seem too evident, which is paramount in the perception of having an 
effective policy. The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP demonstrates 
the lack of will on the part of the Member States to pool sovereignty in 
terms of their national foreign policies, and the difficulties in enforcing 
compliance when the policy has the appearance of a voluntary agreement 
to be respected when its suits the actors. The common denominator 
arising in the internal and external spheres is that the legal instruments 
have come under pressure in recent years. 
 In a similar vein, the accountability of the EU institutions for 
internal and external policies is a core issue. Whilst the parliaments of 
Member States have (potentially) a greater formal role to play in the 
scrutiny of internal and external policies,105 the European Parliament is 
often regarded as the most suitable place for ensuring the democratic 
accountability of EU policies away from purely national interests. The 
constitutionalisation process of the EU has seen increased supervisory, 
budgetary and legislative powers granted to the European Parliament. 
This has been the key to addressing questions of accountability of the 
other EU institutions, in particular relating to internal policies. The 
intergovernmental nature of the second pillar has meant a less extensive 
role for the European Parliament, although it has managed to exert 
increasing influence in the CFSP by means of interinstitutional 
agreements with the Commission and Council.106 Even when compared to 
nation states, whose parliaments have varying degrees of control over 
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foreign policy, without formally increasing the powers of the European 
Parliament in the field of the CFSP, the EU’s external governance is faced 
with even greater accountability issues than its internal policies. It was 
noted at the beginning of this chapter that seeing the EU in terms of a 
system of governance underlines the multi-level nature of decision-
making and also the involvement and roles of private actors in achieving 
policy goals, especially when the methods and processes used are not 
command-and-control style regulations. Involvement of private actors 
necessarily raises questions of accountability, and elected bodies may 
have imperfect control over the practical outcomes of decisions.107 The 
usual way to resolve accountability issues is through democratic 
participation in policy-making, through traditional or non-tradtional 
means. The importance of democratic participation was stressed in the 
White Paper on European Governance. Nevertheless, given that 
governance is often seen as a more applicable descriptive term because of 
the limitations of talking about ‘government’ at the EU level, this also 
risks moving away from the democratic legitimacy of elected 
governments: 
If governance designates the institutionalized 
observation of nation-states, its legitimacy may 
be found in the output of a working self-
government. But it is questionable whether it 
is legitimately possible to organize democracy 
without any democratic origin of this rule. 
Thus, we are dealing with a well-known 
dilemma: the creation of democratic 
accountability would undermine the structure 
of governance institutions, it would also 
require formal rule-making powers and it could 
annihilate the expertocratic criteria as well as 
the external observing perspective. But this 
does not mean that governance structures do 
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not need democratic legitimacy.108 
 Finally, the European integration project faces increasingly 
fundamental questions of legitimacy. Sceptics point to the negative 
referenda results in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional 
Treaty and in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon as evidence of 
disillusionment with the integration project. This is in terms of the goals 
and means of the integration process and the perceived distant and non-
democratic nature of the institutions, despite the fact that the 
Constitutional Treaty in particular was the product of the Convention on 
the Future of Europe, designed to be a more inclusive project than the 
usual intergovernmental conferences by including more input from 
national Parliamentarians and civil society groups. At the heart of the 
issue is the fact that the EU is not a state and has only fragile democratic 
legitimacy which may or may not require it to meet the same standard of 
legitimacy as required for nation-states.109 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by classifying the different uses of governance and 
noting that as a contested term, its usefulness in describing the way in 
which the EU operates is accompanied by its broad use as an academic 
approach to studying the Union and, especially when employed by the EU 
institutions, indicative of particular qualities which suggest that 
‘governance’ automatically carries with it democratic connotations. Using 
the descriptive qualities of governance reveals common challenges arising 
from themes in the external and internal spheres of governance. 
 The discussion of ‘new governance’ and ‘new modes of governance’ 
has generally been restricted to policies which are seen as internal, such 
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as social, economic and employment policies. ‘Governance’ terminology is 
much less employed when discussing the external sphere. It is contended 
here that since the CFSP can also be identified as a system of governance, 
the external/internal division is more blurred than would appear from a 
pillar-based analysis of the EU’s constitutional order. The single 
institutional framework is key in understanding this, and theme of 
institutionalism in the external sphere is indicative of the importance 
placed by the EU on creating multilateral institutional networks, a point 
which is elaborated in the case study on the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership in chapter four. 
 In order to demonstrate to what extent the external/internal 
division is blurred, and how overcoming it can aid our understanding of 
the relationship between the overlapping systems of governance in the 
EU, including that in the CFSP, a more theoretically-informed ‘governance 
approach’ is used. This draws on insights from institutionalism, the 
institutional theory of law, and social constructivism, and is designed to 
recognise and emphasise the social reality and institutional environment 
in which the CFSP exists and contributes to. In doing so, this thesis builds 
on the scholarly work already undertaken on the CFSP, a review of which 




Chapter 2: Approaches to the Analysis of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy  
Analysis of the external relations of the EU is not limited to the CFSP. 
Important ‘external’ powers most notably include the Common 
Commercial Policy1 and the power to conclude association agreements.2 
These have attracted extensive academic attention since their creation. 
Prior to the establishment of the CFSP in the Treaty on European Union, 
the political external relations within European Political Cooperation had 
been the focus of a number of studies.3 Post-1992, the study of the CFSP 
has been approached by legal scholars and political scientists from 
different traditions and theoretical and methodological standpoints. For 
some, the CFSP represents a challenge to traditional concepts of law, 
foreign policy, sovereignty, national interests and identity.4 Others see the 
CFSP as a more limited forum for discussion between nation states. An 
increasing number of works have begun to look beyond the CFSP as a 
distinct ‘pillar’ within the structure of the EU in order to assess the state 
of the EU’s external relations more holistically. There has more recently 
emerged a strand of literature identifying the ‘external governance’ of the 
EU, which is beginning to demonstrate how external relations can be 
framed within the language and context of governance. Evidence of EU 
foreign policy ‘in action’, for example, the various EU missions in the 
Balkans, Congo and the Palestinian Territories, and the heightened 
engagement in the EU’s neighbourhood have resulted in an increased 
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number of empirical studies. These help to show how the Treaty-based 
competences of the CFSP work in practice. 
The previous chapter introduced some of the current themes in EU 
governance and explored the main issues and challenges confronting both 
external and internal governance. The purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the paradigms within which the CFSP has been an object of study, 
to assess the state of the field in the various disciplines and review the 
most important contributions to the study of the CFSP. This will, in turn, 
reveal the limitations of, and gaps in, the field and provide a basis upon 
which the institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis is 
developed in chapter three as a means by which the CFSP can be better 
understood. The contributions to this field of study are considered below, 
broadly, as legal and political science approaches.5  
Legal approaches to the CFSP 
Examining the state of the art with regard to legal approaches to the CFSP 
largely depends on one’s definition of ‘law’. If great importance is attached 
to the well-known characterisation of the EU as a ‘three pillar’ structure, 
then a contrast can immediately be made between the first pillar, where 
the Community Method applies, and the second pillar (CFSP) where it 
does not. As identified in the introduction to this thesis, the Treaty of 
Lisbon would formally abolish the pillar structure, yet the CFSP would 
remain subject to ‘specific rules and procedures’,6 which strongly suggests 
that the CFSP would remain characterised by lawyers as an 
intergovernmental ‘special case’ within the EU’s constitutional order. A 
doctrinal approach to the law of the European Union is certainly possible 
within the first pillar, where ‘hard’ legal instruments and decisions of the 
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ECJ abound, yet when this approach is applied to the CFSP, analysis is 
generally limited to, for example, a review of the competences of the 
actors involved, the procedural aspects of agreeing the CFSP instruments 
(Joint Actions, Common Positions and Common Strategies) and the legal 
effect of economic sanctions against third countries. The ECJ is not 
competent to deal with the substance of many the CFSP issues, and the 
instances where it has given judgments on the CFSP (such as the terrorist 
financing cases examined in the introduction to this thesis) occur, 
generally speaking, when there is an overlap with other institutional 
competences. Hence, in the absence of first pillar binding legislative 
instruments such as regulations, directives and decisions and judgments 
of the ECJ, the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP has allowed some 
legal scholars to view it as lacking in sufficient ‘legal’ qualities for it to be 
treated as an object of legal research. Such a view treats the CFSP rather 
more as the domain of political scientists and foreign policy analysts. 
Legal analysis of the CFSP has the tendency to be detailed in description 
but, with some exceptions, limited in scope of analysis and lacking a 
holistic vision of how the CFSP works within the Union’s legal order. This 
thesis addresses this gap by enlarging the scope of legal analysis to include 
practices, norms and institutions. 
In this respect, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations7 is typical of one type of legal scholarship of 
the CFSP. For Eeckhout, the instruments used under the CFSP are not 
‘legal’ instruments. The ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’ provided 
for under the Article 14-15 TEU are not drawn from established legal 
instruments in domestic, EC or international law. They are not 
comparable to the regulations and directives used under the first pillar, 
and although they are supposed to be binding under international law, no 
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means for enforcement at the EU level were provided for.8 Indeed, ‘the 
TEU appeared to have created some kind of halfway house between 
informal co-ordination of policies and the adoption of formal legal 
instruments with specific legal effects’.9 The scope of the CFSP is limited 
to what is not covered by the EC Treaty, and as such, is framed within the 
context of the debate over whether the Union (as distinct from the 
Community) enjoys legal personality. 
For Eeckhout, only limited legal analysis of the CFSP is possible, 
despite the signs it shows of ‘significant expansion’.10 Even after Treaty 
modifications at Amsterdam and Nice and the increasing use of the 
instruments provided for in the Treaty, the lack of judicial scrutiny over 
the ill-defined the CFSP instruments prevents the type of legal analysis 
possible in other aspects of external relations, such as the Common 
Commercial Policy and the conclusion of international agreements. The 
emphasis of legal scholarship here is on the competence of the actors 
(especially the uncertain remits of the institutions)11 and the situations 
where, for example, a Joint Action rather than a Common Position has 
been used in a specific situation. Full legal analysis of the CFSP would 
only be possible in the case of comprehensive parliamentary and judicial 
oversight of the CFSP and ‘strong constitutionalism’,12 but this was not 
foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty and hence was not a feature of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
Such approaches to the CFSP are found in other works on the legal 
and constitutional arrangements of the EU. Lenaerts and van Nuffel also 
describe the objectives, instruments and procedures laid down by the 
Treaties13 and their relationship with Community law, but without 
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pointing to the existence of a single legal framework in the Union.14 The 
CFSP is similarly treated as a separate entity to the EC’s legal order in 
other legal works.15 German legal scholars have, however, increasingly 
begun to show that the EU can indeed be seen as a single legal entity, 
which has important consequences for the CFSP.16 In areas where the 
activities of the EC and EU meet, such as external trade policy, there is no 
hierarchy between the pillars, or supremacy of one over the other.17 This is 
not a debate addressed directly in this thesis, but it does demonstrate that 
the CFSP plays an increasingly important role in the construction of 
European constitutional law.  
Notable exceptions to the limited legal scope of analysis appeared 
during the early 2000s, in particular the works by Denza, Koutrakos and 
Wessel. Denza’s The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union18 is a 
legal analysis of the institutional structure of the second and third EU 
pillars, and of their respective strengths and weaknesses. The importance 
of the pillar structure in her legal analysis is underlined; she claims that 
attention to the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (the third pillar) is 
necessary because of a lack of widespread legal understanding of these 
pillars and the fact that ‘they are often presented as inferior to the 
European Community in their methods and results and as adulterating 
the pure liquid of the Community legal order’.19 
 Her starting point is the examination of the similarities and 
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differences between EC law and public international law. The 
intergovernmental pillars of the EU, being outside the scope of EC law, the 
ECJ and so on, do not form part of the supranational body of law as 
created by the EC, but neither can they be regarded as examples of purely 
public international law. Instead, she contends that there are points of 
convergence between the two; EC law is best regarded as a ‘particularly 
effective form of regional international law’ yet despite the characteristics 
of EC law which do not exist in public international law (particularly the 
supremacy of EC law over national law), the intergovernmental pillars of 
the EU are a ‘specially designed method based on public international 
law’.20 This is not a new argument as Wyatt has already claimed in 1982 
that Community law should be acknowledged to be in the mainstream of 
public international law, even before the pillar structure came into 
being.21 However, taking into account the legal nature of the CFSP, for 
Denza it is: 
… a unique experiment by EU Member States 
in forming a harmonious approach to the 
wider world. The voices of the Member States 
are to sign in harmony but not necessarily in 
unison. Where sweet singing in the choir is not 
enough, the necessary tools, whether carrot or 
stick, must be borrowed from the European 
Community or the Member States. While the 
music itself – the common policy – has to be 
agreed unanimously, there is room for solo 
signing – delegated action – by some voices 
only and even for qualified majority voting in 
taking implementing decisions. The Member 
states take it in turn to conduct the choir, but 
the powers of the conductor are very limited. 
No singer can be forced to sing, and a 
determined singer can put a stop altogether to 
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a song whose tune he dislikes.22 
By using examples of where the CFSP has been put in practice, 
regarding third states (for example, Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and 
specific subjects (for example, landmines), and the changes made to the 
CFSP by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Denza analyses the CFSP in practice. 
Unlike Eeckhout, who refrained from using the term ‘legal’ when applied 
to the instruments such as Common Positions and Joint Actions, Denza 
does qualify these as ‘legal’ instruments and shows how their meanings 
have been refined through practice. The operational aspects of the CFSP 
are important in her analysis, in a more meaningful way than a simple list 
of measures taken pursuant to each Treaty provision.  
The evolving refinement of the CFSP instruments does not mean that 
they are the sole focus of research on the second pillar. The aim of the 
CFSP is not simply to adopt binding measures on the Member States 
which could result in the ECJ solving potential disputes,23 but to share 
information and facilities which may lead to Common Positions on a 
particular subject.24 In this sense, the achievements of the CFSP should 
not be seen purely in the volume of ‘legal’ instruments adopted since its 
inception, but the way in which it has contributed to a ‘habit of 
solidarity’25 amongst Member States which has become more frequent on a 
number of issues. As a consequence of this, Denza contends that the CFSP 
has served as a means by which Member States have avoided public 
divergences on international issues, such as on Yugoslavia:  
The consequence is that issues such as nuclear 
testing and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
which might have provoked rivalries and 
public disputes among certain Member States 
did not do so. The CFSP was not meant to be a 
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mechanism for settlement of disputes among 
Member States, but by happy chance it has 
proved to be one.26  
This comment was published before the very public divisions 
between Member States over the war in Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, this 
comment forms one of themes of the thesis, namely the explanation of 
how and why the CFSP creates norms and logics of appropriateness which 
the Member States follow despite the lack of formal enforcement 
mechanisms in the Treaty.27 
A further example of a comprehensive approach to the EU’s external 
relations, including the CFSP, is provided by the work of Koutrakos. 
Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law28 and EU 
International Relations Law29 concern the substantive law on the 
relationship with GATT/WTO, the regulation of sanctions, exports of dual-
use goods and armaments. These case studies shed light on the 
interactions between trade and foreign policy in EU law, and specifically 
between the EC and the CFSP. This, he claims, is of particular importance 
because of the EC’s exclusive competence over the Common Commercial 
Policy on the one hand, and the ‘right of the Member States to conduct 
their foreign policy as fully sovereign subjects of international law’ on the 
other.30 The development of EPC and the CFSP has reflected the 
development of the Community itself, that is to say by an incremental 
process of ad hoc arrangements turning into a foreign policy sui generis.31 
Although the CFSP operates in a distinct legal framework from the 
Community Method, it is unrealistic to assume that foreign policy and 
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trade policy can be treated as separate areas of activity.32 
Koutrakos suggests that the rules and actions taken under the CFSP 
are dynamic and wide-ranging yet incomplete.33 Rather than 
concentrating on how public international law can be used to shed light 
on the CFSP, he examines the rules and procedures of the TEU and 
concludes that ‘the effectiveness of the CFSP activities is not entirely 
dependent on procedural provisions or their absence’.34 This is due to the 
fact that there may be sharp differences in opinion between the Member 
States on certain issues: Koutrakos illustrates this with reference to 
divisions over condemning China’s human rights record. Actions or 
decisions made under the CFSP need unanimity, but he contends that 
even if majority voting existed, this would not necessarily make the CFSP 
more credible or influential in the activities it undertakes.35 However, 
given that the aim of the CFSP is the attempt to narrow the gap between 
its considerable international economic strength and its comparatively 
weak political strength, it can be seen from the reactive and declaratory 
nature of its track record that the framework is rather limited.  
These characteristics of the CFSP lead Koutrakos to speculate on its 
nature as a legal entity sui generis capable of operating as a functional 
system.36 This he achieves by examining the institutional interactions 
between the EC and the CFSP and the institutional, substantive and 
administrative difficulties encountered therein. Whilst these issues no 
doubt exist, he contends that the EU has addressed them by the reforms in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. Like the EU itself, processes of interaction have 
developed incrementally and interaction is most likely to occur in areas 
covered by both the first and second pillars (including economic 
sanctions, dual-use goods and arms exports) which pose a challenge to the 
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legal regimes in force. These case studies show that because of the inter-
relationships of trade and foreign policy, the pillars are not separate as 
perhaps they were envisaged at the signing of the TEU. In terms of 
practicality, the ECJ’s jurisprudence in the areas given as examples show 
that there is significant scope for overlap between the issues and hence 
also the powers of the institutions. The maintenance of the two legal 
regimes of the EC and the CFSP is possible, and abolition of the pillar 
structure would not, he claims, solve the legal problems associated with 
the linked trade and foreign policy issues. 
The apparent division between the legal and political science 
approaches to the CFSP has been the product of a traditional reluctance 
on the part of legal scholars to involve themselves in questions of foreign 
policy. However, as stated above, the CFSP as an object of ‘legal’ study 
depends on what is understood to count as law. This issue has been 
debated amongst international lawyers for many years, in particular with 
regard to the practices of actors in humanitarian intervention. As the 
CFSP matures, greater opportunities arise for examining the practices of 
the CFSP and their impact on the legal order. The institutional theory of 
law, the theoretical basis of which is explored in the following chapter, 
does not rely merely on the words of the Treaty or ECJ judgments, but 
looks beyond these to how a legal order can be conceived in terms of 
institutions. 
Such an approach is exemplified by The European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy by Wessel.37 In contrast to other legal studies, Wessel 
approaches the topic from a legal institutional perspective, by which he 
attempts to see whether the CFSP can be considered as a separate legal 
order, and if so, how it is to be interpreted.38 The institutional theory of 
law he employs first appeared in the work of MacCormick and Weinberger 
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in 1986.39 It was subsequently employed by Curtin and Dekker to explain 
the EU as a:  
… highly sophisticated ‘layered international 
organisation’, harbouring beneath its outer 
shell various autonomous and interlinked 
entities with their own specific roles and legal 
systems … The legal structures of the Union 
are very complex, housing a variety of legal 
persons more reminiscent in structural terms 
of an old-fashioned ‘Russian doll’ than any 
architecturally ambitious ‘temple’ or 
‘cathedral’’.40  
Wessel uses the insights developed by institutional legal theorists in 
identifying norms applicable to the legal order of the CFSP. He analyses 
the legal bases and nature of the CFSP decisions and decision-making, 
without needing to analyse the effectiveness of such decisions.41 His 
intellectual framework focuses on the systemic relations between legal 
norms. As the TEU is the most important source upon which the CFSP 
decisions are validly derived the CFSP should not, he contends, be 
analysed separately as merely a form of diplomatic political cooperation: 
[The] concept of legal order assumes an 
objective presence of legal norms when 
relations between states are concerned. It even 
implies that socio-political studies, regardless 
of their claims to provide a pure ‘power 
analysis’, implicitly make use of legal rules in 
identifying the relevant actors (states, the 
Council, the Commission, etc.), the relevant 
outcomes (legally defined decisions) and the 
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tactics used (for instance the use of a veto).42 
For Wessel, the TEU is the source of the legal norms surrounding the 
CFSP. Applying the institutional theory of law to the CFSP means that the 
policy is more than a purely intergovernmental form of international 
cooperation.43 Drawing on parallels with the literature on multi-level 
governance, Wessels advances the view that the different issue areas of 
the Union cannot be compartmentalised as ‘supranational’ or 
‘intergovernmental’ but instead combine and contribute to the emergence 
of a ‘multilevel constitution’ at the Union level.44 Despite the fact, as noted 
by many scholars in this field, that the CFSP does not replace the foreign 
policies of the Member States, but exists in parallel to it, Wessel cites 
various ‘serious constraints’ on the ability of Member States to conduct 
their individual policies. The ‘institutional system’ in which the CFSP 
decision-making takes place is evident in that Member States, who 
nevertheless control the outcome of the CFSP, do not in general try to act 
in an incompatible way; ‘it is certainly possible to witness a ‘European 
reflex’ where systematic cooperation is concerned’.45 Since the same EU 
institutions serve the three pillars through a single institutional 
framework, there is substantial mutual influence between the CFSP and 
other two pillars. As the foreign policy of the Union can be found in 
measures taken under the first pillar (food and humanitarian aid, 
environmental and development policy are cited as examples) the two are 
necessarily linked and have a legal effect on the Member States. 
Furthermore, the lack of supervisory role of the Commission or any other 
body in ensuring that the CFSP is carried out does not negate the 
existence of legal norms; it is desirable for Wessel that such mechanisms 
                                                   
42
 Wessel (n 37) 46. 
43
 Wessel (n 37) 319. 
44
 R A Wessel, 'The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations' in N 
Tsagourias (ed) Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European 
Perspectives (CUP, Cambridge 2007). 
45
 Wessel (n 37) 321. 
97 
 
would make the CFSP ‘work’ better so that the legal norms can mould the 
‘real’ or ‘social’ world, that is to create a common policy.46 
Wessel subscribes to the view of some legal scholars post-
Maastricht47 that, in legal terms, the European Communities and the 
European Union have merged. Wessel expands on this unity in later 
pieces and claims that the ‘bits and pieces’ making up the Union are now 
seen as more connected than in the early days of the CFSP.48 In doing so, 
he addresses the issue of potential conflicts between norms in the EU’s 
external relations with third states which raises questions about the 
existence of a hierarchy of norms and how such issues can be solved. If, as 
he suggests, there is a unity between the pillars, the question of the 
international legal personality of the Union must be revisited. As ‘legal 
personality is nothing more (or less) than independent existence within 
the international legal system’, the Union has this personality, although 
because it is not a state, its legal capacity exists only according to the 
specific competences attributed to it.49 This in turn poses the questions of 
how the capacities of the Union are delimited with respect to the Member 
States and within the different policies of the Union.50 Wessel concludes 
that despite some areas where actions taken under the CFSP could have 
been achieved under Community law (the observance of elections in 
Russia and the Korean Energy Development Organisation are examples) 
which has led to a partial ‘PESCalization’ of Community principles,51 in 
practice overlapping competences are rare: 
Delimitation proves to be possible not only 
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where the competences of the Member States 
are concerned, but also where competences 
within the various Union areas are at stake. 
Even in the event of a close link between the 
CFSP and Community issues (such as in the 
case of economic sanctions), the Treaty clearly 
divides the competences. The choice for the 
correct legal basis seems to depend on the 
issue in question (the content of the decision) 
rather than on the prima facie general rules of 
supremacy of the Community provisions.52 
Legal approaches to the CFSP have, until recently, often been limited 
to a description or analysis of the institutional competences and operate, 
according to Wessel, within research communities divided along content-
driven ‘pillar’ lines.53 There appears to have been a reluctance to deem as 
‘legal’ the operational aspects of the CFSP. In comparison to the more 
extensive treatment of the external relations of the first pillar (in 
particular the CCP) and issues such as mixed agreements, the CFSP has 
often been regarded as the domain of political scientists and foreign policy 
analysts. This is certainly true where the scope of ‘legal’ analysis is limited 
to binding legislative or regulatory acts, or the decisions of the ECJ, 
neither of which are applicable to the CFSP. The institutionalist legal 
scholars are a marked exception to this. Whilst there have been recent 
attempts to enlarge the legal paradigm to include, in particular, analysis 
of the instruments available for use under the second pillar, the CFSP has 
often been characterised as  ‘political’ and as such, the task of critical 
analysis of the CFSP has been seen as the domain of political scientists. 
Political scientists from different traditions and methodological 
standpoints have varied in their approaches to the EU and the CFSP, to 
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which discussion now turns. 
Approaches to the CFSP in political science 
Political scientists from a number of different traditions have paid 
increasing attention to the emergence of an EU foreign policy since the 
creation of the CFSP. Although the EPC had been the focus of a number of 
works, the commitment in the TEU to the explicit creation of a common 
foreign policy for the EU has prompted a diverse field of literature on the 
characteristics, methods, policy-outcomes and decision-making features of 
the CFSP/European foreign policy. Analysis of the institutions involved in 
the broad sphere of EU foreign policy has also been undertaken by 
political scientists, and case studies on policies towards specific regions 
and issues are numerous.54 In a similar way to certain recent legal works 
explored above, some have looked beyond the pillar structure in their 
analysis, and taken ‘European foreign policy’ to include external relations 
competences from outside the scope of the CFSP.55 Such a definition of 
‘foreign policy’ is offered by K. Smith as: 
an explicit plan of action, a strategy designed 
to serve specific objectives (an activist 
conception), or it can mean a series of habitual 
responses to events in the international realm. 
The Union has frequently been criticised as 
capable only of reacting to outside events, 
rather than initiating active policies, in the 
sense of long-term strategies to pursue its 
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interests. Its reactions could, though, still be 
considered policy … Pulling together these 
various elements, a common, consistent 
foreign policy thus means that the member 
states and EC institutions have expressed a 
unified position in response to external events 
and/or formulated a plan of action directed 
towards the fulfilment of specified 
political/security objective, and have agreed to 
use Community/the CFSP instruments and/or 
instruments under national competence in a 
coordinated way to implement it.56 
International Relations (IR) scholarship is where the major debates 
about the nature and relevance of the CFSP have taken place. Much of the 
debate centres on the key question which arises as soon as the 
CFSP/European foreign policy is considered: is it comparable to the 
foreign policy of a nation state, or is it sui generis requiring separate and 
distinct attention? This question is intrinsically linked to the study of the 
EU as a whole: is the EU itself a sui generis entity, or can it be treated with 
the same methodological tools as when studies of nation states are 
undertaken? If the EU’s foreign policy is to be analysed (whether as a 
comparison to that of a nation state or not) then is there a need for some 
adjustment to the state-centric focus of traditional foreign policy 
analysis?57  
In IR scholarship, approaches vary in their ability to conceive the 
CFSP as being potentially significant and/or effective. There has also been 
discussion on whether the study of the CFSP and European foreign policy 
‘belongs’ within IR or European integration theory.58 This debate also has 
its roots in the questions that have arisen by the very existence of the EU 
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and to what extent its political authority replaces that of the Member 
States or represents a challenge to the Westphalian state.  
For neorealists, states exist in an anarchic international system. As 
such, they protect their own security and sovereignty above all else, and 
are not constrained by any higher authority. States are the only 
components in the international system that matter and they are unitary 
and rational.59 They share similar interests in safeguarding their security, 
but according to neorealists, this means that the logic of anarchy cannot 
be overcome. Not all states are the same, but it is only the unequal 
distribution of power capabilities amongst them which explains their 
different behaviour in given circumstances, and not ideology.60 Although 
neorealists recognise that states form alliances in order to protect their 
own security interests, cooperation is inherently difficult because, 
fundamentally, states do not trust each other in the context of fear and 
uncertainty in the anarchic international system.61 The EU has posed a 
challenge to neorealist thought, because of the gradual integration of its 
members. Neorealists point to the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP 
as evidence that nation states do not want to cede their competences in 
foreign policy to another body.62  
Neoliberal institutionalists see the possibilities for cooperation 
through shared interests between the states, while maintaining that there 
is a logic of anarchy, and neofunctionalism (which itself developed in the 
context of European integration in the 1950s and 60s) allows for 
increasing integration through the ‘spillover’ effect, although the lack of 
communitarisation of the CFSP poses further problems for the use of 
neofunctionalism as an explanation of the CFSP.63 More recent works have 
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combined elements of neorealism and neoliberalism under the 
nomenclature ‘rationalism’64 to argue how a communitarisation of the 
CFSP would improve its effectiveness.65 Rationalism as a school of 
thought in international relations theory drew on aspects of the more-
established theories of realism and liberalism: ‘like realism, rationalism 
begins with the condition of anarchy [in the international political 
sphere] but it is more inclined than realism to underline the ways in 
which the sense of belonging to the community of humankind has had its 
civilizing effect on international relations’. Wagner’s concept of 
‘ineffectiveness’ refers to the capacity of the EU to produce collective 
decisions rather than to the impact on events, since the former is 
necessary for the latter. 
Constructivist approaches in IR developed during the early 1990s66 
and have been enormously influential in international relations 
scholarship in the post-Cold War world. Arguing that the neorealist view 
of the world in particular is simplistic, constructivists do not see a state’s 
interests as given. Instead, they explain interest formation by focusing on 
the social construction of identities.67 Constructivists are much more 
positive about the role of the EU and the possibility for states to cooperate 
to the extent that a CFSP is possible. Although a wide term applied to a 
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number of approaches, constructivists focus their attention on the social 
origins of behaviour.68 They look to the development of EPC and the CFSP 
as a case of social construction: the increased levels and frequency with 
which foreign ministers have engaged in dialogue have led to what Glarbo 
terms a ‘co-ordination reflex’, that is a single Member State or group of 
states have become accustomed to discussing a proposed policy or action 
with their European partners before embarking on it, even if they are not 
seeking a common action or any of the instruments available under the 
CFSP.69 The notion of framing and reframing of EU foreign policy is stated 
by M.E. Smith to be a reflection of the interaction between three separate 
‘layers’: ideas, institutions and policies.70 As far as the latter is concerned, 
Smith is also cautious about seeing the CFSP in the context of how the 
foreign policies of nation-states are perceived: 
If policy is taken to consist of a sustainable 
balance between interests, commitments and 
capabilities, rather than simply the elaboration 
of institutional frameworks or the 
construction of a ‘club’ of likeminded states, 
then many would judge the EU still to be sorely 
lacking … But of course, this lack of European 
identity and solidarity is only a problem if the 
template or the frame for ‘policy’ is taken to be 
essentially that of ‘modernist’ foreign policy: a 
monolithic pattern of nation-state action, with 
a unified national government acting in the 
national interest and with the capacity to 
deploy the full range of coercive and persuasive 
instruments.71 
Alternative insights into the CFSP in the field of political science 
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have been through the perspective of governance which, as noted in the 
previous chapter, is a relatively new endeavour in terms of external 
relations. Since ‘governance’ alone has insufficient theoretical and 
methodological detail to constitute a self-standing approach, this use of 
governance relies on insights from other strands of scholarship. Insights 
from institutionalist and constructivist scholars have, for example, 
employed the language of governance in their analyses.72 The use of a 
governance approach has already gained in influence during the last few 
years concerning internal policies of the EU, but in the field of external 
relations, the governance approach has found difficulties precisely 
because of the lack of supranationalism (and the supranational 
institutions) over the CFSP.73 European foreign policy is not yet, according 
to Hill and Smith, capable of being identified as a form of multi-level 
governance.74  
Koenig-Archibugi challenges the perception of international 
cooperation (of which the CFSP is an example) as the usual way in which 
governments attempt to solve problems on behalf of their societies when 
unilateral actions are insufficient.75 Instead, as an alternative 
interpretation, ‘governments, far from being faithful agents of societal 
groups, pursue their own goals and are prepared to collude with other 
governments against their own societies if this helps them attain those 
goals’.76 Koenig-Archibugi does not intend this ‘collusive delegation’ 
account to be taken as a full theory of the level of institutionalism of the 
CFSP; the other theories and hypotheses in international relations 
scholarship can be employed in a complementary fashion in order to shed 
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light on the complexity of the CFSP: 
The exploration of the diversity of government 
preferences concerning the institutional 
structure of the CFSP suggests that collusive 
delegation is best seen as part of a multicausal 
account of intergovernmental cooperation 
rather than as an explanation superseding all 
other. This is one reason why it is appropriate 
to distinguish the collusive delegation thesis – 
a set of empirically testable hypothesis – from 
the new raison d’état perspective – a 
conceptual lens that makes visible certain 
patterns in world politics.77 
The enlargement of the EU in May 2004 which brought in eight new 
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe served as an interesting 
case study for the proponents of what was identified in the previous 
chapter as the use of ‘governance’ as an approach to understanding the 
EU. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s ‘Governance by conditionality: EU 
rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe’78 
examines the process of rule transfer from the EU to the new Member 
States and outlines a theoretical framework to study governance modes, 
in the external context of enlargement.79 Their research points to the 
effectiveness of rule transfer as explained by the ‘external incentives 
model’; during the accession process, the EU is capable of bargaining with 
the new Member States in order for them to adopt the acquis 
communautaire, with membership of the EU as the ‘prize’.80 This can be 
seen an example of using its bargaining power to full effect when dealing 
with non-Member States, which therefore goes some way in explaining its 
dealings on the international plane. 
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A more explicit academic approach to ‘external governance’ has been 
put forward by Lavenex, with the focus on the European states which have 
applied to join the EU.81 Although using ‘external governance’ is a 
perspective in its infancy, shifting boundaries through enlargement and 
the attempts to promote EU policies outside the geographical borders of 
the EU have been particularly appropriate in using ‘governance’ to 
characterise the lead-up to the 2004 expansion into Central and Eastern 
Europe.82 External governance, as Lavenex states, is particularly apt for 
the EU since, unlike nation states, legal and institutional boundaries are 
not necessarily fixed: the acquis communautaire applies to Member States, 
some non-Member States who have adopted it because they hope to join 
the EU through the enlargement process, or because it allows for specific 
advantages short of membership which they do not seek (for example, the 
EEA states). Enlargement is the primary field in which the blurring of 
what is internal and external can be felt, though this is also true of the 
EU’s interactions with other states, such as those in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the ACP, where conditionality has been 
used as an important tool in the EU’s pursuit of expanding ‘its boundaries 
of order’.83 Other policies outside the scope of the CFSP also have strong 
external dimensions, as Lavenex has explored in relation to immigration 
policies.84 Conditionality has become a strong feature of enlargement and 
related external policies, including the European Neighbourhood Policy: 
this is an example of a highly important tool at the disposal of the EU in 
order to influence the choices of non-Member States. Using governance as 
an approach takes account of this political power and influence which in 
the ENP context means offering certain advantages associated with EU 
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membership, short of membership itself.85 Whereas traditional research 
on the EU’s external relations has focussed on economic relations and the 
CFSP, her alternative view is that EU external relations with peripheral 
states are shaped by ‘the external dimension of internal politics’.86 
Lavenex’s approach to external governance is returned to in chapter five, 
which helps to explain the process of ‘externalisation’ of law and policy in 
the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the issue of 
migration. 
The variety of approaches to the CFSP, European foreign policy and 
the EU as an international actor by IR scholars has demonstrated a 
number of key focuses which differ substantially from the analyses by 
legal scholars. Whilst many legal texts describe the Treaty basis of the 
CFSP and competences, often citing it as a relatively unsuccessful policy 
when placed next to the first pillar, political scientists have addressed 
important questions such as ‘does the EU have a foreign policy?’, ‘can it be 
compared to the foreign policy of a nation state?’, ‘can it be considered to 
have become a coherent and strategic actor?’ and, if the previous question 
is answered in the negative, ‘how can the foreign policy be strengthened?’. 
In attempting to offer answers to these important questions, it is clear 
from the research undertaken in recent years that political scientists have 
not only become diversified in their methods of analysis, but have begun 
to use increasingly diversified policy analysis frameworks when looking at 
the external spheres of activity of the EU. 
Conclusion 
The CFSP has become a significant area of research since its creation. The 
recognition of the need to redress the image of the EU as an ‘economic 
giant but political dwarf’ through the establishment of the CFSP has 
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prompted extensive and comprehensive works on both the CFSP as an 
individual object of research, or as part of the EU’s external relations. This 
has been particularly true for IR scholars, and not only from those who 
have traditionally engaged in foreign policy analysis as, for example, the 
work on developing theoretical approaches to understanding the EU 
based on governance demonstrates.  
An analysis of the literature in the field reveals, however, that 
approaches by legal scholars have often been limited to a competence-
based analysis of the CFSP. This reflects the traditional reticence to deal 
with foreign policy in a national context, unless there is a ‘hard’ legal 
angle such as the imposition of sanctions, or the contractual or 
constitutional relations with other states or international organisations. 
Recent works by legal scholars have begun to buck this trend, 
demonstrating the importance of the CFSP for the legal order of the EU. In 
this sense, scholarship of the CFSP is beginning to follow a similar pattern 
as that which relates to the ‘internal’ sphere. Lawyers were originally 
concerned with the formalism of the Treaty provisions, decisions of the 
ECJ and legislative instruments, and have more recently used less black-
letter approaches in looking at the EU. This has included underlining the 
importance of soft law, as identified in chapter one, and also 
understanding the EU as a system of governance. The contribution of this 
thesis is to take forward this research agenda on governance by including 
the role of the CFSP. In order to do so, it is necessary to build a more 
robust theoretical framework than the contested and malleable term 
‘governance’ as an academic approach implies. The following chapter 
builds an institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis in order 
to explore the institutional practices and social reality with which the 




Chapter 3: An Institutional Constructivist Framework of 
Legal Analysis for the CFSP 
The study of the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy is a challenging subject for traditional approaches to law and 
politics. Understanding the CFSP using existing legal and political science 
approaches demonstrates the limitations in comprehending the external 
relations of the EU as a non-state polity. The literature available on the 
CFSP shows that legal scholars have tended to focus on the competences 
of the institutions. The weight attached to the intergovernmental nature 
of the CFSP as a ‘pillar’ of the EU’s structure, as distinct from the 
supranationalism and ‘hard’ legal instruments in the Community pillar, 
has largely prevented a more comprehensive understanding of how the 
CFSP works as a self-standing policy, how it fits into the European 
integration process and is linked to the other EU policy fields. Legal 
scholars have tended to leave analysis of the success or failure of the CFSP 
to those in the political science and International Relations disciplines. 
They, in turn, have found difficulty in applying the dominant theoretical 
paradigms to the EU as a non-state actor in international affairs. 
 The EU and the CFSP are not completely unsuited to analysis 
through traditional frames of reference used by legal and political 
scholars, which are centred on the nation state. Yet, the quest for legality 
in classical legal methodology is insufficient if the search is to explain the 
‘law’ of the CFSP, beyond the treaty-based competences of the institutions. 
More sophisticated tools of analysis are required to reach beyond the 
study of the competences of the CFSP laid down in the Treaties. By the 
same token, the EU’s external relations cannot be contained within 
traditional boundaries of foreign policy analysis, which for International 
Relations scholars has generally been within intergovernmentalist 
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paradigms.1 Recalling the discussion in chapter one, a system of 
governance is an attractive characterisation of the EU’s law and policy-
making, but as an academic approach, governance has received only 
limited application towards the external sphere. It was also noted that 
governance by itself in an insufficient conceptual framework for analysis 
and lacks the necessary theoretical refinement for evaluating the role of 
practices, norms and institutions, but it can be used a starting point for an 
exploration of the modes, methods and processes associated with systems 
of law and policy-making and their effects. Using the terminology of 
governance also transcends what is seen as ‘legal’ and ‘political’ in the 
EU’s activities, encompassing its various multi-level, institutional formats 
and its policy areas.  
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to a sharpening of the 
analytical lenses through which we can study the EU, in order to see how 
and to what extent the CFSP, as a system of governance, relates to the 
other spheres of governance within the EU and impacts on the Union’s 
wider external relations. The emphasis within this aim is placed upon 
using a theoretical framework to explain how, rather than why, the CFSP 
works. This necessitates bridging two divides which hinder the 
understanding of the CFSP and its place in the constitutional and political 
order of the European Union: the academic divide between legal and 
political science approaches, and the divide between the ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ spheres of governance. Having confronted these challenges in 
the previous two chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to identify and 
develop the more specific approach taken in order to test the hypothesis 
and answer the research questions, positioning and delimiting theoretical 
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This chapter builds a theoretical framework using mutually 
compatible insights from institutionalism (in particular new 
institutionalism) as a tool drawn from political science, the institutional 
theory of law, and constructivism. This first entails a survey of theoretical 
considerations and limitations of the approaches drawn upon; 
institutionalism, constructivism and the institutional theory of law. Both 
institutionalism and constructivism as theoretical approaches entail 
divergent concepts and methodological strands. 
 This framework is termed an ‘institutional constructivist framework 
of legal analysis’. The emphasis on the social practices within the CFSP 
and the norms that these practices create suggests that constructivism is 
a useful means by which a broad interest in the key role of institutions in 
the ‘reality’ of the CFSP can be refined. This approach allows for a legal 
analysis of the CFSP beyond the Treaty-based competences and the 
changes which have occurred through the operation of the CFSP in 
practice, informed by theories in law which are sensitive and responsive 
to the law-like qualities of the system of governance. This chapter 
proceeds by firstly identifying the role of institutions in systems of 
governance and discussing institutionalism, identifying the different 
strands within this broad paradigm. Of these different strands, 
institutional constructivism is considered to be the most appropriate 
because of the importance of longer-term institutional development and 
the importance of social practices and patterns of change, positioning it 
most closely within the scope of the characteristics of governance 
identified in chapter one. As such, the framework employed here is that of 
a toolkit for understanding ‘governance’. After clarifying more fully the 
limits of the ‘institutions’ sought in this research project, discussion then 
turns to constructivism and the institutional theory of law. These two 
theoretical approaches are used to complement and refine the research on 
institutionalism in the CFSP. Constructivist insights help to see the 
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norms and identities and consequently the social reality in which the 
CFSP exists and which it contributes to. The institutional theory of law is 
used because of the search for the specific ‘legal’ quality of the norms and 
practices which arise in the CFSP, and their (legal) effects. The 
combination of these three mutually compatible paradigms is explored at 
the end of this chapter. 
Bringing institutions to the fore: institutionalism old and new 
Recalling the discussion of the diverse meanings of ‘governance’ in 
chapter one, and the growing institutionalisation noted in the EU’s 
spheres of governance, the existence, development and role of institutions 
is vital in understanding the operation of the CFSP beyond the Treaty 
provisions. The starting point for developing the theoretical framework is 
the place and role of institutions in governance. Examining the role, 
power and influence of institutions allows for questions of institutional 
arrangement rather than ‘black letter’ legality to arise.2 
Institutionalisation has been one of the dominant themes of the CFSP 
during its lifetime, as was explored in chapter one. In accentuating the 
institutional dimensions of the CFSP, the broad-based governance 
approach drawn on here is one that ‘is at its conceptual heart not a legal 
concept but an institutional framework’.3 Consequently, the emergence, 
nature and construction of institutions and institutionalist theories 
warrant further attention in order for them to be used as a basis of the 
analytical framework.  
First, it is necessary to distinguish the theoretical underpinnings of 
‘old’ and ‘new’ types of institutionalism. Both are relevant in the 
construction of the analytical framework and both have close associations 
with the place and role of law and rule-based behaviour. According to 
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Peters, the roots of political science are in the study of institutions.4 
Institutional enquiry is thus fundamental to the study of how politics and 
political organisation works, and such enquiry was closely related to legal 
study. During the past few decades, institutionalism lost ground in 
political science disciplines in favour of behaviouralism and rational 
choice theory. However, from the 1980s onwards, institutionalism has 
enjoyed a revival as both a distinct (if broad) theoretical approach, and 
also as a variant or slant on competing theories, for example, the 
institutionalist input into rational choice theory.5 If the various 
approaches are grouped together as ‘new institutionalism’, they appear to 
have regained at least some of the ground lost to competing theories since 
1945. 
 Traditional institutionalism, dating from the late 19th century, 
focused on the central place of law in government, and on the importance 
of structure as a determinant of behaviour.6 The structures that 
institutionalists were mainly concerned with were the formal and static 
types of government in operation in given states, such as presidential or 
parliamentary systems, the political organisations of government and 
institutions of the legal system, such as the courts. The emphasis on law 
meant that their analyses were formal and not concerned with the more 
abstract features or influences of structures on society. This also 
demonstrates the close association with legal study of government and 
political organisation. There was furthermore a strong normative element 
to the work of ‘old’ institutionalists, as they saw part of their role as the 
promotion of better government.  
 During the ‘behavioural revolution’ which occurred within political 
science scholarship during the 1950s and 60s, behaviourists and rational 
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choice analysts challenged the structural nature of the institutionalists’ 
views, especially on the grounds of the place of the individual: 
This approach [behavioural and rational choice 
analysis] can make a strong claim that 
individuals are the appropriate focus for social 
and political analysis. Social collectivities such 
as political parties, interest groups, legislatures 
or whatever do not make decisions. The people 
within those collectivities make the decisions, 
and there are then rules to permit the 
aggregation of the individual behaviors. The 
institutionalist answer, however, is that the 
same people would make different choices 
depending upon the nature of the institution 
within which they were operating at the time.7 
(emphasis added) 
 The last sentence reveals to some extent how institutionalists have 
responded to claims that institutions alone do not make decisions, and 
also shows how institutionalism can offer new slants on what have been 
seen as opposing theories. The revival of institutionalism (which has since 
become identified as ‘new institutionalism’) was pioneered by March and 
Olsen in their work undertaken jointly and separately since 1984.8 ‘New’ 
institutionalist perspectives draw on the institutionalist tradition noted 
above, but are substantially wider in terms of what can be termed as an 
‘institution’ and capable of structuring and organising behaviour. Despite 
this fundamental shift in the core object of their research, new and old 
institutionalism do share enough core ideas for the new to be seen as 
bringing back in what had become seen to be an outdated approach to 
politics.910 March and Olsen’s principal rationale for reviving an 
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institutionalist perspective was their criticism of dominant political 
science theorising which they contended to be overly preoccupied with 
the rational self-interested motivations of individual actors.11 
Behaviouralists and rational choice theorists had dismissed institutions 
as simply the aggregation of individual preferences. As in the institutional 
theory of law (explored below), March and Olsen avoided reductionism in 
political analysis (reducing collective behaviour to individual behaviour) 
since they contend that this hinders analysis of the wider impact of 
structures on society.12 New institutionalism therefore avoids a return to 
the overly historical-descriptive, legalistic approach of ‘old’ 
institutionalism13 and concerns itself not only with the impact of 
institutions on individuals but the interaction between institutions and 
individuals.14 Although new institutionalism may seem to be more 
divorced from legal study, they nevertheless continue to stress the 
importance of rule-based behaviour within institutions. 
Variants and strands which are grouped together as new 
institutionalist approaches have become increasingly widespread since 
the mid-1980s. The need for renewed interest in institutions is in part 
represented by the existence of the EU itself, a legal and political entity 
with no parallel elsewhere in the world. An ‘institutionalist turn’ occurred 
in the study of the EU amongst political scientists during the 1990s.15 For 
institutionalists, the EU is a unique form of supranational political 
community,16 with evolving standards of conduct and common goals set 
                                                   
11
 R A W Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity 
and Accountability (Open University Press, Buckingham 1997) 78. 
12
 JG March and JP Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (Free Press, New York 1989). 
13
 J P Olsen, 'Political Science and Organisation theory: Parallel Agenda but Mutual 
Disregard' in RN Czada and A Windhoff-Héritier (eds) Political Choice: Institutions, Rules 
and the Limits of Rationality (Westview Press, Colorado 1991) 112. 
14
 Lowndes (n 10) 91. 
15
 Two prominent examples are: S Bulmer, 'The New Governance of the European Union: a 
New Institutionalist Approach' (1994) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 351; P Pierson, 
'The Path to European Integration: a Historical Institutionalist Analysis' (1996) 29 
Comparative Political Studies 123. 
16
 March and Olsen (n 12) 127. 
116 
 
out in the Treaties, first and foremost, ‘an ever closer Union amongst the 
peoples of Europe’. The significance of the Treaty-based goals which set 
the EU apart from other international organisations is the legal 
integration of European society they represent. Further, the European 
integration process has produced a great number of institutions and 
structural features, which have gradually expanded through waves of 
enlargement across much of the continent.17 The nature of the EU as an 
expanding polity demonstrates the blurred and therefore limited 
significance of the internal/external division. The growing involvement of 
non-EU states and actors in internal policy fields, such as the 
environment and transport, also contributes to this view. Because of the 
nature of the EU, which has evolved throughout its history by growing in 
both size and with respect to its competences, understanding its 
institutional dynamics and the way in which it operates is essential in 
explaining the structure of the system of governance of the Union and its 
political organisation.18 This suggests that in terms of the CFSP, 
institutionalism can take account of the multi-level nature of the EU and 
consequently avoids overly emphasising the role of states by recognising 
the role of other actors and institutions. 
It is useful to briefly note some of the variants of institutionalist 
perspectives which have arisen since the revival of the approach.19 March 
and Olsen’s version of institutionalism, has been termed as ‘normative 
institutionalism’ by Peters due to ‘the very strong emphasis these authors 
place on the norms of institutions as a means of understanding how they 
function and how they determine, or at least shape, individual behavior’.20 
Normative in this sense however, is different to normative theory as 
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promoting particular norms.21 By contrast, rational choice 
institutionalists are functionalist in nature, and see institutions as 
‘systems of rules and inducements to behavior in which individuals 
attempt to maximise their own utilities’.22 Their starting point is the 
assumption that actors in decision-making arenas behave strategically in 
order to reach their preferred outcome.23 Within the context of the EU, 
this strand of institutionalism has helped identify the relative powers of 
different actors, in particular the five institutions.24 Rational choice 
institutionalists therefore see institutions as thin structures, with their 
scholarly attention concentrated on the role of individuals within these 
structures, 25 rather than factors such as culture.26 In terms of the CFSP, 
these institutionalists see the role of the political leaders as paramount 
and their focus would therefore be on the interests each Member States 
has in the CFSP and how they maximise these interests. This is similar to 
the view of neo-realists in international relations scholarship. Historical 
institutionalism contends that the history of a policy or system results in 
choices being made which then have a strong bearing on decisions taken 
afterwards. This incorporates ideas of ‘path dependency’27 and the 
association of critical junctures as representing branching points from 
where historical development moves along a new path.28 A historical 
institutionalist perspective on the CFSP suggests therefore that the 
‘critical junctures’ would be changes brought about by the Treaty 
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amendments which have modified the way the CFSP works, and other 
junctures, such as the Franco-British St Malo Declaration on European 
defence cooperation in 1998.29 These ‘internal’ factors which become 
critical junctures could also be joined by ‘external’ factors, which could 
include how 9/11 has prompted decisions to be made within the CFSP 
which have a strong security dimension. 
Empirical institutionalists, as their name suggests, concentrate on 
empirical research into the effect of structures on political processes.30 
International institutionalism looks at the structure surrounding the 
behaviour of states and individuals in the international arena, for 
example international regime theory.31 The emphasis of this perspective is 
rather more on states, rather than on non-state actors, which does not 
wholly make it suitable for use as an analysis of the CFSP as emerging 
from a non-state polity. Network institutionalism looks at the structured 
interaction between official actors in the government process. This 
perspective has already been applied in the field of EU external relations.32 
A further strand of institutionalism, institutional constructivism, is used 
in this thesis and is developed in more detail below. 
Defining an ‘institution’ 
Despite their contrasting approaches, there are certain elements which 
make up the common core of contemporary strands of institutionalism 
known collectively as ‘new institutionalism’. Widening the scope of what 
counts as an ‘institution’ lies at the core of new institutionalism. March 
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and Olsen’s own definition of an institution is: 
a relatively stable collection of practices and 
rules defining appropriate behaviour for 
specific groups of actors in specific situations. 
Such practices and rules are embedded in 
structures of meaning and schemes of 
interpretation that explain and legitimize 
particular identities and the practices and 
rules associated with them.33 
 With the notion that an institution is not necessarily a formal 
structure, (new) institutionalism then follows from this as, 
a general approach to the study of political 
institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and 
hypotheses concerning the relations between 
institutional characteristics and political 
agency, performance and change. 
Institutionalism emphasizes the endogenous 
nature and social construction of political 
institutions.34 
First, to recognise the existence of an institution, there is a need for 
some kind of structural feature. These can be either formal (a legislature, 
an agency or some other legal framework) or informal (network of 
interacting organisations, set of shared norms) which allows the analyst 
to see ‘some sort of patterned interactions that are predictable based upon 
specified relationships among the actors’.35 Institutions may be defined as 
organisations which are endowed with personnel, buildings and funds but 
also as social structures.36 Second, there is a need for some stability over 
time. Regular meetings could therefore be an institution in this sense, 
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which can apply in the EU context even without a formal legal basis. 
Third, the institution must affect individual or group behaviour by 
constraining the behaviour in some way either formally or informally. 
Fourth, there is a need for some degree of shared values. The operation of 
institutions in practice goes beyond the ‘hard’ institutions set up, in the 
case of the EU, by the Treaties to see the existence of other institutions 
which are not as readily visible and the significance of which have been 
often ignored or unaccounted for.  
Institutions therefore include, but are not limited to, the examples 
given in chapter one, such as the High Representative for the CFSP, the 
Northern Dimension Initiative and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
Institutions go beyond into the realm of the more informal practices and 
rules which govern the conduct of those involved in the CFSP and result 
in changing behaviour and interests of the actors. For example, the 
institutionalisation of constant communication and consultation between 
the foreign ministries of Member States has had a great impact on working 
practices, which in turn feed into the creation of common interests and 
identities at EU level.37 
The sub-policies of the CFSP contain institutions of their own, such 
as dialogues, committee frameworks and regular practices. The 
implications of this here is that the CFSP can be seen not only through a 
competence-based lens as limited to ‘outputs’ in the form of Joint Actions, 
Common Positions and Common Strategies as adopted in the Council. 
Neither is the CFSP limited to the relations between the Member States 
who control the ‘intergovernmental pillar’. Instead, the CFSP can be 
understood as a more inclusive institutional field where the practices of 
the High Representative, agencies, and the variety of other actors count. 
This perspective of enlarging the scope of what might be seen as an 
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institution brings in the possibility of seeing the links with other EU 
policies and breaking-out of the ‘intergovernmental pillar’ mould of 
analysis of the CFSP.  
 This perspective is not without its limitations. What ‘counts’ as an 
institution within the definition above remains somewhat undefined, and 
the criteria of ‘relatively stable’ is not sufficient in itself to categorise the 
rules and practices as institutions or not. A specific issue in relation to the 
EU is that it has a relatively recent history and periodic enlargements 
have a great effect on its operation. Thus, whilst old Member States have 
institutionalised frameworks of consultation and cooperation, admission 
of new Member States (especially in the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004) 
means that the existence of such institutions needs re-evaluation in the 
light of such changes and the incorporation of new actors who contribute 
to institution-building. Furthermore, there is seemingly little attention 
given to when an ‘institution’ can no longer be termed as such. For 
example, if a Member State elects a Eurosceptic government that ignores 
the consultative and cooperation frameworks built up as institution in the 
CFSP, does that mean that the institution is dead? This may depend on 
whether the institution continues to affect individual or group behaviour, 
which may be difficult to ascertain. 
March and Olsen do not contend that institutionalism is, or claims to 
be, a ‘full-blown theory’ of political institutions.38 It is for this reason that 
institutionalism is combined with insights from constructivism in this 
thesis. The contribution of institutionalism is, however, to allow insight 
into systems of governance which operate ‘below the surface’, in order to 
discover to what extent institutions direct the actions and processes of 
the actors associated with them. Institutions are ‘living’ and more than 
the simple sum of calculated self-interests.39 In this sense, what ‘counts’ as 
an institution will depend on the circumstances of the field under 
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analysis. Establishing strict criteria of when an institution starts and 
stops being as such would deflect attention from the utility of the 
perspective in seeking to understand the role of institutions in the reality 
of the CFSP.  
 The evolution of institutions, and the potential for their demise, 
makes ‘living’ an appropriate characterisation of their existence in time 
and space. As ‘living’ suggests, institutions are not static, making their 
identification sometimes problematic, yet their defence by ‘insiders’ and 
validation by ‘outsiders’ make them both visible and resistant to rapid 
changes.40 The significance placed on the social construction of 
institutions underlines that the creation of institutions is in part through 
social interaction as well as formal, legal decision-making. Within the 
CFSP, the practices of the Council Presidency in issuing Declarations on 
specific issues and events on behalf of the EU regularly and consistently 
contributes to the ‘living’ nature of the CFSP as an institution. 
Underlining the ‘living nature of institutions helps to explain why 
changes may occur progressively and why institutions are often resistant 
to rapid changes. This resistance places the institutionalists’ emphasis 
squarely on the long-term41 and, with the exception of rational choice 
institutionalists, institutionalists also eschew being overly concerned 
with critical junctures, in favour of development through socialisation 
processes, where actors are induced into the norms and rules of a given 
community.42 In following this logic of socialisation processes, viewing the 
CFSP as merely an intergovernmental forum constituted by periodic 
summits and occasional operations on the ground is avoided. The Council 
does indeed have the key role in the CFSP, but understanding the CFSP as 
a living institution takes into account the effect regular contact and 
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decision-making has on decision-makers across the Member States and 
how ideas and socialisation process are built-up.43 Elites across the EU 
become more familiar with the CFSP as an arena in which foreign policy 
decisions can be taken, and new actors (most evidently the new Member 
States) are induced to the values, identities and ideas contained within. 
Specifically, it becomes normal and expected for both Member States and 
outsiders to look to the EU for its view on a particular issue or event 
occurring beyond its borders. Even if the Member States do not agree to 
put in place a Treaty-based instrument, the mere fact that they discuss 
issues of foreign policy within this institutional frame contributes to the 
dynamism of the CFSP as a living institution. As such, an analysis of the 
CFSP is not only possible in terms of ‘outputs’ (that is, the formally 
created legal instruments) but also the effect it has on ‘insiders’ (EU 
institutions and Member States, for example), ‘outsiders’ (third states) and 
other policy areas, whether these relate to external relations in full, in 
part or not at all. These effects are often less visible or quantifiable, but a 
greater understanding of the role of the CFSP beyond the Treaty 
competences can be sought as a changing and developing institution over 
time.  
  Changes in institutions can be manifested by changes in rules, 
routines, norms and identities44 and brought about by social, economic, 
technical and cultural changes.45 It is not necessarily the highly visible 
changes which are the product of processes of ‘grand designs’ that result 
in institutional changes.46 In the context of the CFSP, changes are not 
limited to those brought about by Treaty amendments. To again take the 
example of the post of High Representative of the CFSP, this was 
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introduced by a Treaty amendment at Amsterdam.47 Whilst the Treaty 
defines the role of the post, it can be seen to have changed (or rather, 
developed) because of the identification of Javier Solana, the only person 
to hold the post, as ‘Mr the CFSP’ or ‘Europe’s foreign minister’ by many 
both inside and outside the EU. A cultural perception of this identity 
demonstrates how an institution created by a Treaty article has changed, 
and that it is not necessary for a formal change in a Treaty (such as the 
proposal for ‘upgrading’ the High Representative to become a Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs)48 for changes to arise. An even earlier 
example of change in European foreign policy before the CFSP was created 
was by technical means: the COREU telex network between national 
foreign ministers greatly aided the institutionalisation of constant 
consultation between Member States from its creation in 1973. 
Institutions undergo processes of learning to adapt to changing 
circumstances in order to take advantage of opportunities and bypass 
threats.49 This includes replicating other institutions.50 Institutions 
provide an abstract definition of standards of behaviour and a ‘compass’ 
for the assessment of attempts at change.51 The task for institutionalists 
regarding change is thus: 
to go beyond a focus on how a specific 
institution affects change and attend to how 
the dynamics of change can be understood in 
terms of the organization, interaction and 
collisions among competing institutional 
structures, norms, rules, identities, and 
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Further explanation is needed here of the significance of ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ and the importance of such logics in shaping change. 
According to March and Olsen, politics is organised by such logics. That is 
to say that if an institution is effective in influencing the behaviour of its 
members through its rules and routines, those members will think more 
about whether an action conforms to the norms of the organization than 
about what the consequences would be for him/herself.53 In a multi-
national diplomatic setting such as the CFSP, this does not mean that the 
Member States will always necessarily have the same view on a specific 
issue. What it does mean is that before embarking on a course of action, 
the Member State will at least consider whether it would be contrary to 
the norms of the institution (that is, the CFSP), and if it does not, then to 
recognise this and attempt to justify the action, perhaps by referring to 
the support of other Members. The opposite of logics of appropriateness 
are logics of consequentiality, where actors anticipate consequences 
according to their personal preferences and interests.54 The latter explains 
foreign policy as an interpretation of the outcomes expected by the state: 
the EU itself exists because of the strengthening of national governments 
and their collective decision-making.55 Whilst logics of consequentiality 
may not be wholly absent from the institutionalist approach, what is 
appropriate in decision-making and institutional design plays a large part 
in explaining how institutions work and change.56 March and Olsen’s 
approach is to recognise and prioritise the role of logics of 
appropriateness over the logics of consequentiality. 
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It is not therefore necessary for ‘extreme’ situations to arise which 
give appreciation to the logic of appropriateness, which in a CFSP context 
would mean an urgent international crisis in which Member States are 
sharply divided over two fundamentally different decisions to take. 
Institutions affect the ways in which individuals and groups interact 
inside and outside established institutions, and create the aspirations of 
political community and the meaning of concepts such as democracy. 
Appropriateness refers to the iterative processes of matching behaviour to 
different situations as and when they arise.57 Institutions adapt to 
environments and environments adapt to institutions.58 Identities and 
interests that are formed gain and lose salience, which is a central process 
of governance.59 the CFSP is, therefore, not merely an intergovernmental 
forum in which Member States periodically agree to do or say something 
on a particular issue in the world, but also an institution capable of 
creating logics of appropriateness that affect its Member States and 
possibly non-Member States too. For example, rather than simply issuing 
a policy on developments in a non-Member State, such as a military coup 
or a humanitarian crisis, Member States are likely to behave in a way 
which takes into account what other Member States are likely to think 
and integrate this. A clear example in practice is the death penalty: the 
Council regularly issue condemnations of executions carried out in non-
Member States and consistently refer to the shared view on opposition to 
the death penalty amongst the Member States. These are likely to be 
accompanied by a similar the CFSP declaration from the Council.60 
From this it follows that it is not necessarily only the most visible 
aspects of the CFSP ‘on the ground’, such as the operations under the EU 
banner in Bosnia or Congo which give rise to the logics of 
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appropriateness. The declaratory aspects of the CFSP, and the informal 
processes associated with the involvement of the actors in the CFSP are a 
fertile source for looking for where the logics of appropriateness arise and 
to what extent they influence members and non-members.  
The reason for seeking out the logics of appropriateness in the CFSP 
is the light it sheds on the nature of the values built up within the CFSP. It 
has already been noted that ‘civilian power Europe’ has long been seen as 
a hallmark of the foreign policy of the EU, even before the CFSP was 
created in the TEU. The key place of non-military issues, conflict 
resolution, and environmental protection and so on has been emphasised 
as the contribution the EU has to make in world affairs. That is not to say 
that nation states cannot have these factors as the (dominant) focus of 
their foreign policies,61 but the CFSP acts as a further Europe-wide ‘layer’. 
More recently, Manners has convincingly argued that ‘normative power 
Europe’ is an accurate depiction of the EU’s foreign policy.62 The death 
penalty issue as noted above comes within the depiction of the normative 
power that the EU uses. It is one example of the norms and values that the 
logic of appropriateness allows us to see in terms of its effect on members 
and non-members. In terms of research, however, seeking to understand 
how these logics influence and guide actors has a serious potential 
drawback as there is no independent means of ascertaining whether 
norms and values contributed to behaviour and in what measure. There is 
hence no way of arguing that norms and values were not the root causes of 
the behaviour.63  
In this thesis, the law-like quality of norms to which other norms are 
added is highlighted by using insights from the institutional theory of law. 
This assumes that there is a strong social norm of compliance with law 
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and legal norms and stresses the logics of appropriateness arising from 
values as well as from the rules and practices laid down in the Treaties 
and other sources of law. The suggestion is that a system of governance 
operates on the basis of rule-based behaviour and a combination of 
different instruments and processes, which may be identified as hard or 
soft law if the latter includes the social norms which have arisen through 
institutional practices and behaviour. Testing the hypothesis seeks to 
demonstrate that the CFSP impacts on the EU’s external sphere of 
governance and constitutional order beyond the measures provided for 
the CFSP in the Treaty. The wider impact of the CFSP as a system of 
governance can only be understood if the logics of appropriateness and 
law-like quality of norms are part of a process which operates in a linear 
direction or in a more diverse way. The importance of the social 
construction of institutions was highlighted as being part of March and 
Olsen’s ‘new institutionalism’ approach. Social constructivism rejects the 
notion of linear causality and the (realist) contention that individual 
preferences are fixed and given. Instead, constructivism opts for a 
discussion of how preferences and choices come about in relation to the 
strategic aims of actors. This suggests that the work of constructivists 
within international relations scholarship can be used in order to 
supplement the theoretical framework insofar as the search for how the 
social reality in which the CFSP exists and contributes to works.  
Refining institutionalism: the construction of social reality 
One branch of institutionalism has incorporated insights developed by 
constructivists, which came to prominence during the 1990s.64 Hall and 
Taylor identify this approach as ‘sociological institutionalism’,65 but 
‘institutional constructivism’ is the term preferred by Peters, whose 
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typology was followed above, and it is this latter term which is used in this 
thesis.66 The literature also refers to this branch as ‘modern’ or 
‘conventional’ constructivism.67 Constructivism has gained in academic 
popularity within scholars of European integration, although it does not 
purport to be a substantive theory of EU integration. Indeed, 
constructivism came relatively late to this field.68 Although 
constructivism has become influential in the International Relations 
discipline, it is also relevant for legal scholars seeking to transcend the 
law/political science divide in scholarship by attempting to comprehend 
both the rules and shared norms that make up the EU and its 
development.69  
Constructivism is a specific position in the philosophy of the social 
sciences,70 and it is difficult to define succinctly, in part because it also 
covers a variety of approaches. It is best understood as an approach to 
understanding systems of governance, rather than as a self-standing 
theory.71 As a central thrust, constructivists claim that social realities only 
exist by human agreement through intersubjective understanding and are 
therefore susceptible to change. Consequently, institutional 
constructivism pays particular attention to the role of institutions in 
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these realities. Institutional constructivism places emphasis on the 
importance of institutions in the constitution of actors and their 
interests. Through processes of interaction, institutional constructivists 
see the construction of identities and interests of those involved in 
systems of governance.72 The aim is not to seek to predict behaviour of 
institutions, but to provide an explanation of reasons for outcomes and 
changes73 and to provide theoretical and empirical explanations of social 
institutions and social change.74 Such changes can include the processes 
of norm transfer and the adoption of, for example, democratic standards 
in the countries which applied to join the EU during the 1990s and, within 
the EU, the shaping of domestic legal practices in the Member States by 
the ECJ.75 
As March and Olsen tell us, ‘institutionalism emphasizes the 
endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions’.76 
Constructivists regard institutions as important, as they see within 
institutions both formal rules and informal norms which constitute their 
interests, identities and preferences. This demonstrates the generally 
greater interest constructivists have in discussing ontological issues over 
epistemological debates.77 Institutionalism and constructivism 
complement each other without major conceptual difficulty. The 
significance of this is that constructivists focus their research more on the 
construction of social reality by norms and rules than on the processes of 
how this reality is created. They go much further than other 
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institutionalists, particularly rationalist and historical institutionalists, 
in recognising the role and significant of norms, ideas and culture.78 These 
norms and rules structure and provide actors with direction and goals for 
action.79 This point marks out their difference from realists/neo-realists 
who assume that actors’ self-interests are both given and fixed.80 For 
institutional constructivists, the goal is to take the impact of social factors 
such as ideas and norms seriously.81 International agreements embody 
shared norms which modify behaviour, interests and identities.82 In order 
for this modification to take place, however, norms and ideas must have 
authority and legitimacy and evoke trust. Not all ideas, therefore, become 
influential because they first need to be accepted and supported with 
power derived from the institution.83  
The significance of ideas, knowledge, intersubjectivities and 
discourses are upgraded within the study of institutions.84 Ideas are 
socially embedded and involve a social structuring element. They 
represent shared reference points that not only send the same message to 
different actors but which also cause the same behaviour among these 
actors through interpretation of these ideas.85 It therefore becomes 
possible for researchers to analyse how different actors behave in different 
contexts. The death penalty is again a good example here. The idea that 
abolition of the death penalty is part of modern, democratic statehood is 
shared by the Member States and has evolved into a pre-requisite to 
membership of the EU. As such, it forms part of the civilian 
power/normative power Europe arguments identified above. In terms of 
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the CFSP, the death penalty issue often arises in the political dialogue 
with third states that retain it. However, the behaviour of the EU can be 
markedly different depending on whether dialogue is with a democratic 
ally (such as the United States or Japan) or with a developing state in 
Africa or elsewhere. Analysis of the discourse employed by the EU could 
be a means by which the different behaviour as dependent on context 
could be seen. The difficulty in this is identifying when an ‘idea’ is the 
subject of common agreement, since in the absence of this it will be open 
to many different potential interpretations. However, that is not to say 
that this is alien to the study even of ’hard’ law: in the context of the EU, a 
directive may be subject to different interpretations in Member States. 
The importance, therefore, in the absence of an arbiter (such as the 
European Court of Justice) is to emphasise the importance of ideas having 
been institutionalised. 
 Once institutionalised, these norms and ideas contribute to an 
understanding of the social reality in which the actors exist, the identity 
of the actors, and in turn, the shaping of their interests by the formation 
of identities.86 The use of ‘identities’ in the plural is deliberate. This is 
particularly apt in the EU context, where the Member States have both 
individual and shared identities at national, EU and global level, which 
was evident over the Iraq issue in 2003. Applying these constructivist 
insights to European integration accounts for the impact the EU 
institutions have on the behaviour and the preferences and identities of 
individuals and Member States and vice versa.87 
The evolving nature of the CFSP fits with the focus on institutions as 
both catalysts for and agents of change.88 By highlighting and refining the 
role of institutions in the process of the construction of reality, 
institutional constructivism pays attention to the shaping of ideas and 
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norms through discursive practices by institutional power.89 As 
institutions, the EU and the CFSP can be seen, therefore, as means by 
which foreign policy ideas of the Member States can be changed over time.  
Institutional constructivism treats law as one of many tools which is 
capable of transforming the behaviour of actors by changing identities, 
aims and preferences in opposition to other disciplines in IR, primarily 
neorealism, in which law acts as a constraint on actors with fixed 
preferences.90 In seeking the ideas that are present in the EU and the CFSP 
as an institution, institutional constructivism accommodates the view 
that the EU is not an actor in international affairs in the conventional 
sense.91 Moreover, as an institution, it embodies a collective identity based 
on shared principles, ideas and norms: 
the constructivist approach … is to take 
account of the motives of actors, and the 
objective and social reality in which decisions 
are made. What is relevant here is the way in 
which actors interpret their reality, and often 
the importance that is attached to the role of 
ideas. Institutional rules and the ideas and 
norms that underpin them have significance 
for the behaviour of actors, shaping and 
changing their behaviour. The EU as an 
institution that embodies certain principles, 
including democracy, the rule of law, respect 
for human rights and free markets, offers a set 
of standards for the members to follow, to 
incorporate within the national structures, 
and hence the collective (international) 
identity of the European Union is formed.92  
Identifying this institutional identity of the EU has significant 
                                                   
89
 Kostakopoulou (n 41) 236. 
90
 D Trubek, P Cottrell and M Nance, '"Soft Law", "Hard Law" and EU Integration' in G de 
Búrca and J Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, Oxford 2006) 
70.  
91
 Rosamond (n 84) 471. 
92
 M Farrell, 'EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?' (2005) 10 
European Foreign Affairs Review 451, 455. 
134 
 
implications for the characteristics of the CFSP as a system of governance. 
Seeing the EU as an ‘open, pacific, principled, consensual network 
characterized by an unconventional, contra-Westphalian nature’,93 
provides a starting point for discussion of the extent to which this 
impacts on the CFSP as the focal point of the EU’s external relations. 
Using the constructivist approach to the CFSP underlines the centrality of 
collective values and on the view that actors are often motivated by moral 
or social concerns.94  
In this study, the collective values of the system of governance of the 
Union are sought, especially those which have been created and have 
evolved and been expressed in the context of the CFSP and the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. These reveal the extent to which the CFSP 
can be characterised as a system of governance endowed with a set of 
values, which help to illuminate how and why the EU has attempted or 
succeeded in promoting these values beyond its borders. The 
constructivists’ view that identities are multiple fits with the institutional 
arrangement of the CFSP, where different actors (Council, High 
Representative, Member States) play roles within the system of 
governance and may have differing values or be responsible for the 
promotion of certain values over others. Furthermore, identifying the 
core principles that the EU stands for goes some way towards examining 
whether these principles create norms which, through 
institutionalisation, influence others. Using constructivism in tandem 
with institutionalism points to the longer-term emergence of principles 
and the shaping of institutions, in contrast to rational choice 
institutionalism, which is more concerned with decision-making and 
short-term effects. If the EU can be seen as a normative power, the 
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emergence of this normative power not only defines the EU as an 
international actor but also underlines the importance of collective norms 
(both implementation of and transfer of norms) as a specific mode of 
international relations.95 The normative dimension to the EU as a power 
can also be found in the pursuit of non-interest based policies that are 
constructed through ethical reasoning. Thus ‘normative’ is more than 
adopting a set of norms or allowing for norms to effectively impact upon 
the Union’s international behaviour. 
Using constructivism to supplement the institutionalist approaches 
means that less emphasis is placed on how things are than how things 
became what they are, since the social construction of reality is process-
based.96 This chimes with the view of March and Olsen that institutions 
should be seen as processes rather than fixed organisations. 
Constructivists also see the processes of learning which result in 
socialisation and appropriate behaviour: March and Olsen’s ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ fit comfortably within the combination of these 
approaches.97 In the context of this thesis, the CFSP can be understood as 
an evolving process of institution and norm-building, which exists in and 
contributes to a social reality which can be observed. By exploring the way 
in which the CFSP operates beyond the Treaty-based competences, it 
becomes possible to evaluate how, in the context of European integration, 
it has engaged in an ‘open-ended institutional search process’.98  
Whilst the complementary approaches of institutionalism and 
constructivism focus on understanding the social reality in which 
institutions exist and evolve, their combined emphasis is on the 
emergence of social norms and their effects. The relationship between 
social and legal norms is less clear, and in order to offer answers to the 
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research questions within a legal context, the quality of legal norms 
merits attention. For this purpose, insights from the institutional theory 
of law are employed. 
The institutional theory of law 
A modern institutional tradition has arisen within legal theory, in which 
scholars have sought to approach law as an institutional normative order 
and the pursuit of identifying the nature of legal norms.99 The 
institutional theory of law was principally developed by MacCormick and 
Weinberger. Their ideas were refined separately at the outset but 
essentially contained a similar, innovative approach to legal theory: the 
avoidance of reducing law to duty-imposing norms by enlarging the scope 
of study to include principles, value and consequentialist argumentation 
relevant to legal decisions.100 This entailed a combination of legal 
positivism with Searle’s institutionalism and speech-act theory, whereby 
social facts depend on human agreement in order for them to exist.101 The 
institutional theory of law is part of the legal positivist tradition in that it 
assumes that the nature and existence of legal norms cannot be accounted 
for in terms of morality of brute fact, that is to say that their existence 
does not depend on satisfying any particular set of moral values of 
universal application to all legal systems.102 MacCormick and 
Weinberger’s joint aims in elaborating the institutional theory of law are 
set out as follows: 
Our institutional theory of law aims first to 
provide a sound ontological and 
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epistemological foundation for two equally 
valid and mutually complementary disciplines: 
legal dogmatics and the sociology of law. It 
aims second to make a contribution to the 
understanding of legal structures and to the 
methods proper to legal study. And it aims 
finally to show the place (and the limits) of 
practical reason in law and on human social 
life. These are matters with which any 
comprehensive theory of law must deal.103 
 These legal structures can be seen as legal institutions. These legal 
institutions create institutional legal facts, for example, contracts, trusts, 
personality, ownership etc.104 They can appropriately be termed as ‘legal 
institutions’ since they have a specific legal existence, albeit possibly in a 
temporal rather than spatial sense.105 There may not even be a physical 
existence in either space or time, but the institutional facts are 
nevertheless commonly thought of as existing106 because they are not 
merely concepts, but are given specific meaning through rules and 
conventions.107 Institutions can arise even without being specifically 
created by legislation, for example, by case law or conventions. It is 
possible to analyse constitutional norms as evolving through social 
practices108 and it is therefore perfectly possible to have a normative order 
without explicitly formulated norms.109 Constitutional norms can emerge 
and become respected not because they carry with them any formal 
enforcement mechanisms but because general opinion suggests that they 
should be followed. It is not necessarily the case that this general opinion 
is universal and it is likely that depending on the circumstances or social 
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setting, the norm may exhibit flexibility.110 For example, the CFSP 
declarations which express Union concern at events in a third country 
may depend on the sensibilities of the individual Member States or the 
healthiness of the relationship with the third state concerned. According 
to MacCormick, the acquisition of a more formal character in the use of 
norms leads to the expression of an institutional normative order, and 
therefore law.111 The emergence, development or evolution of norms can 
concurrently be a process of the emergence, development or evolution of 
institutions. 
March and Olsen contend that the basic building blocks of 
institutions are rules, a view which is certainly compatible with any legal 
analysis of institutions.112 According to the logic of appropriateness, 
actions are seen as rule-based.113 Social constructivists also point to the 
importance of rules and norms in the make-up of the EU.114 Yet, rules are 
not only regulative but constitutive, that is they define a set of practices 
which make up a particular social activity: recognition of this is at the 
heart of the distinction between constructivists and neorealists.115 This is 
common to MacCormick and Weinberger’s view of legal systems as 
dynamic systems which do not only result from the substantive and 
procedural rules of law.116 They also recognise that nation states are not 
the only instances of institutional normative order in the world, as 
demonstrated by the existence of regional and global institutions and 
organisation including, inter alia, the EU and UN.117 The EU in particular 
represents a challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty for the 
Member States and the institutional theory of law is open to the 
                                                   
110
 MacCormick (n 99) 19. 
111
 MacCormick (n 99) 20. 
112
 March and Olsen (n 12) 22. 
113
 March and Olsen (n 9) 951. 
114
 Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener (n 68) 539. 
115
 Ruggie (n 94) 871. 
116
 March and Olsen (n 34) 19. 
117
 N MacCormick, 'Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts' (1998) Law and 
Philosophy 301, 331. 
139 
 
possibility of pluralism in sovereign (or even post-sovereign) legal 
orders.118 Although the notion of a ‘dynamic legal system’ is credited to 
Kelsen and his Pure Theory, the institutional theory of law rejects 
Kelsen’s view that legal dynamics are ‘internal’ and shielded from 
observable social processes. The institutional theory of law underscores 
the interplay of socially existent norms and observable features of social 
life, and takes the basis of legal dynamics to lie in this interplay. 
 Legal institutions can be treated as distinct social phenomena.119 
This, however, poses the issue of how social and legal institutions are 
distinguished or distinguishable. According to Ruiter, there is a 
corresponding relationship between legal and social institutions. A legal 
institution is a system of a state of affairs and activities which must have a 
counterpart in social reality so that the institution can also exist as a 
social institution:120  
The system determines the institution’s 
objectives, its internal and external 
organization, and the ways in which it can be 
developed. Thus, it provides an elaborate 
picture of a practice that counts as the 
corresponding social institution. Accordingly, 
a social institution is a collection of social 
relationships that is treated as a distinct social 
phenomenon because it is organized in 
conformity with the overall picture presented 
by a valid legal institution and its regime.121 
 The distinction is also made between normative and real 
institutions, though the category of ‘real’ includes socially-constructed 
institutions as well as those in material existence. Normative institutions 
are ‘institution-concepts’ which make up a legal system, and determine 
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what possibilities for action exist within a legal system.122 Real 
institutions are the practices associated with normative institutions: 
In the case of ideal entities, their character as 
real will appear to be in the one hand founded 
upon their connection with the sphere of 
material reality and to be on the other hand 
conditioned by the facts which allow one to 
pick out ideal entities as constituent parts of 
real events and therefore as something 
participating in temporal existence.123 
 MacCormick, in an article published in 1998,124 accepts criticism of 
his earlier notion that there is a need for rules (normative institutions) 
before there can be institutional facts. This is relevant here, especially 
when considering the practices taken under European Political 
Cooperation before the CFSP was more clearly defined in the TEU. The 
issue is therefore to return to consideration of when something ‘counts’ in 
institutional terms. According to Searle’s notion of a ‘constitutive rule’: 
That the one counts as the other depends on 
the possibility of interpreting what occurs in 
the light of a norm or norms, that may range 
from the most informal implicit norm or 
convention to the most highly formalized and 
articulated rule.125 
 The existence of the legal system, therefore, within the institutional 
theory of law, is not only in the ‘normative system’ but also in the fact that 
it is visible as ‘a matter of what is actually existent in social reality’.126 In 
using the institutional theory of law, it is therefore possible to conceive 
the CFSP as a legal institution, which is equipped with rules and 
procedures and as an institutional order, since it represents a shared 
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framework of understanding an interpretation amongst actors within a 
social setting.127 Within MacCormick and Weinberger’s theory, therefore, 
it is impossible to consider the legal system without reference to social 
reality. Ruiter claims that the question is no longer how the concept of a 
legal system can help us to legitimise legal norms of conduct. Moreover, 
the question is ‘what kind of results stemming from human activity, can 
obtain legal validity as elements of a legal system?’.128 Norms of conduct 
develop over time, since ‘practices evolve and develop as people find ways 
of articulating or realizing aims, ends, or values’.129 One issue which 
remains problematic is the distinction between rules and habits, and 
under what circumstances the former can become the latter and vice 
versa. This would seem to be an important distinction to make, because an 
understanding of ‘law’ places emphasis on the existence of rules. However, 
it is not necessarily the case that habits or practices always necessitate the 
explicit formulation of rules; this may only occur if a practice is breaking-
down or being questioned.130 What this signifies here is that rules, which 
are often formulated in institutionalised contexts, do not account for a 
full description of the workings of either the institutions or wider society. 
Hence, institutional forms and practices are just as relevant in 
considering the existence and operation of a system of governance as 
formal rules. 
 The institutional theory of law has been employed by Curtin and 
Dekker131 to explain the set-up and workings of the EU’s legal system by 
the application of the concept of ‘legal institution’ to the EU. They 
contend that the Union has a unitary, if complex, legal system which 
                                                   
127
 N MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: a Theory of Legal Reasoning (OUP, 
Oxford 2005) 6. 
128
 Ruiter (n 119) 363. 
129
 MacCormick (n 117) 333. 
130
 MacCormick (n 99) 68. 
131
 DM Curtin and IF Dekker, 'The EU as a "Layered" International Organisation: 
Institutional Unity in Disguise' in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP, Oxford 1999). 
142 
 
emerged from the TEU.132 From this, it follows that the traditional, 
doctrinal legal analysis of the CFSP would be to examine its legal base 
within the Treaty, including the competences of those involved (the 
Council, High Representative etc.). The institutional theory of law, 
however, looks beyond what is merely written in the text, in order to allow 
for an analysis of the CFSP as a ‘legal institution’. This makes it possible to 
conduct a legal analysis of what has been done under the CFSP since its 
creation in order to complete a fuller picture of the CFSP as a legal 
institution. Curtin and Dekker underline the importance of legal practices 
which recognise the existence of a phenomenon and hence a legal 
institution.133 These ‘legal practices’ are actions which make the legal 
institution an ‘operational entity’. An ‘operational entity’ does not 
necessarily entail the type of formally constituted (that is, Treaty-based) 
outputs in the CFSP, but acts of cooperation and negotiation in a legal 
institution, adherence to general principles, the establishment of decision-
making or executive organs, of procedures followed in order to ensure 
compliance with legal norms or in the appointment of agents for the 
implementation of regulations.134  
 Curtin and Dekker in their analysis of the EU as a layered 
international organisation see the CFSP as a sub-legal system emerging 
from the EU’s legal order.135 They point to the legal practices of the CFSP, 
such as Joint Actions and Common Positions as indicative of the 
actorness, presence and capability of EU in conducting a foreign policy.136 
If it is therefore possible to regard the CFSP as an institution, and to 
examine the practices associated within it as institutionalised, it is also 
therefore possible to search for institutional facts. These can arise beyond 
the formal, Treaty-based legal practices. Hulsen, in his exploration of the 
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emergence of institutional facts, states that; 
the facticity of an institutional fact depends on 
its being internalized by the members of a 
group. For it is only on this condition that an 
institutional fact can have the same kind of 
incontestability as a brute fact. In short, it is 
only in this way that an institutional fact can 
be a fact.137 
 It follows from this that the CFSP becomes a socially constructed 
institution if it is accepted as such by the members of the group.138 the 
CFSP should not just be seen as a form of intergovernmental political 
cooperation, but as a ‘living institution’ of the type identified earlier in 
this chapter, capable of producing effects beyond those laid down in the 
Treaty: 
The presented concept of legal order assumes 
an objective presence of legal norms when 
relations between states are concerned. If one 
is prepared to accept the systemic relations 
between legal norms, one can also accept the 
existence of a CFSP legal order as a system of 
valid legal norms derived from the competence 
of states to conclude international legal 
agreements.139 
 In this respect, the CFSP is taken to be a self-standing institution 
which is capable of building up norms. The question is then whether these 
norms can diffuse to other policy areas within the EU’s system of 
governance. This does not entail looking for ground-breaking changes 
which can be traced to a particular moment in the institution’s 
development. Indeed, more routine standards of behaviour are significant, 
and ‘in this normative conception of institutions it is the routine and the 
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mundane that appear most important’.140  
Conclusion: creating an analytical framework 
The purpose of this thesis is to engage in analysis of the CFSP by going 
beyond traditional, competence-based legal approaches and characterising 
the CFSP as both a sub-legal system within the EU’s legal order, and as a 
system of governance. This helps to explain how the formal-legal 
constitutionalism of the Union’s legal order works in practice.141 In order 
to do so, the norms and institutions which have arisen in the practice of 
the CFSP are sought. It is necessary to look for both norms and 
institutions in equal measure, so that the practices, ideas and identities of 
the actors involved in the CFSP demonstrate how the policy works in 
practice and the effects it has on other policy areas. Through an 
institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis, the institutions 
and social practices of the CFSP are brought to the fore. In accounting for 
the presence of the institutions and social practices in the CFSP, the next 
step is to consider what consequences arise for the future of the policy, 
the EU’s external relations in general and other ‘internal’ policy areas. The 
task then is to identify the institutions, according to March and Olsen’s 
definition, which have arisen in the context of the CFSP and their 
relationship with norms. The relationship between norms and 
institutions should be two-way: institutions structure the social reality in 
which the CFSP exists, and permit norms to arise and sustain them. This 
is termed the ‘dual quality’ of norms.142 In turn, the norms influence the 
changing nature of institutions and institutional development. Taken 
together, it is possible to identify the logics of appropriateness which 
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influence not only the institutions and Member States of the EU, but 
possibly also other actors too, in particular, non Member States. This is 
important because of the contribution to fulfilling the aims of the CFSP 
that could be made if the norms and institutions can be seen as having a 
substantial impact on both members and non-members. It is also 
important in seeing how the relationship between the CFSP and other 
policy areas is evolving, if at all, and what effects the norms and 
institutions have beyond this policy area. This will enable answers to the 
central hypothesis to be offered through a detailed case study. 
 The case-study chosen in this thesis is the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EuroMed) and, as a substantive law and policy sphere within 
this partnership, the issue of migration. This has been chosen as a case 
study for five principal reasons. First, the Mediterranean is a geographical 
and policy area upon which the EU has placed considerable importance 
and devoted significant financial and other resources. Although there 
have been marked periods of greater or lesser activism in relation to the 
Mediterranean, it is nevertheless one of the prime regions which has 
occupied the foreign policy agenda of the Union since the creation of the 
CFSP and even before. EuroMed has a longer history, but exists in a 
parallel, complementary way to the more recent European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). Taking into account the problem of when practices become 
regular enough to be seen as an institution, as EuroMed is almost as old as 
the CFSP itself, a longer term perspective of its development can be made. 
The Mediterranean is an area of global strategic importance, in which all 
EU Member States have an interest (to a greater or lesser extent) and one 
within which Europe as a whole has a vital role to play. The Partnership 
was not created by a CFSP instrument, or indeed on the basis of any 
formal Treaty article, but it consequently became the subject of the CFSP 
Common Strategy for the Mediterranean.143 The links which can be made 
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between the objectives of the CFSP and the system of governance which 
has been created in EuroMed helps to make the process of identifying 
processes and norms more visible.  
Second, there are clear links that can be made with other policy 
spheres because of the proximity of the Mediterranean states. Migration, 
trade, the environment and intercultural dialogue are prominent 
examples which have played a role in the Partnership. These have all been 
the focus of attention within the institutions of the partnership. 
Migration has been selected because it is of particular importance to the 
EU institutions, and EU and non-EU states which are part of the 
Partnership, and there has been a great increase in the instances where 
the importance of migration issues are underlined both internally and 
externally. Migration is interesting because it did not appear initially as a 
raison d’être of the Partnership in the early official documentation, but 
has since become a central theme in Euro-Mediterranean relations, the 
analysis of which allows for a rich source of interactions between spheres 
of internal and external governance. Discussion of and action on 
migration has become increasingly present on the agenda of the EU 
institutions. 
Third, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is an arrangement 
between the EU, its institutions and Member States, and partners around 
the Mediterranean. The latter, stretching from Morocco in the West to 
Jordan in the East, do not form a homogenous group. The Partnership is 
therefore much more complex and dynamic in its multi-level 
relationships than is the case for the EU’s bilateral relations with a single 
third country. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the ‘joint 
ownership’ of the policy and institutions between the EU and the 
partners. Migration also reflects this multi-faceted nature of EuroMed 
relations, since the different dimensions of migration in the 
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Mediterranean cover regular and irregular migration flows with the 
Partner States as both sending and transit countries for migrants to the 
EU. 
Fourth, and following from this, the Mediterranean is a case where 
the ‘blurring’ between what is seen as internal and external policy-making 
is particularly evident. Some Partner States have completed the transition 
to full EU members, and others may follow. Since EuroMed exhibits 
features familiar to the enlargement process, and in a sense could be seen 
in similar terms of extending the Union’s system of governance model.144 
Questions about to what extent traditional nation state borders apply in 
this institutional framework are of great significance. 
Finally, the policy has specific aims, objectives and tools, as 
demonstrated by the elaborate institutional framework which has been 
set up. This makes it appropriate for an analysis of institutions and norms 
created within, and the logics of appropriateness which both constrain 
actors and create opportunities and expectations for action. Once these 
norms have been identified, it is possible to see how and to what extent 
they reflect the characteristics of governance, how the CFSP has 
developed and what effect is has had on other spheres. 
 In order to use EuroMed as a case study, it is necessary to revisit the 
hypothesis and research questions identified in the introduction and pose 
additional questions tailed to the empirical scope of analysis, on the basis 
of the theoretical framework elaborated in this chapter. This will, in turn, 
allow for answers to the main research questions to be offered in the final 
chapter. To recall the hypothesis and research questions posed in the 
introduction: 
 Assuming that it is possible to characterise it as a system of 
governance, the CFSP can be seen to have consequences beyond the 
Treaty-based instruments and, as such, it is an integral part of the 
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 First, what are the characteristics of ‘governance’ and how and why 
is this term appropriate for characterising the CFSP? 
 Second, how does this approach to understanding the CFSP differ 
from a traditional, diplomacy-based foreign policy? What are the 
goals and instruments associated with foreign policy that could be 
expected to be seen within the CFSP? 
 Third, does the use of the terminology of ‘governance’ help to 
explain the institutional development of the CFSP and if so, how?  
 Fourth, what are the legal outcomes in the EU’s external relations, 
which can be traced to the institutional development of the CFSP?  
 Fifth, how can the relationship between the CFSP and other EU 
policies with an external dimension be characterised, and is this 
relationship evolving or static? 
The characteristics and uses of ‘governance’ in both the general and 
EU sense have already been addressed in earlier chapters. The empirical 
focus of the case study of EuroMed and migration will help to offer 
answers to the above questions through the following lines of inquiry: 
 
 How has EuroMed developed and what practices or sets of practices 
have arisen from its institutional structure? 
 To what extent does EuroMed exhibit the goals and instruments 
that we would expect to see in foreign policy? 
 Can EuroMed be characterised as a system of governance and what 
does the social reality it exists in and contributes to reveal about 
the relationship between EuroMed and the CFSP? 
 What is the relationship between EuroMed and ‘internal’ policy 
making? Can the legal outcomes visible in the area of migration law 
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be traced to the CFSP? 
 
The following chapters explore the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
the development of migration law and policy at EU level and the 
relationship between these and the CFSP. In doing so, the thesis 
demonstrates that although the CFSP instruments have been used only 
sparingly in the context of the Mediterranean, the advent of the Barcelona 
Process and its development has been used to fulfil goals in both the CFSP 
and migration law and policy. It is possible therefore to see the 
development of discursive links emerging from the CFSP and its 
intergovernmental frame. This has promoted discussion of foreign policy 
issues within the wider context of European integration, to the use of the 
system of governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 
‘external’ dimension of migration policy for the fulfilment of the CFSP 
goals as laid down in the Treaty.  
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Chapter 4: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a System 
of Governance 
Understanding the CFSP of the EU as a system of governance requires 
greater scrutiny of the complexity of the EU’s relationships with non-
Member States. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EuroMed/the 
Barcelona Process) provides a rich source of interactions within the 
context of an elaborate institutional framework and against the 
background of a complex history in the region. It must be noted at this 
juncture that EuroMed was not the direct product of one of the CFSP 
instruments provided for in the TEU. Although it was subsequently the 
subject of a CFSP Common Strategy in 2000, EuroMed was not created 
pursuant to any specific Treaty article. Nevertheless, analysis of its aims 
and development demonstrates that it shares close affinity with the 
Treaty-based aims of the CFSP. 
 EuroMed is a general and holistic framework for relations between 
the EU and the states around the Mediterranean Sea, initially created by 
the Barcelona Declaration 1995.1 As made explicit through the 
subsequently created the CFSP Common Strategy in 2000, it is also the 
frame within which the EU conducts its foreign policy towards the region 
and the states in the region. The stated aim of the Barcelona Declaration 
was to create an area of peace, stability and prosperity across the 
Mediterranean through cooperation amongst the partners in areas 
characterised as ‘baskets’: a political and security partnership to establish 
a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial 
partnership, and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. 
Cooperation on migration, social interaction, justice and security has 
been added as a fourth area of cooperation since 2005.2 It is not without 
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significance for the arguments here that EuroMed is known as the 
Barcelona Process: the gradual institutionalisation of the framework 
across the baskets towards the general aim of creating a shared area of 
peace, stability and prosperity serves as a useful concept in seeing 
EuroMed as a way of moving towards substantial change in the 
governance of the Mediterranean area. The task here is to demonstrate 
how EuroMed has emerged as a system of governance, strongly inspired by 
that of the EU but including non-Member States as actors.  
The institutional framework and the extensive historical and 
economic relationships which form the backdrop to EuroMed do not 
automatically make a ‘system of governance’ an appropriate 
characterisation of the partnership. What does allow for this 
characterisation is the nature of the relationships which function through 
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral forms, and as a result setting 
EuroMed apart from, for example, the EU’s relations with a single third-
state. The multilateral aspects of EuroMed are the most significant in 
terms of seeing it as an example of regional governance at work, yet 
understanding it in this way also relies on comprehension of how the 
bilateral and unilateral aspects shape the progress of the Barcelona 
Process. Recalling the exploration of EU governance in chapter one, where 
the internal/external policy division was seen to be of increasingly limited 
significance, the Mediterranean provides a good example of why this is so. 
This is in part due to the proximity of the Mediterranean states, some of 
which have been included in the enlargement process, but also by the 
impact of political and economic decisions and policies by the EU on the 
Partner States and, to a certain extent, vice versa. One particular area 
where this is clear is migration law and policy, explored in the context of 
EuroMed in chapter six. Migration law and policy is not an area of specific 
competence of the CFSP, but it does demonstrate how the foreign policy 
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goals as articulated in the Treaty are translated into legal and policy 
outputs in an area and in a manner which blurs the internal/external 
dimensions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to EuroMed 
and to explore the development and operation of its institutions, 
relationships and the system of governance that has consequently 
emerged. This involves analysis of the institutional framework as 
elaborated by the Barcelona Process, and also the institutions (according 
to March and Olsen’s definition) which have emerged from the sets of 
practices and rules which define appropriate behaviour.3 The chapter also 
places EuroMed within the context of the more recent European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which does not replace the Barcelona Process, but 
which covers all the EuroMed partners (except Turkey, Albania and 
Mauritania) in addition to the Union’s neighbours in the East. The 
‘Barcelona Process: Union of the Mediterranean’ initiative of the French 
EU Presidency is also examined. This is followed by a discussion of the 
(emerging) characteristics of the system of governance of the EuroMed 
space, and in particular whether the principle of joint ownership of the 
Barcelona Process by the EU and the Partner States is substantiated. 
EuroMed and ‘the Mediterranean’ region 
Before considering the institutionalisation of the relationships between 
actors in the region, it is important to note the complexities of this 
geographical and political space. Although the Mediterranean Sea is a 
defined geographical feature, ‘the Mediterranean’ as a political space is 
less evident. Covering parts of Europe (including the Western Balkans), 
North Africa and the Middle East, ‘the Mediterranean’ does not easily fit 
into existing structures in International Relations as a defined region. The 
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 JG March and JP Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' 
(1998) 52 International Organization 943, 948. 
154 
 
nature of the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean has not been 
consistent in terms of its geographical focus. Whilst the participants of 
EuroMed can be seen as divided between EU Member States to the North 
and non-members to the South, the geo-political map is complicated by 
the status of Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in North Africa 
surrounded by Morocco), Gibraltar and the Sovereign Base Areas of 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus (all of which remain under UK 
sovereignty) at strategic points in the Mediterranean, and the growth of 
the EU to gradually take in states in the region, most recently Malta and 
Cyprus who have changed their EuroMed status from initial Partner 
States to full EU Member States. Croatia and Turkey are also currently 
pursuing this course, with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro 
as the only other EuroMed Partner States with both the ambitions and 
prospects of eventually joining the Union. Morocco’s attempt to apply for 
membership in 1987 was firmly rejected by the Council,4 and the TEU 
subsequently made clear that membership is only open to ‘European’ 
states.5 This does not imply therefore that participation in EuroMed 
indicates potential future EU membership for those states not considered 
to be ‘European’. 
Amongst the non-EU partners of EuroMed, there exist great 
differences in political systems, levels of economic and democratic 
development and depth of neighbourly relations. Therefore, they cannot 
be characterised as collectively making up a region in any other way than 
their geographical proximity to each other. The region is also where some 
of the most complex and long-term issues in world affairs are centred, and 
as a result, the region is often characterised as perpetually embroiled in 
conflict, the threat of conflict or, at best, tension. For this reason, the 
Council is aware that fulfilling its objectives in the CFSP is inherently 
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 Bulletin of the European Community, 9-1987, point 2.2.19. 
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related to regional policies, of which EuroMed is a prime example.6 This is 
crucial in understanding how the relationship between the systems of 
governance in the EU, the CFSP and EuroMed exists. 
Aside from the Barcelona Process, few projects for Mediterranean-
wide economic or political integration have been sustained. Although 
regional organisations have been created from time to time, none have 
capitalised on promises for economic or political integration on a region-
wide basis, or included all the (Southern) Mediterranean states.7 Trade 
agreements have tended to be full of exceptions and rarely ratified or 
implemented. In this respect, the difference between the Southern 
partners compared to the emergent European identity in the states 
bordering the North of the Mediterranean Sea is stark. Many of the states 
around the Mediterranean have suffered from long-term political 
instability and frequent changes in governments and political directions. 
This has hampered long-term engagement projects with neighbouring 
states. In the post-Cold War era, the depth of relations each state has (or 
not) with the United States, and the emphasis each places within their 
national foreign policies, cuts across the area rather than unifies it. One 
point in common as far as the EU is concerned, however, is that all the 
states around the Mediterranean have strong connections with mainland 
Europe, stretching back to Antiquity. Colonisation of much of the 
Mediterranean, and the drawing up of post-war national boundaries by 
Europeans has left physical, political and cultural legacies on the 
Southern Mediterranean and contributed to issues at the forefront of 
domestic debates in EU states, such as migration. Economic ties between 
the EU and Mediterranean are extensive, although the economic strength 
of the two sides of the Mediterranean is vastly different. 
As a consequence, understanding ‘the Mediterranean’ as a region of 
                                                   
6
 Common Strategy of the European Union 2000/458/CFSP on the Mediterranean region 
[2000] OJ L 183. 
7
 T Christiansen, F Petito and B Tonra, 'Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: the 
European Union's "Near Abroad"' (2000) 35 Cooperation and Conflict 389, 401.  
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political and economic interactions automatically makes the EU one of 
the actors in this space. The EU has always bordered the Mediterranean 
Sea since its creation,8 and through successive enlargements has seen its 
frontiers extended along its shores. The EU Member States maintain their 
own bilateral relations with the non-Member States, and as may be 
expected, the Member States which have been most active in the 
development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are France, Spain, 
Portugal, Malta, Italy and, to a more limited extent, Greece and Cyprus.9 
Nevertheless, other non-Mediterranean Member States have devoted 
significant resources and efforts in the Partnership, in particular Finland 
and Sweden.10 In addition to the EC association agreements with 
individual states, which pre-date the Barcelona Process,11 the 
Mediterranean has long been the focus of EU external policies, which were 
conducted under the auspices of European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
the Euro-Arab Dialogue and Global Mediterranean Policy during the 1970s, 
the Renovated Mediterranean Policy in the 1980s and the Venice 
Declaration on the Middle East 1980.12 As the titles of these policies 
suggest, and given the unclear concept of ‘the Mediterranean’ as a region, 
policies were generally divided between those towards Maghreb (Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia) and the Mashreq (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and 
                                                   
8
 It might also be noted here that pre-independence Algeria, being part of France, meant 
that in the 1957-62 period, the Community also had a Southern Mediterranean frontier. 
9
 M Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean (Routledge, 
Oxford 2006), 91. A recent example is provided by the Priorities in External Relations of 
the Portuguese EU Presidency 2007, where the Mediterranean was listed as the first 
priority: Portuguese Presidency of the Council, 'A Stronger Union for a Better World' 
(2007) <http://www.eu2007.pt/NR/rdonlyres/B9B87547-C363-43FB-A5FF-
67D4D2C39B72/0/PrioridadesEN.pdf > (accessed 25 July 2008). 
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 Interview with Council Official (Brussels, September 2008). 
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 The first Association Agreements concluded by then European Community were with 
Greece (1961), Turkey (1963). These were followed by Agreements with Malta (1970), 
Portugal (1972), Cyprus (1973), Israel (1975), Algeria (1976), Tunisia (1976), Egypt (1977), 
Jordan (1977), Lebanon (1977), Syria (1977), and Morocco (1978). 
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 S Stavridis and J Hutchence, 'Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy' 
(2000) 5 European Foreign Affairs Review 35, 38; F Tanner, 'North Africa: Partnership, 
Exceptionalism and Neglect' in R Dannreuther (ed) European Foreign and Security 
Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy (Routledge, Abingdon 2004). 
157 
 
Syria). It would be erroneous to suggest that the (Southern) Mediterranean 
has always been at the forefront of external policy-making. As Bicchi has 
noted, there have only been sparse periods of sustained activity on the 
part of the EU towards the region during its existence, with long periods 
in inactivity, such as the 1980s.13 The first period of activity on the part of 
the EU was following the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy. This aimed to 
create a wide free-trade area in industrial goods across the Mediterranean, 
with funds destined for economic development, but Member States could 
not agree on what trade concessions to make to the non-Member States 
(which included future EU Members such as Spain, Portugal and Greece), 
and the impetus for such a grand project was soon lost.14  
The second period of activity in European policy-making in the 
Mediterranean occurred during and immediately after the geo-political 
changes at the end of the Cold War at the same time as the elaboration of 
the CFSP. Initiatives launched by EU Member States included the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)15, 
the Western Mediterranean Forum/5 + 5 Dialogue16 and the Mediterranean 
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 F Bicchi, 'Defining European Interests in Foreign Policy: Insights from the 
Mediterranean Case' (2002) University of Oslo Centre for European Studies, ARENA 
Working Paper No. 13/03 <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-
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 Tsoukalis, in an article published in 1977, notes that ‘global’ was a rather exaggerated 
term for a policy only dealing with trade and aid. The lack of concessions on trade in 
agricultural goods and the oil crises of the 1970s were also factors contributing to the 
demise of the Global Mediterranean Policy: L Tsoukalis, 'The EEC and the Mediterranean: 
is ‘Global’ Policy a Misnomer?' (1977) 53 International Affairs 422 
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 Proposed by the Spanish and Italian governments in 1990 and designed to include the 
EU, US, Mediterranean and Gulf States within a regional institutional framework, 
discussing and cooperating on issues including security and economics. The CSCM goals 
were never realised, although an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly has met on four 
occasions, most recently in Napflion, Greece in 2005: Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, 'Final Declaration' (2005) 
<http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/cscm05.htm> (accessed 25 July 2008). 
16
 The Western Mediterranean Forum was a French initiative proposed during the same 
period as for the CSCM, but as an informal forum for dialogue with no fixed goals. The 
participants were four EU states; France, Spain, Italy and Portugal with Malta and five 
North African states; Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. The focus on 
cooperation was more on economic, rather than political, cooperation. It was frozen in 
1992 but relaunched by Portugal in 2001 as the 5 + 5 dialogue by the Declaration of Lisbon 
of 26 January 2001. At the first meeting of Heads of State and Government in Tunis in 
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Forum.17 A lack of institutionalisation in the frameworks has meant that 
the initiatives remained purely informal, ad hoc intergovernmental 
dialogues. As the Mediterranean began to feature more prominently on 
the foreign policy agenda of the Council, the need for a Mediterranean-
wide policy was stressed by a number of Member States, in particular 
France and Spain, at a time when the EU’s attention was fixed more 
closely on developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The limitations of 
informal processes of dialogue both past and present also provided the 
impetus for institutionalisation within EuroMed.18 In this way, EuroMed 
can be seen as a successor to early projects, although the means and aims 
were substantially different. Positive developments in the Middle East 
Peace Process also gave impetus to the search for a new policy covering 
Eastern Mediterranean countries as well as those in Northern Africa.19 
Issues of concern to non-Mediterranean EU Member States, in particular 
migration and the effects of instability in the Middle East, mean that most 
EU members see the relevance of EuroMed within their domestic systems 
and the importance of stability and prosperity on the Southern borders as 
well as those in the East.20 This period of activity eventually resulted in 
the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, during the Spanish Presidency of the 
EU, which launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
To these two periods of European activity towards frameworks for 
cooperation must be added a third. French President Sarkozy, during his 
national election campaign in May 2007, announced his proposal for a 
                                                                                                                                                
2003, the Dialogue was described in the final Declaration as a ‘regional forum for 
consultation, cooperation and comprehensive thinking’: Heads of State and Government 
of The Western Mediterranean Countries: the 5+5 Dialogue, 'Tunis Declaration' (2003) 
<http://www.5plus5.tn/english/index_en.htm#  > (accessed 25 July 2008). 
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 Distinct from the Western Mediterranean Forum (now the 5 + 5 Dialogue) the 
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Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. It also 
operates on an informal basis and is only open to states wishing to discuss cooperative 
projects. Due to a lack of a funding mechanism, such projects have not been forthcoming. 
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 Christiansen, Petito and Tonra (n 7) 403. 
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 S Dosenrode and A Stubkjær, The European Union and the Middle East (Sheffield 
Academic Press, London 2002) 126. 
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Union Méditerranéenne (Mediterranean Union) as a key policy priority. 
The details of this plan were not supported by detailed policy documents. 
It was however clear from his speech in Toulon that the aim was for some 
type of Union between the EU Member States with Mediterranean 
coastlines (France, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) and 
South coasts of the Mediterranean, based on the early days of the 
Community, but a separate entity from the EU.21 This would exclude non-
Mediterranean EU Member States, which prompted German Federal 
Chancellor Merkel to express strong doubts as to the legal and political 
viability of doing so. The Union Méditerranéenne quickly became 
refashioned as a renewal of the Barcelona Process, to be understood as 
building on the progress made, rather than representing a break from the 
past.22 It adopted a variety of innovations and working methods which 
had in fact already been discussed in EuroMed in recent years.23 As a 
renewal of EuroMed as laid down in the content of the Joint Paris 
Declaration, the changes brought about to EuroMed are considered below. 
The focus of this case study is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
and ‘the Mediterranean’ is therefore understood as a political space, as 
opposed to a defined geographical space, which incorporates a variety of 
actors: all EU Member States, non-EU states bordering or in proximity to 
the Mediterranean Sea, the institutions of the EU (primarily the 
Commission, Council and Parliament), common institutions created by 
the Barcelona Process and the involvement of civil society, experts and 
non-governmental actors. 
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 N Sarkozy, 'Presidential Election Campaign Speech in Toulon, France' (2007) 
<www.sarkozy.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=7fevrier2007_Toulon_DiscoursNS.pdf
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 Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, ‘Joint Declaration of the Barcelona 
Conference and its Work Programme (Joint Paris Declaration)’ (Paris, 13 July 2008). 
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 Interview with Council Official (Brussels, September 2008). 
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EuroMed is both a partnership between the EU and non-member 
Partner States and also a frame for the EU’s foreign policy in the region. 
To what extent these two characterisations of EuroMed differ is explored 
later in this chapter. In contrast to the previous initiatives alluded to 
above, the Barcelona Process represents, for the first time, a holistic and 
comprehensive policy towards the entire Mediterranean region which 
addressing wide-ranging and cross-cutting issues. A reading of the 
founding text of EuroMed, the Barcelona Declaration, does not 
immediately suggest that the purposes of EuroMed are confined to any 
one particular sphere. The terminology in the Declaration refers to the 
‘strategic’ importance of the Mediterranean for all those involved, and 
‘strategic’ here has political and economic connotations. Reflecting the 
EU’s importance in terms of its economic strength, trade and economic 
relations nevertheless feature strongly in the Declaration. This is a 
common feature of most of the EU’s relationships with third states and 
regions across the globe. Yet few of the EU’s external relationships have 
such an emphasis on non-economic issues as well. Indeed, the only 
instances where this does occur to such an extent is in the EU’s other 
neighbourhoods, that is in the Western Balkans and with certain 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have not or not yet joined 
the EU. The Barcelona Declaration is also notable for the importance 
attached to intercultural dialogue, which has also begun to play a larger 
part in EuroMed than in the early stages of the Barcelona process, as a 
result of tensions between Europe and its Mediterranean Partners such as 
those surrounding the Danish cartoons in 2006. Intercultural dialogue is 
not restricted to state-to-state cultural dialogue, but cuts across national 
boundaries to cover, for example, dialogue between different religious 
faiths. Considerable importance is placed on promoting ‘grassroots’ 
cultural cooperation in a variety of different fields, which the Council 
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considers to be key to the value added nature of EuroMed.24 
According to the Barcelona Declaration 1995, a ‘comprehensive 
partnership … through strengthened political dialogue, the development 
of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, 
cultural and human dimension’ was created.25 The partnership brought 
together the European Union and its ‘Mediterranean Partners’: Algeria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. All the Partners border the 
Mediterranean Sea except for Jordan, which has been included because of 
its proximity to the Mediterranean and influence in, specifically, the 
Palestinian Territories. The presence of Jordan underlines the context in 
which the Barcelona Declaration was agreed, namely the renewed hope for 
a lasting solution to the Middle East conflict in the early 1990s.26 Balkan 
states were not invited to the first Barcelona Conference: given that the 
Middle East Peace Process was the catalyst for engaging more fully with 
the Mediterranean Partners, it was felt on the EU side that the Balkans 
(which was only just emerging from its own conflicts) would be best dealt 
with under a separate framework.27 
Despite its lack of statehood, the Palestinian Authority is included as 
a full partner in EuroMed and although its bilateral agreement with the 
EU is different in some aspects of substance and form, for the purposes of 
EuroMed (and this thesis), it is referred to as a Partner State. Since the 
beginning of Barcelona Process, two of the partners, Malta and Cyprus, 
have become EU Member States. The first enlargement on the Partner 
State side occurred when Albania and Mauritania were invited to join 
EuroMed as full participants in November 2007. Albania requested to join 
EuroMed because it is a Mediterranean state and has an interest in 
advancing its EU membership ambitions through involvement in regional 
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 Preamble, Barcelona Declaration 1995. 
26
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fora. Its expression of interest in joining, along with that of Mauritania, 
was the subject of long discussion as it was felt on the EU side that the 
focus of EuroMed should remain on issues linked to developments in the 
Middle East. This has now changed given that the aims of the Barcelona 
Process have moved away from the Middle East Peace Process and into 
other areas including migration.28 During its first months in participating, 
Albania has been active in finding a role as a bridge between the EU and 
Member States.29 Mauritania does not border the Mediterranean Sea, but it 
was invited to the initial Barcelona summit as an observer, and 
subsequently requested full membership. It is a member of regional bodies 
including the Arab Maghreb Union (of which all other members are 
participants in EuroMed) and has been included in previous EU initiatives 
towards the Mediterranean.30 Like Albania, it is also a sending and transit 
point for migrants to the EU, which is theme of the following chapters, 
and which helps to explain why its request to become a full participant in 
EuroMed has been accepted. 
The Paris Summit of 13 July 2008 relaunched the remodelled 
EuroMed as: ‘the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ and 
widened the participation to include Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Monaco.31 As all existing EU Member States are also 
members of EuroMed, the number of full EuroMed participants has grown 
though EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 to 43. Besides the clear interest 
of Cyprus and Malta in EuroMed, some of the other new EU Member States 
have manifested a strong interest in the development of the Barcelona 
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Tracing the membership of EuroMed around the Mediterranean 
region reveals only selected geographical gaps. Croatia’s relationship with 
the EU was previously defined by the enlargement process and policies 
regarding the Western Balkans and was, until the Paris Summit, not to be 
a full member of EuroMed until it becomes an EU Member State.33 This 
also appeared to be the case for other countries in South-Eastern Europe, 
but the states with Mediterranean coastlines (Albania, Montenegro and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) have now been invited to join.34 The initial rationale 
for excluding Balkan countries (that is, the emphasis on the Peace 
Process) was seemingly no longer present. With the exception of Albania, 
the other Balkan states were ambivalent about EuroMed but accepted the 
invitation to join: the aim on the part of the French Presidency was to 
ensure as wider participation around the Mediterranean Sea as possible in 
the new initiative. This is also the case for Monaco, which has now joined 
the relaunched EuroMed, although other non-EU microstates in the 
Mediterranean region (notably Andorra and San Marino) have not.  
By far the most notable absentee amongst the EuroMed participants 
is Libya. At the time of the start of the Barcelona Process, Libya was 
subject to a UN sanctions regime35 and was not invited to participate by 
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the EU with which it had no official relations. Following the lifting of UN 
sanctions in 2003,36 many EU Member States reopened bilateral 
diplomatic relations with Tripoli and preliminary moves were quickly 
made to include Libya within the partnership. Libyan leader Colonel 
Gaddafi was invited in 2004 to visit to the institutions in Brussels and the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Tunis was subsequently 
accredited to cover Libya. Although not a full member of EuroMed, it has 
observer status since the EuroMed Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart in 
1999. The EU has stressed that Libya is eligible for membership of 
EuroMed and participation in other frameworks such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, but must accept the relevant acquis first.37 In July 
2007, the Libyan authorities allowed five Bulgarian medics convicted of 
infecting several hundred children with HIV in a Benghazi hospital to 
return to Bulgaria, thereby ending a long-running impasse in EU-Libyan 
relations. A closer relationship with the EU was reported to be one of the 
conditions for their release,38 which suggests that Libya’s membership of 
EuroMed will be accelerated.39 Following the call in the Council 
Conclusions of 15 October 2007, the Commission proposed a negotiating 
mandate for a Framework Agreement with Libya in February 2008.40 This 
has not yet materialised. Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi declined the 
invitation to participate in or send a Ministerial delegation to the 
relaunch of EuroMed in Paris in July 2008 and was reported in the Libyan 
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press to view the Union for the Mediterranean as a ‘colonialist’ and ‘racist’ 
enterprise.41  
With the exception of Libya, for which the door to future 
membership of EuroMed remains open, and which maintains observer 
status, the partnership involves all the states around the Southern 
Mediterranean in some capacity. It is therefore possible to speak of 
EuroMed as a forum for a general Mediterranean policy on the part of the 
EU, although the connotations of ‘Mediterranean’ suggest the North 
African region rather than all the participants in EuroMed. 
The Barcelona Declaration 1995 laid down the general guidelines and 
aims for EuroMed on the basis of cooperation around three ‘baskets’: 
economic, political and cultural. The Declaration was accompanied by a 
Work Programme for the period 1995-2000 which detailed the 
institutional level at which the framework was to put into action the aims 
agreed in the Declaration. A further work programme was agreed on the 
occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in 2005, which 
added migration, social interaction, justice and security as a fourth area 
for cooperation,42 and the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the 
Mediterranean in July 2008 contained provisions for concrete cooperation 
projects. As part of the partnership, the EU has concluded EuroMed 
Association Agreements with each Partner State, excluding Albania and 
Mauritania.43 These have either updated and expanded the bilateral 
Association/Cooperation Agreements concluded in the 1970s, or 
constituted the first comprehensive agreement between the Union and 
the state. The final EuroMed Association Agreement negotiations with 
Syria were concluded in late 2004, completing the web of bilateral 
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agreements within the EuroMed framework. All the agreements are in 
force or are expected to enter into force in the near future and they are 
unaffected by the relaunch of EuroMed in July 2008. The basis of the 
system of governance in EuroMed is therefore both found in the legal texts 
concluded by the EU and the Partner States, and the multilateral layer of 
institutions, supported by funding mechanisms which operate on a 
unilateral basis. This level of institutionalisation across both sides of the 
Mediterranean is without precedent in the region in modern times. 
It is impossible to discuss the external relations of the EU in the 
Mediterranean without reference to the conflict in the Middle East. Since 
the 1970s, when EPC was the forum for discussion by the Member States 
on foreign policy issues, the Union’s stated goals have been to try to 
promote a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict and this is often 
the tone of any initiative towards the more global Mediterranean region. 
The Union is well aware, however, of the complexity of the multiple issues 
arising from the sustained conflict and its shadowing effect on all 
multilateral and bilateral relationships with states in the Middle East and 
North Africa. It has already been stated above that the birth of the 
Barcelona Process was motivated by the prospect of a lasting solution to 
the Middle East conflict and the opportunities for economic, political and 
cultural cooperation that this would allow. However, in an attempt to 
avoid the Barcelona Process directly confronting the Middle East issues, 
the EU’s Middle East Peace Process policy and the Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East are officially separate 
policies, but ‘complementary’ to EuroMed.44 The Middle East conflict and 
Peace Process inevitably play a large part in the relationships within the 
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EuroMed institutional framework at all levels to the extent that it has 
been difficult to ‘disentangle’ the two.45 Due to the inclusion of Israel and 
all its neighbours in EuroMed, progress (or lack thereof) in the Barcelona 
Process, including its launch in 1995, has often been strongly tied to shifts 
in the relationships between, in particular, Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, Israel and Syria and, more recently, Lebanon and Syria. 
There are two consequences of the content and progress of the 
Barcelona Process which have significance in considering EuroMed as a 
system of governance. First, linking economic and non-economic issues 
within the same institutional framework (explored below) distinguishes 
EuroMed from a model of traditional bilateral relations between the EU 
and a third-state. Second, and a related point, is the involvement of an 
increased number of actors across the EU and Partner States in the issues 
which are covered by EuroMed. National Parliaments and civil society are 
two examples of such actors. As identified in chapter one, this is one of the 
hallmarks of using a system of governance (as opposed to simply 
‘government’) to identify and characterise the formation and execution of 
policies in the EuroMed space. The emphasis on intercultural dialogue, 
civil society, science and technology can be seen as evidence of this.46 
It is not suggested here that EuroMed is a law-making forum in a 
traditional sense. By characterising EuroMed as a system of governance, 
albeit one which is less sophisticated and developed than that of the 
Union itself, the extent to which logics of appropriateness are created 
becomes more visible. This allows for an assessment (though analysis of 
the specific policy area of migration) of the relative effect of EuroMed on 
‘mainstream’ EU decision and law-making forms as found in the CFSP. To 
what the Barcelona Process is geared towards satisfying EU priorities 
rather than establishing a true partnership across the Mediterranean is 
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explored below. It is worth noting here that the political dimensions of 
EuroMed cover democratization in the region, security and migration, all 
of which have a direct impact on the domestic spheres of the EU Member 
States. These factors have also been cited in surveys on EU citizens’ 
concerns about challenges facing the EU’s relations with neighbouring 
countries.47 The cross-cutting nature of many issues discussed within the 
context of the EuroMed demonstrates the relevance of avoiding too strong 
an attachment to the pillar structure of the EU in terms of competence, 
nor to issues seen as only ‘political’. The baskets around which EuroMed 
functions do not separate out the institutional actors as to their subject-
matter according to the pillar structure of the Treaties. This theme is 
returned to in the following chapter. 
The aims of EuroMed and the relationship with the European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
The aims of the creation of EuroMed as stated in the Barcelona 
Declaration 1995 were to facilitate and promote cooperation amongst the 
partners around the following three ‘baskets’: 
 
• A political and security partnership with the aim of 
establishing a common area of peace and stability; 
• An economic and financial partnership with the aim of 
creating an area of shared prosperity; 
• A partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an 
effort to promote understanding between cultures and 
exchanges between civil societies.48 
 
This comprehensive approach around the above baskets, coupled 
with an institutional framework for discussion and cooperation from the 
level of government down to grassroots and non-governmental 
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organisations, took into account the drawbacks or failures of previous 
initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean region during the early 
1990s under EPC or by European states, which did not supplement 
diplomatic contacts with a network of state and non-state relationships 
across different policy areas.49 
The creation of institutions is important for EuroMed, since it is not 
merely designed to be a forum for high-level dialogue but to promote 
practical cooperation on a continuous basis. There was an inherent 
recognition at Barcelona that the prosperity gaps between the Northern 
and Southern borders of the Mediterranean and economic instability 
hinder the search for political security and cooperation and therefore the 
key to promoting cooperation across the three baskets was by the creation 
of a Free Trade Area, drawing on the achievement of the Single Market 
amongst the EU’s Member States.  
Cultural cooperation has been the basket which has received the 
least high-level attention and seen the most limited institutional 
development for much of the lifetime of the Barcelona Process. It did 
become the focal point of greater attention in EuroMed after 9/11, as a 
result of the increased recognition by participating governments that 
EuroMed should not be restricted to governmental-level dialogue but to 
reach beyond into civil society in order to promote intercultural dialogue 
and understanding. It was in these terms that Belgian Presidency of the 
EU at the time of 9/11 saw the renewed utility of EuroMed.50 The tenth 
anniversary Barcelona Summit in 2005 added cooperation on ‘migration, 
social interaction, justice and security’ as a fourth area in addition to the 
existing three baskets, although this is often abbreviated to simply the 
‘migration’ basket.51 
The Barcelona Process has been most visibly active around the 
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economic basket, the principal aim of which is to create a Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area by 2010 to include the Union and all the Partner States. In 
the view of the Commission, progress in this basket has been the most 
extensive, if slow to demonstrate outcomes.52 The Free Trade Area is to be 
achieved by putting in place the EuroMed Association Agreements 
between the Union and each partner as referred to above. The Partner 
States are, in turn, encouraged by the Commission and Council to engage 
‘horizontally’ so as to promote greater free trade between them. This is an 
important factor in a region which has very limited cross-border economic 
integration. Although the Free Trade Area featured prominently in the 
publicised goals of EuroMed at its inception, it was not the case that the 
Free Trade Area would eventually result in the extension of the 
comprehensive EU single market to the Partner States.53 Agricultural 
products, for example, are excluded from the Free Trade Area negotiations 
despite their importance for the economies of many Partner States.54 
The Arab Maghreb Union and the League of Arab States (Arab 
League) are two regional organisations charged with facilitating regional 
economic integration between the states of North Africa and the Middle 
East. The Agadir Agreement, signed by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and 
Jordan in 2004, and which entered into force on 1 January 2006, has made 
some progress in this field, though there is little prospect at present of an 
integration process stretching across the whole of the Southern 
Mediterranean. The engagement of the Arab Maghreb Union and League of 
Arab States in this task is problematic, since the former has not held a 
high-level meeting in over ten years and the latter organisation includes 
many members in the Arabian Gulf and elsewhere in Africa who are not 
EuroMed Partner States. Israel and Turkey are not members of either 
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 Most of the Mediterranean Partners are also covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which was launched in 2004 and 
which has since been promoted by the Commission and Council as the 
prism for Union policy towards neighbouring states. The Partner States 
not covered by the ENP are Croatia and Turkey (which have begun 
accession negotiations), Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro 
(covered by the framework for the Western Balkans, along with other 
states in the former Yugoslavia who are not in EuroMed or the ENP), 
Mauritania (which, as a sub-Saharan state, is part of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework and therefore covered by the 
Cotonou Agreement on ACP-EU Development Cooperation) and Monaco 
(to which no ‘regional’ policy applies). The ENP has not replaced EuroMed, 
but exists as a complementary means to support the Barcelona Process 
whilst ensuring consistency with policies towards the EU’s other 
neighbours. Due to the financial and political emphasis which the EU 
institutions have placed on the ENP,55 its impact on the EU’s relationship 
with Mediterranean Partners and the system of governance in EuroMed 
merits some attention.  
The development of the ENP is grounded in the enlargement process. 
As the EU moved towards the 2004 enlargement, moves to develop a new 
common policy towards the countries soon to be in close proximity to the 
new Eastern borders (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), but which had no 
prospect of successfully applying to join the Union until the very distant 
future, gained momentum. The Commission demonstrated its awareness 
that the removal of internal borders should not mean that new external 
dividing lines should be drawn between the new Members and the new 
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neighbours in its Communication on ‘Wider Europe’.56 Recalling the post-
Cold War emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe, and the subsequent 
context this provided for the development of the ENP, some EU Member 
States and EuroMed partners considered that the Mediterranean could be 
sidelined in a new EU initiative towards neighbouring regions. These fears 
arose because of the original proposal for the ENP was entitled ‘Wider 
Europe’, which appear to point to the Eastern, rather that Southern, 
dimension to the EU’s neighbourhood. Partner States also expressed 
concern at the shift in language from ‘partnership’ with the EU, which 
implies inclusiveness based on a close relationship of equals, to that of 
mere ‘neighbours’.57 The coexistence of EuroMed and the ENP was quickly 
underlined by the Commission. In reassuring the EuroMed Partner States 
immediately after the launch of the ENP, Commissioner Wallström at the 
EuroMed Parliamentary Assembly in 2005 stated that: 
the Barcelona Process remains key to relations 
between the European Union and the Southern 
Mediterranean. It is not a matter of recasting 
Barcelona but rather rereading it, 
rediscovering it and realising, as certain 
analysts have said, its potential. ... Whilst the 
action plans already agreed with the first 
signatory Mediterranean countries contain 
differences, they are also the bedrock of shared 
values and objectives which the Commission 
deems indispensable if we are to avoid 
divergent paths.58 
The ENP was designed and adopted to cover all neighbours to the 
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East and South of the Union’s territory.59 Due to the inclusion of the 
EuroMed partners, the designing and drafting of the ENP allowed for an 
assessment of the Barcelona Process and to address its shortcomings and 
successes. As examined at the end of this chapter, although progress in 
achieving the goals of the Barcelona Declaration has been slow, it is 
significant that the emphasis was placed on strengthening EuroMed and 
underlining the complementary nature of the ENP, rather than abolishing 
it. This was also demonstrated by the relaunch of the Barcelona Process in 
2005, soon after the creation of the ENP, and more recently by the Union 
for the Mediterranean initiative. With the launch and relaunch of 
initiatives, it is not always clear (even in the EU institutions) whether the 
primary emphasis on the EU’s policy towards the states concerned should 
be placed on the ENP or EuroMed in Council conclusions. The track 
record shows that the practice is not consistent.60 
It is contended here that far from replacing EuroMed, the ENP has 
added an additional dimension to the system of governance in EuroMed. 
The exploration of the institutional development of EuroMed below 
reveals that there is significant overlap between the ENP and its 
instruments and the institutions and instruments of EuroMed, but this 
does not necessarily demote the latter to the status of a mere fore-runner 
to the ENP. Many common objectives are shared in EuroMed and the ENP. 
The stated aim of the ENP is to ‘share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 
enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, 
security and well-being for all concerned’.61 It is not yet fully apparent 
which benefits are referred to, though this is understood to be the 
economic benefits of accession to the EU and, consequently, the political 
stability which should ensue. The overarching aim of the ENP is to bring 
together all the countries in the vicinity of the EU’s territory under one 
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policy in order to create a ‘ring of friends’ sharing the EU’s fundamental 
values.62 A more critical view is that it groups together the countries 
which are not envisaged as future EU Member States, which explains why 
states in the Balkans and Turkey are not included, and pacifies them with 
references to sharing the benefits of enlargement rather than being 
directly involved in the enlargement process. The ENP also excludes 
Russia with which the EU has agreed a separate ‘Strategic Partnership’. 
This appears to emphasise the greater importance on relations with 
Russia than other neighbours despite the stated aim of the policy to be 
comprehensive and for all the EU’s neighbours. 
 The reference by the Commission in its Strategy Paper to the 
perceived benefits through the ENP for non-members after the completion 
of the enlargement processes highlights the nature of enlargement as the 
most successful external policy the EU has put into practice. But it also 
draws attention to the importance of the land borders with the new, post-
enlargement EU neighbours, rather than the Mediterranean partners, 
whose relationships with the EU have been less affected by recent 
enlargements. By putting both the Mediterranean partners and the 
Eastern neighbours within the same policy, the Commission is trying to 
ensure that the two neighbourhood policies can use the instruments 
developed within both EuroMed and the ENP to tackle common problems. 
Similarly, the Council’s approval of the Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ 
proposal underscored the principle that it does not replace the Barcelona 
Process and that the implementation of existing agreements remains a 
priority.63 According to the Commission, the instruments available in the 
ENP can be seen as ‘additional bilateral incentives and opportunities, 
responding to individual countries’ reform efforts’.64 The emphasis on 
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bilateralism in the ENP is significant: a multilateral element was not 
envisaged and the first meeting of all governments in the EU and the ENP 
states only took place in August 2007, three years after the launch of the 
policy and in the absence of future comprehensive meetings of this type, 
cannot be said to constitute an ‘institution’. There appears to be little 
express attempt on the part of the Union to either build a ‘region’ from 
these diverse neighbourhood countries or to promote cooperation or 
integration between them in the way that this has been promoted in 
EuroMed. Exactly how the relationship between EuroMed and the ENP 
operates in practice is not yet clear, though the Commission claims that 
‘the ENP has given a real opportunity to strengthen our relations with our 
Mediterranean partners’.65 This sustains the argument here that the ENP 
can be understood as adding a supplementary dimension or layer to 
EuroMed, rather than reducing its significance.  
The ENP supplements EuroMed by ‘[reinforcing] existing forms of 
regional and subregional cooperation and provide a framework for their 
further development’.66 The EuroMed Association Agreements signed with 
each Partner State also form the basis of their bilateral ENP relationship, 
supplemented by an ‘ENP Action Plan’ agreeing areas for reform with 
various sub-committees created to monitor progress. As such, references 
are made later in this chapter to the Action Plans which have been 
concluded with the Mediterranean states under the auspices of the ENP, 
in addition to the EuroMed Association Agreements, as these have strong 
implications for EuroMed as a system of governance and in particular the 
bilateral dimension of relations between the EU and each Partner state. As 
stated above, however, these can be seen as fitting into the system of 
governance as an additional ‘layer’ rather than diluting the relationship 
with each Partner State in the context of EuroMed. 
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Whilst the ENP might have been thought of as replacing EuroMed, an 
important difference remains between the two which justifies continued 
analysis of the latter. EuroMed was designed at the outset to be a 
partnership, which means that the participating Partner States agree to 
the terms of the Barcelona Declaration in order to be involved in the 
institutional framework outlined below. The ENP, by contrast, suggests 
that whilst cooperation with neighbours is underlined through the 
agreement of Action Plans, it primarily remains an external policy 
through which the EU’s relationships with neighbouring states are 
governed. The 2008 relaunch of EuroMed as ‘the Barcelona Process: Union 
for the Mediterranean’, which continues to stress multilateral cooperation 
in EuroMed, also suggests that the ENP does not render EuroMed obsolete.  
The ENP also applies to neighbouring states regardless of whether 
they participate in the ‘sharing of the benefits of enlargement’ or not: 
Libya and Belarus are two states with which the EU does not have a deep 
relationship, but they are covered by the ENP. A consensual element is not 
necessary insofar as the ENP applies to neighbouring states. The 
Commission and Council have been consistent is stating that both states 
may benefit from incentives provided under the ENP, but there is no 
mention of an ENP ‘acquis’ which needs to be accepted by the partners. 
This is in contrast to EuroMed where new Mediterranean members (most 
recently, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina) may take part 
because, according to the Joint Paris Declaration, they have ‘accepted the 
acquis of the Barcelona Process’. Libya (as the only non-participating 
Mediterranean state) has been told it can participate on the condition that 
it accepts the acquis too. With the emphasis on participation in 
institutional frameworks and the need to accept certain criteria as a 
prerequisite, EuroMed can be seen in terms of a system of governance. The 
institutional framework of EuroMed, explored in the following section, 
remains largely unchanged by the ENP. Yet, the ENP more closely 
resembles a more traditional (as far as this is possible within the context 
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of the EU) instrument of foreign policy. This does not prevent the ENP 
from being a system of governance in itself, but supplementing EuroMed, 
the ENP serves to clarify the existence of EuroMed as a frame for the 
foreign policy of the Union towards the Mediterranean.  
Institutions and instruments in EuroMed 
The roles of the EU institutions in external relations were examined in the 
introduction. It is axiomatic that the Council has a key role in EuroMed, 
even though it was not created pursuant to a CFSP instrument. It should 
also be noted that the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy 
is not the only ‘personification’ of the CFSP in the Mediterranean region, 
since a Special Representative for the Middle East, Marc Otte (a former 
Belgian ambassador to Israel) was appointed in 2003.67 The lack of a 
formal role in the CFSP for the Commission has not prevented it from 
having an important role in external relations, and in particular in 
EuroMed.  
The complexity of the EU’s external relations framework, including 
the personification of the EU’s external relations in the various forms of 
the Commissioner for External Relations, Commissioner for 
Development, Commissioner for Trade, with the High Representative for 
the CFSP (since 1998) and various ad hoc Special Representatives of the 
Council poses particular problems in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 
where personalised diplomacy is of high importance. The diverse 
portfolios of the actors have caused some Partner States to question 
where the centre of decision-making in the EU lies.68  
Yet, the process of institutionalisation has become a strong feature of 
the CFSP, as explored in chapter one. In EuroMed, institutionalisation has 
                                                   
67
 Council Joint Action 2003/965/CFSP appointing the European Union Special 
Representative for the Middle East peace process and amending Joint Action 
2002/965/CFSP [2003] OJ L 184/45. 
68
 Interview with Council Official (Brussels, September 2008). 
178 
 
gradually taken place since the Barcelona Declaration and is a particularly 
appropriate means of understanding the development of the partnership 
as a process. At the time of the Barcelona Declaration, the institutional 
features of EuroMed were rather light, but have since developed into a 
much more elaborate and complex framework. Within the system of 
governance of EuroMed, multilateral, bilateral and unilateral institutional 
features are discernible.69 As noted above in terms of the contrast between 
EuroMed and the ENP, the multilateral features are what makes EuroMed 
distinctive in the EU’s external relations. It can also be said that the 
EuroMed institutional arrangements reflects the complexity of the EU’s 
own institutional structure. The danger of so many institutions and 
individuals with competence to speak for the EU is the perception 
amongst Partner States of an EU which is lacking in both transparency 
and predictability.70  
 The Barcelona Declaration did not, at first, establish the complex 
institutional framework in which EuroMed operates today. Instead, at 
Barcelona the parties opted for a wide agreement covering possibilities for 
future institutionalisation of dialogue. The following section evaluates the 
institutions of EuroMed and their development, before moving on to 
discuss how these characterise the governance of EuroMed and in 
particular the emphasis which is placed on the joint ownership of the 
Barcelona Process.  
The EuroMed Conference of Ministers 
The EuroMed Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs brings together 
Ministers from EU Member States and Partner States as well as the 
Council and Commission. The Conference takes place on an annual basis 
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with sectoral ministers’ meetings (including Economic and Finance 
ministers and those with portfolios for Trade, Migration, Energy and 
Culture) taking place on a more occasional basis. With the exception of 
the second meeting in Malta (an applicant EU state at the time) in 1997, all 
the annual Foreign Ministers’ conferences have taken place in the EU. 
This is significant because after the Barcelona Declaration which launched 
EuroMed, and the next Ministerial conference in Malta, the outcome of the 
meetings appear as Presidency conclusions, mirroring the institutional 
nature of the European Council. Within the key role played by the Council 
in the EU’s external relations, the beginning of EuroMed and its 
subsequent revitalisation in the early 2000s can often be traced to the 
Presidencies of Member States with Mediterranean policies of their own 
especially those of Spain (1995, 2002) and France (2000, 2008). This is 
similarly often reflected in the EuroMed conclusions. 
The Presidency of the EuroMed Conference of Ministers rotates 
between EU Member States but not the Partner States, who are limited in 
their steering capacity to participation in the EuroMed Committee as 
noted below. This has been implicitly recognised as a drawback, since the 
relaunch of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean in Paris 
as a key policy priority of the French EU Presidency was in fact co-chaired 
by France and Egypt. There is provision in the Joint Declaration for co-
Presidencies of EuroMed Conferences and Summits, Senior Officials 
meetings and ad hoc experts meetings. Co-presiding is open to all 
participants and is to be undertaken by one EU and one non-EU state 
concurrently.71 It appears that the EU co-president will be the Member 
States holding the Council Presidency (even if these Member States are 
not Mediterranean: such as the Czech Republic and Sweden in 2009). For 
the Partner State, it is unclear how the co-president will be chosen. Some 
Partner States do not wish to be obliged to host meetings where they 
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would be forced to invite all EuroMed participants (i.e. including Israel). 
Whilst the EU Member States are accustomed to the representative role of 
the Member State holding the Council Presidency in external relations, it 
is less clear whether the role of the Partner State co-president would be to 
represent all the Partner States in EuroMed: a difficult task given the 
diversity of the non-EU participants.72 
The Presidency Conclusions of the conferences reveal the changing 
nature of the baskets and the progress in cooperation within them, and 
also the extent to which progress has been affected by factors outside the 
scope of EuroMed. The most notable of these is the situation in the Middle 
East: the Fourth EuroMed Conference in Marseille in 2000 was clearly 
marked by the lack of regional stability and resulted in the postponement, 
and eventual abandonment of the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter for Peace and Stability, which had previously been envisaged in 
past Presidency Conclusions as a major breakthrough in EuroMed 
political relations.73 
The EuroMed Conference held in October 2001 in Brussels was clearly 
marked by the events in New York one month previously and the 
repercussions for Europe and the Mediterranean. The Presidency 
conclusions are not forthcoming with any major initiatives or 
developments in advancing the Barcelona Process but were an occasion 
for EuroMed participants to meet and engage in discussions on the 
international climate. In the context of post-9/11 tension and the renewed 
violence in the Middle East which continued during 2002, the Presidency 
Conclusions of the fifth EuroMed conference in Valencia are notable for 
the invigoration of the Economic and Financial Partnership basket, and 
the production of an Action Plan for moving on the proposed Free Trade 
Area which was far more detailed and concrete in the measures proposed 
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than any previous Conclusions.74 
More recently, conclusions have begun to lend weight to institutional 
creation as a means to fulfil EuroMed goals. With the creation and 
development of the two institutions discussed below, the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Anna Lindh Foundation, important aspects of, in 
particular, the cultural EuroMed basket have been devolved to more 
appropriate fora, leaving the EuroMed Conference of Foreign Ministers 
the opportunity to discuss the overarching political and economic aims of 
the Partnership. The Tampere Conclusions of November 2006 are notable 
for attaching the widespread and numerous initiatives to be carried out 
under the auspices of the Barcelona Process in 2007.  
What is important in terms of the system of governance in EuroMed 
is how the focus on the Mediterranean has shifted since 2001. By making 
more clearly the link between EuroMed and both internal and external 
security, non-Mediterranean EU members have begun to perceive 
EuroMed as a more useful framework for action. Migration too has begun 
to play a much more prominent role, to the extent that some consider 
migration to now be the main focus of the Barcelona Process.75 As such, 
interest in the potential for EuroMed as a framework for cooperation and 
action is not restricted to the EU members in the South. 
The EuroMed Committee 
The Barcelona Declaration foresaw the creation of a EuroMed Committee 
composed of senior officials from an EU Troika of past, present and future 
Council Presidencies and one representative from each Mediterranean 
Partner to meet regularly and prepare the meetings of the EuroMed 
Conference of Ministers. The Committee was also charged with taking 
stock of the Barcelona Process and updating the work programme. The 
Commission was named as responsible for the preparation of and follow-
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up work to the Committee meetings. 
 Whilst the text of the Barcelona Declaration suggested that the role 
of the EuroMed Committee would have a more administrative than policy-
making role, and that it could draw on the experience of COREPER in the 
Council’s decision-making structure, it has evolved into a much more 
significant institution in EuroMed. After the renewal of the Barcelona 
Process in 2000, the Belgian Presidency report of 2001 on implementation 
of the Common Strategy of the Mediterranean noted that: 
… the Euro-Mediterranean Committee, with a 
view to reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, 
endeavoured to play a more strategic role as it 
was regularly called upon to examine the 
implementation of the various regional 
programmes or the launch of new programmes, 
like the framework document for the future 
JHA regional programme and the follow-up to 
the Marseille conclusions.76 
 Similarly, the Valencia EuroMed Ministerial Conference 
Conclusions 2002 acknowledged the more influential role the EuroMed 
Committee has taken on in the Barcelona Process by noting that greater 
involvement of the Partner States was needed through the restructuring 
of the Committee.77 The Committee has become increasingly important in 
drafting the Work Programme for the Barcelona Process, which serves as 
the general plan for the development of EuroMed. An example of this 
importance is the instrumental role played by the Committee in moving 
forward the third basket of EuroMed by devising the structure and remit 
of what eventually became the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue 
between Cultures. The EuroMed Committee meets and follows a formal 
agenda, which helps to focus the minds of the participants on discussion 
of cooperation and, since the discussions are private, away from reverting 
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to grand political debates or reference to ongoing tensions in the Middle 
East.78 
The Joint Paris Declaration 2008 reinforces this institutional 
dimension of EuroMed by providing for a Joint Permanent Committee to 
be based in Brussels, which will also have the ability to consult EuroMed 
partners ‘if an exceptional situation arises’, though little direction is given 
to what kind of situations are envisaged. The Committee will, along with 
the other institutions, be supported by a permanent secretariat. The 
mandates of the Joint Permanent Committee and secretariat will be 
decided by the EuroMed Conference of Ministers in November 2008. 
The EuroMed Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) 
A Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue was envisaged by the 
Barcelona Declaration as a means to exchange ideas and increase channels 
of dialogue between members of the national Parliaments of the EU, those 
of the Partner States, and the European Parliament. The Dialogue’s remit 
was extremely vague and no provision was made for the capacity to make 
binding resolutions on the Barcelona Process. After convening on an 
annual basis, the Dialogue participants recommended in 1997 that their 
dialogue be transformed into a EuroMed Parliamentary Forum. This was a 
significant step in institutionalising the meeting from an ad hoc basis 
towards becoming a more stable feature of the Barcelona Process. The 
Forum was convened on five successive occasions between 1996 and 2001. 
In a similar manner to the EuroMed Ministerial Conference, and 
recognising the Mediterranean as a potential flashpoint, the Forum met 
during the immediate aftermath of 9/11, which gave impetus to proposals 
to institutionalise even further the Forum into an Assembly, with a 
greater emphasis on the importance of dialogue between cultures. Despite 
some resistance to the proposal from EU national Parliaments wary about 
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the creation and cost implications of a new body,79 the fifth EuroMed 
Ministerial Conference in Valencia in 2002 approved the upgrading of the 
Forum to the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA).80 
Acquiring the status of an Assembly endowed it with the capacity to make 
resolutions within an established structure including a presidency, 
working groups and rules of procedure. There was little of no pressure or 
encouragement from government ministers in the EuroMed Conference to 
institutionalise the Parliamentary dimension in EuroMed. Nevertheless, 
the Assembly has come to be regarded as a permanent, stable feature of 
the Barcelona Process and as a place where ideas on how to move the 
Barcelona Process forwards can emerge and take shape. Resolutions of the 
EMPA have become increasingly influential on the EuroMed Committee 
and Conference of Ministers.81 
The first plenary session of the Assembly took place in Athens in 
March 2004 but was overshadowed by the Madrid bombings several days 
previously, and renewed tension between Israel and Arab states. 
Nevertheless, it set itself procedural rules and the primary subjects for 
discussion.82 These included, inter alia, security and stability in the region, 
issues relating to immigration, cultural, social and humanitarian 
cooperation, and advancing the Free Trade Area. The Assembly has gained 
the ability to adopt and promulgate proposals and communicate these to 
the other EuroMed institutions. Further plenary sessions took place 
under the presidencies of Egypt, the European Parliament, Tunisia and 
Greece in Cairo (2005), Brussels (2006), Tunis (2007) and Athens (2008) 
with additional sessions held by the working groups on each of the 
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baskets on a continuous basis across the EuroMed region.83 The EMPA 
bureau, consisting of four members (usually Presidents of national 
parliaments), used the Paris Summit in July 2008 as an opportunity to 
communicate the call by EMPA to the Heads of Government for twice-
yearly summits, a joint presidency, a standing joint committee based in 
Brussels and a secretariat.84 The Paris Declaration agreed to support the 
‘strengthening’ of EMPA as the ‘legitimate’ parliamentary expression of 
the Barcelona Process.85  
The significance of the EMPA and its institutional development for 
the purposes of this chapter are three-fold. First, against the background 
of its institutionalisation and vague remit in the Barcelona Declaration, 
the Assembly has been particularly active in promoting the ‘third’ basket 
of the Barcelona Process, namely that of social, cultural and human 
affairs. It has already been noted above that this basket has seen the least 
progress overall in EuroMed, but in the context of almost constant tension 
in the Mediterranean area between North and South, which came to the 
fore during the Danish cartoons affair in 2006. Intercultural dialogue was 
by no means the basket which received the most attention at the start of 
the Barcelona Process and it is telling that its importance in Euro-
Mediterranean relations has now been placed alongside the creation of a 
Free Trade Area in the Paris Declaration. By orienting discussion towards 
issues in this basket, such as how to promote intercultural dialogue as a 
means to bridge the different identities in the EuroMed region,86 the 
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‘reality’ of EuroMed as an institutional framework is more visible.  
By establishing and developing itself as an institution, the EMPA has 
built up the informal as well as formal norms that a constructivist 
approach recognises as important: this in turn has provided the actors 
with the direction and goals for action. Ideas, which again figure strongly 
in the institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis used in this 
thesis, have been translated into concrete initiatives. The clearest 
example of this is the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the 
Dialogue of Cultures in Alexandria and the proposal for a EuroMed 
University.87 Such developments legitimise the identity of the EMPA and 
provide an institutionalised forum which has structure and direction. The 
participants in the EMPA, that is to say the Parliamentarians, have 
become used to this institutionalised dialogue, and the legitimising effect 
of the institution provides justification for a strengthening of its role. The 
Plenary Sessions of the EMPA often appear less as debates in the UK 
Parliamentary sense but rather as grand speeches where each delegation 
speaks about the importance of general cooperation in the absence of a 
defined agenda.88 As is also the case for the EuroMed Committee, the 
EMPA committee sessions are where the details of positions and ideas 
come together against the background of a defined agenda for discussion, 
which is often more technical in nature, and between only three or four 
participants.89 There would be little to gain in committee sessions in 
making a lengthy speech about the Middle East conflict, which conversely 
may on occasion occur in the plenary sessions depending on the current 
developments in the region. 
Second, despite occasional tensions between the participants in the 
early years of the Parliamentary dimension, the continued participation 
of all Arab Partner States and Israel has been maintained. The very fact 
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that all Partner States, including Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 
send delegations and participate in the EMPA committees is an 
achievement in itself. Avoiding overly-contentious subjects or reference to 
unresolved issues in the region (such as long-term border disputes) within 
the EMPA demonstrates that by underlining the cooperative nature of 
dialogue between the participants, these practices have helped define 
appropriate behaviour within EuroMed. Furthermore, issues such as 
intercultural dialogue and women’s rights do not often take a central role 
within the EuroMed ministerial conferences, but have found a central 
place in the EMPA. The EMPA, significantly, created an hoc committee on 
women’s rights in 2006, which has become a central topic of the 
committee and plenary debates and which had not been extensively 
discussed at the governmental level in the EuroMed Ministerial 
Conferences.90 This suggests that logics of appropriateness in terms of 
what subjects can be brought to the table, how progress can be made in 
these issues and what contribution the EMPA can make to EuroMed may 
arise.  
Third, and a related point, is that the EMPA has an important role in 
bringing a democratic element to the institutional framework in EuroMed. 
Although the electorate of the EU or Partner States do not directly decide 
which of their parliamentarians participate, the Assembly provides an 
occasion for discussion not only between the EU members to the North 
and partners to the South, but also between the Mediterranean Partner 
States, in the absence of any such regional parliamentary body in North 
Africa or the Middle East. This is significant because of the importance of 
parliamentarianism in the development of democracy in the Partner 
States, which is a strong feature of the bilateral association agreements 
with most of the Partner States.  
The parliaments of the countries of the 
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Mediterranean Basin will be called on to play a 
significant role in the future, since 
parliamentarianism is the cornerstone of 
democracy and an indispensable condition for 
cooperation and development. … The various 
political perspectives (socialist, liberal, and so 
forth) from both sides of the Mediterranean 
frequently agree on issues that the 
governments of their countries are unable to 
deal with directly because of the persistence of 
outdated and ineffective diplomatic 
objectives.91 
Debates and exchanges of views in the context of the EMPA can 
therefore operate in a different way, yet adding to the depth of 
interactions within EuroMed. Political pluralism is lacking in many 
Partner States, and many delegations from Partner States are either 
dominated by parliamentarians unwilling or unable to contribute to 
debates or discussions in a way which might contradict the position of 
their governments. Whilst it may not be the case that delegations are 
instructed on what they may or may not by governments, it is apparent 
that self-censorship is practiced, which may explain why speeches in the 
plenary sessions are often generic and lacking in formal proposals.92 
Herein also lies the different role of the EMPA when compared to a 
national (European) Parliament: the latter holds the government to 
account but it is unlikely that the EMPA could function in a way which 
would force the EuroMed Ministerial Conference to justify or explain their 
decisions. The relationship between government and Parliament is often 
the reverse in Partner States: for example, when the European Parliament 
passed a resolution in January 2008 criticising human rights protection in 
Egypt,93 the Egyptian government summoned EU Member State 
ambassadors in Cairo to protest. The response of the Council and the EU 
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Ambassadors was to state that they have no control over the actions of the 
European Parliament, which is free to pass resolutions as it sees fit.94 
Despite the lack of pluralism in many of the Partner States, the 
EMPA does provide an opportunity for cooperative dialogue along party 
lines, which plays a much more limited role in the ministerial 
conferences. The European Parliament’s centre-right EPP-ED group has 
been the most active in seeking like-minded political parties and 
politicians in Partner States with a view to encouraging a party-political 
structure in the EMPA instead of the national delegations.95 The difficulty 
in doing so, however, lies in the substantial differences between the raison 
d’être of the European Parliament (as a multi-national institution) and the 
EMPA. The former is part of a European integration process which places 
together parties which may have very different ideologies in groups so as 
to form Europe-wide political movements, but no such integration aspect 
exists in EMPA.96 Since the Parliamentary delegations from Partner States 
are often not able to orientate policy discussions, it would appear that 
linking EuroMed-wide political groupings would be a very difficult task. 
Independent EuroMed institutions 
The idea of a EuroMed civil or cultural foundation as a means by which 
policies in the third basket can be put into practice emerged in the early 
years of EuroMed. However, it was only after 9/11 that the impetus to put 
the idea into practice gained momentum. What eventually became the 
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between 
Cultures was endorsed in 2003,97 eight years after the beginning of the 
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Barcelona Process.98 As the first institution of EuroMed situated outside 
the EU (in Alexandria, Egypt) and jointly funded by the Partner States as 
well as the EU, its broad remit is to ‘promote the dialogue between 
cultures and contribute to the visibility of the Barcelona Process through 
intellectual, cultural and civil society exchanges’.99 The Foundation is 
independent from the EU institutions and EuroMed states and works on 
the basis of a ‘network or networks’ of national cultural institutes (such 
the British Council, Goethe Institute, and University-based study centres 
across EuroMed countries) but with ‘linkage’ to the aims of the Barcelona 
Process. The Paris Declaration reaffirmed its status as a ‘EuroMed 
institution’.100 
The participation of civil society and NGOs in the EuroMed 
Partnership has been facilitated by the EuroMed Non-Governmental 
Platform and Civil Forums. The first Civil Forum took place in Barcelona 
in 1995 at the outset of the Barcelona Process, and fora have been held on 
an annual basis since, mirroring the Ministerial Conferences. The 
participants are NGOs involved in diverse areas relevant to the EuroMed 
Partnership, including human rights (including the rights of citizens 
resident in states other than their own), trade unions, environmental and 
minority groups, from both sides of the Mediterranean. In Valencia in 
2003, the civil society networks and actors took the step of 
institutionalising their presence in EuroMed by establishing a EuroMed 
Non-Governmental Platform. This was achieved by the adoption of a 
Charter of Objective and Values in Cyprus in 2004,101 and statutes at a 
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General Assembly in Luxembourg in April 2005.102 The Ministerial 
Conference at Luxembourg identified this as a positive means by which 
civil society in the EuroMed Partner States could be strengthened.103 Both 
reiterate that membership of the Platform is restricted to bodies totally 
independent of government, commercial or religious control. 
Headquarters of the Platform were established in Paris, and in its short 
history, it has been active in calling on the EuroMed institutions to 
consider the human and civil dimensions of common areas of concern, in 
particular migration.104 
Other institutions which have been funded by the EuroMed funding 
mechanism (MEDA) include the EuroMed Training and Information 
Seminars for Diplomats (held twice each year in Malta), the EuroMed 
Study Commission (EuroMesCo, a network of study centres on the 
Mediterranean), the FEMISE network of foreign policy and economic 
research institutes, the EuroMed Heritage Programme and EuroMed 
Youth Programme. The non-governmental dimensions of EuroMed show 
how the Barcelona Process has emphasised grassroots cooperation 
between the EU and Partner States, which in turn has helped to solidify 
and reinforce the network of contacts as the ‘glue’ holding EuroMed 
together.105 
Instruments coopted by EuroMed: the Association Agreements 
The bilateral dimension of Barcelona Process consists of the relationship 
between the EU and each of the Mediterranean Partners through the 
EuroMed Association Agreements. These have been concluded on the legal 
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basis of Article 310 EC which states that ‘the Community may conclude 
with one or more States or international organisations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedures’. It may be noted that this article is 
not a CFSP provision. However, the vagueness of this provision, which has 
been used in a variety of contexts and for different purposes, does not 
prevent it from being used to fulfil goals in the CFSP. The Association 
Agreements form the ‘fabric’ of the network of relationships and are the 
principal means by which the Free Trade Area across the EuroMed space 
is designed to take shape. They do not concern only economic issues as 
they commit the parties to wide-ranging political and human rights 
dialogue, and also facilitate bilateral discussions on issues such as 
migration. Although the Treaty does not provide any explanation of 
‘association’ in Article 310 or elsewhere, the consistent terming of the 
agreements as ‘EuroMed Association Agreements’ by the Commission and 
Council suggest that they are given a specific meaning in the context of 
the Barcelona Process. 
The process of negotiating, concluding and ratifying the Association 
Agreements has been, in some cases, extremely lengthy and even at the 
10th anniversary Barcelona summit in 2005, not all of the Agreements were 
in force. The EuroMed Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, 
Morocco and Jordan were signed soon after the Barcelona Declaration 
during the period 1995-1997 and gradually all entered into force before 
2000. No EuroMed Association Agreement was made with Malta or 
Cyprus, since they were already engaged in pre-accession strategies.106 
With Turkey, no specific EuroMed Association Agreement was concluded 
because of the existing framework and Agreement on the definite phase of 
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the customs union signed in 1995.107 Turkey is now also in a pre-accession 
strategy and the subject of regular progress reports.108 An interim 
agreement was concluded with the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(as representing the Palestinian Authority) in 1997 which was due to last 
for five years whilst a full EuroMed Association Agreement was concluded. 
A full agreement has, in the context of political instability, not 
materialised. The Agreements with Lebanon and Syria were the most 
lengthy, and as former External Relations Commissioner Patten notes, 
most difficult.109 For Lebanon, an interim trade agreement was signed in 
2002 and entered into force the following year,110 covering limited trade-
related aspects and a human rights clause contained in the full EuroMed 
Association Agreement, which was also signed in 2002 and finally entered 
into force in 2006.111 Syria was the final Partner State with whom the 
Council concluded negotiations on Association Agreement, in 2004. 
However, the Agreement has not been signed: a number of EU Member 
States and the Commission have demanded proof from the Syrian 
government that it is contributing positively to regional stability and ‘the 
leadership’s ability to translate some of its words of good will into 
deeds’.112 Only when the Association Agreement is signed and ratified will 
an ENP Action Plan be discussed and Syria will be able to benefit from the 
financial ENP instruments.113 In the meantime, relations are governed by 
the earlier Cooperation Agreement 1977. The more recent EuroMed 
participants (Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina) will not 
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need EuroMed Association Agreements since their content is already in 
place within the context of (pre-)enlargement and Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements. A EuroMed Association Agreement may be 
proposed in the future with Mauritania: bilateral relations currently 
operate within the ambit of the ACP framework.114 In the light of the coup 
d’état in August 2008 by the Mauritanian military, a further bilateral 
agreement or deepening of bilateral relations is unlikely to be proposed 
for some time. 
Under the framework of the EuroMed Association Agreements, an 
Association Council at Ministerial level and Association Committee 
comprising of senior officials have been created with each Partner state.115 
The Association Council includes members of, on the EU side, the Council 
of Ministers and Commission, and the government of the Partner State on 
the other. Meetings are chaired alternatively by the EU Council President 
and the government of the Partner State.116 
 The Association Agreements are mixed agreements: they are 
concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States, the latter 
complementing the powers of the Community, and hence widening the 
potential scope of the content of the agreements. Much of the content of 
the Association Agreements is devoted to technical details on economic 
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cooperation in different sectors, conditions of reciprocal market access, 
and trade in industrial goods. The level of detail in the content and 
potential economic gains sought or resisted by the parties explains why 
certain Association Agreements took longer to negotiate and conclude 
than others. In terms of governance of the EuroMed space, the wide 
ranging nature of the economic and non-economic content of the 
agreements allows for a substantial level of differentiation between the EU 
and each of the Partners. This has an important tool for the EU since each 
Association Agreement is able to acknowledge the different national 
interests of each Mediterranean Partner, and the areas which the EU 
identifies as needing for improvement. This allows for a greater level of 
specificity in analysing what progress has been made in the bilateral 
relationship. 
 The EuroMed Association Agreements demonstrate the extent of 
the depth of the relationship, both economically and politically, the EU 
has with each Mediterranean Partner state. Excluding Turkey from this 
discussion, which has a customs union, the EuroMed agreement with 
Israel is the briefest, since the abolition of customs duties and related 
issues were already resolved in previous agreements. This is in contrast 
with the agreement with, for example, Algeria, where the gradual abolition 
of customs duties is foreseen in Articles 9-11 of the EC-Algeria EuroMed 
Association Agreement.117  
 Clauses which are specific to individual Partner states are evident 
in the Agreements. For example, Article 59 of the Agreement with 
Lebanon concerns cooperation in reinforcement of institutions and rule 
of law, as ‘an independent and effective judiciary and well-trained legal 
profession are of particular importance’. This does not appear in other 
Agreements, and given the wording which emphases the improvements 
needed to be made by the Lebanese government, it therefore can be 
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assumed to have been included at the behest of the EU. The consequence 
of using the Association Agreements is therefore that they can lead to the 
perception that the EU is using its economic weight to address its 
concerns in Partner states, but that despite claims that the foundation of 
EuroMed is that of ‘joint ownership’, the Partner states are not able to put 
across their common concerns. Part of this stems from the lack of ability 
on the part of the Partners to form a coherent lobbying group, and their 
vast differences in size, political and economic development, which has 
led to a differentiated approach taken by the EU through the Association 
Agreements.118 
The unilateral dimension: the MEDA and ENPI programmes 
The unilateral dimensions to EuroMed are the MEDA programme 
(‘mesures d’accompagnement financiers et techniques à la réforme des 
structures économiques et sociales dans le cadre du partenariat euro-
méditerranéen’) and European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instruments (ENPI) which relate to the financing of projects undertaken 
pursuant to the Partnership. Under the original MEDA Council 
Regulation, 3,435 million euros were committed to providing technical 
and financial support measures to accompany the reform of economic and 
social structures in the Mediterranean partners.119 The Regulation was 
amended in 2000, and the funding allocation under the MEDA II 
Regulation was increased to 5,350 million euros.120 Increasing funding, 
however, came with a more defined approach of ‘express[ing] more clearly 
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the envisaged impact of planned MEDA funded operations in the context 
of Mediterranean partners’ reform processes and the establishment of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’.121 This has resulted in the publication of 
more strategy plans in the long-term, medium term and annual basis for 
linking funding to the overall goals of EuroMed, including the 
establishment of the Free Trade Area. This reform was inspired by the 
TACIS and PHARE programmes in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
Decisions are made by the MED Committee comprising of the 
Commission, representatives of the Member States and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB).122  
The other source of funding is the possibility of loans granted for 
projects by the European Investment Bank. Since 2002 this has been 
known as the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and 
Partnership (FEMIP). Loans to Mediterranean Partners have totalled 4,808 
million euros during the 1995-1999 period, 6,400 million from 2000 until 
2007123 and 14 billion euros in total since 1974.124 The MEDA II Regulation 
amended MEDA I and emphasised the closeness of the relationship 
between EU and EIB funding.125 
Since 2007, the MEDA financial instruments have been replaced with 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The 
ENPI places the funding mechanisms for EuroMed under the same 
umbrella programme as for the other ENP countries, although the 
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Commission publishes a Regional Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative 
Programme specifically for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as 
for each Partner State.126 The ENPI are used for financial support 
according to the aims of the Barcelona Process and the ENP Action Plans 
agreed with each Partner State. Turkey and Croatia are not subject to this 
procedure, as funding is provided through the enlargement process and 
Commission DG Enlargement. Albania and Mauritania are not part of the 
ENP and they have not been subject to county reports since joining 
EuroMed. 
Funding is provided for bilateral projects or initiatives and also for 
region-wide cooperation projects. Examples of the latter, such as 
EuroMesCo and the Heritage Programme, were noted above. Such projects 
account for 10-15% of the funding,127 and the rest is devoted to programmes 
pursuant to the bilateral Association Agreements. These include economic 
and social programmes designed to foster trade, competitiveness and the 
establishment of the Free Trade Area. They also include programmes on 
human rights and democracy and are a means by which EU funding can be 
channelled directly to civil society and non-governmental actors. Human 
rights and democracy promotion have become more central in the 
National Indicative Programmes on each Partner State.128 
Taking account of the unilateral dimension is of vital importance in 
understanding the system of governance in EuroMed. Despite the 
commitment of large-scale financing of MEDA, much of the money 
allocated to the programme went unspent because of the reluctance of the 
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Partner States to engage in programmes linked to political reform, and the 
bureaucratic complications of securing funding.  
Since the funding of the partnership relies on the Union institutions 
and Member States, it is not surprising that the Commission in particular 
has exercised a leadership role which potentially reinforces the content of 
the bilateral dimension above. Funding to the Partner States can be 
suspended in cases of violation of democratic principles and the rule of 
law.129 The emphasis on human rights and democracy in the EU’s 
neighbourhood has prompted some commentators to note that the use of 
MEDA funding for democracy promotion in the Mediterranean represents 
an ‘important testing ground’ for the EU’s capabilities as an international 
actor.130 It is much more difficult, therefore, for the EU to more forcefully 
engage in democracy promotion by, for example, publicly criticising more 
strongly their Mediterranean partners and highlighting the direct funding 
of opposition movements. Doing so would be likely to generate short-term 
focus on human rights/democracy issues in the media, but would 
ultimately harm the longer-term processes of dialogue which lie at the 
core of EuroMed.131 The preference of the Council and Commission is 
therefore to pursue a more ‘softly softly’ approach which avoids outright 
criticism of the Mediterranean Partners: the latter is an option more 
regularly pursued by the European Parliament.132 
At the Barcelona Conference in 1995, the importance of civil society 
in EuroMed was recognised in the text of the Declaration, and whilst the 
interest groups envisaged as making up ‘civil society’ were identified, the 
mechanisms for their contribution to the Barcelona Process were not 
defined. Civil society is a fundamental part of the third EuroMed basket 
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on social, cultural and human affairs as a contributing factor to the 
creation of an area of peace, stability and dialogue. This can be seen as 
based on Europe’s own integration experiences and is a key factor in 
seeing EuroMed as a system of governance. Unfortunately, it is also the 
basket which has been the most neglected and lacking in progress. The 
establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation will 
channel the funds to organisations engaged in intercultural dialogue and 
projects aimed at increasing cooperation across borders in the fields of, 
inter alia, education, the arts, journalism and human rights. The EU has 
been reluctant to engage directly with major civil society associations in 
some Mediterranean countries, including certain Islamic associations 
deemed to be too radical.133 There have also been instances of governments 
setting up their own NGOs in order to ‘siphon off these EU funds’.134 If this 
is true on a wide-scale, it would mean that efforts for democratisation and 
cultural cooperation are minimal when compared with the economic 
arrangements in EuroMed.  
Characterising the EuroMed system of governance in the CFSP 
context 
The institutional framework and multilateral, bilateral and unilateral 
features of EuroMed suggest that governance is an appropriate 
characterisation of the rules and practices defining appropriate behaviour 
and creating logics of appropriateness. Analysis of the emergence of 
institutions and their development is possible. To what extent these rules 
and practices define behaviour is analysed in the following chapters. 
However, in order for this to be done, it is first necessary to discuss 
further six observations on the system of governance in EuroMed and its 
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 First, the reason why further exploration of the system of 
governance of EuroMed beyond the institutions and instruments is 
necessary is due to the language of the Barcelona Declaration and 
subsequent EuroMed documents. These stress the joint ownership of the 
Barcelona Process between the EU and the Partner States. EuroMed can be 
differentiated from the more traditional model of relations with third 
states in that it has created multilateral, collective institutions bringing 
all the EU Members and Partner States together. Yet, ‘joint ownership’ 
suggests that a partnership of equals exists between the EU (institutions 
and Member States) and the Partner States as a collective group. In a 
partnership of equals, each side should be able to influence the 
development of EuroMed. Considering the Partner States as a collective 
group in any other way than geographically is impossible. The EuroMed 
Partnership is one between the EU institutions and Member States on the 
one hand and each Partner State individually on the other. As such, much 
of the policy making and operational elements flows from the bilateral 
and unilateral dimensions of the Barcelona Process. Even on the 
multilateral front, and despite the repeated claims by the Commission 
that the Mediterranean Partners bear equal responsibility for the 
development of EuroMed, the institutional framework and subject-matter 
have been designed and implemented on the European side. The 
institutional framework, including the EuroMed Committee, bears 
resemblance to that of the EU decision-making framework, suggesting that 
the Barcelona Process has been modelled on a European view of how a 
system of governance should function.135 EuroMed does not yet have an 
independent secretariat and the Commission acts as the administrative 
centre of both the Barcelona Process and the ENP.136 The initial choice of 
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the participants to include and exclude in the launch of the Barcelona 
Process was made by the Council, which has also set the agenda for 
discussion in the institutional framework. The terms of the Barcelona 
Declaration were drafted by the Council and Commission, and presented 
to the Mediterranean partners, rather than as a product of collaboration. 
The Barcelona Declaration subsequently appeared in similar terms in the 
CFSP Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, signifying the similarity 
between the EU’s foreign policy goals and the goals of the Barcelona 
Process. The EuroMed Ministerial Conclusions are given as Presidency 
(that is, of the EU) Conclusions, reaffirming the role of the Council and 
making the former appear as merely a veneer for the latter. The 
Commission administers the MEDA/ENPI programmes and reports on the 
progress, or lack thereof, of each of the Mediterranean Partners’ economic 
and political reforms. The European Parliament acts as the secretariat for 
the EMPA and will continue to do so if the proposal for a permanent 
secretariat at the Parliament in Brussels materialises. 
Second, in the absence of the Mediterranean Partners forming a 
collective and coherent grouping independently of EuroMed, the Council 
(especially the Member State holding the Presidency) and Commission 
retain control over the Barcelona Process through its bilateral and 
unilateral dimensions. Recalling that the goal of creating a EuroMed Free 
Trade Area by 2010 is through the conclusion of individual Association 
Agreements with each of the Partner States, this differentiates the process 
from a multilaterally-based convergence of individual states. Creating a 
system of governance by concluding bilateral association agreements 
carries the risk of maintaining a hub-spoke approach, with the 
economically-powerful EU institutions as the centre defining the 
economic agenda for integration, and the Partner States at the end of each 
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spoke.137 With the linkage between the economic issues involved in 
creating the EuroMed Free Trade Area and the other baskets, this hub-
spoke analogy could apply across the system of governance in EuroMed 
more generally, including in the sphere of migration control.138 This could 
be reduced if the Partner States advanced the integration process between 
themselves, yet it could also be said that horizontal integration is 
rendered more difficult by the governance system the EU institutions 
have instigated in EuroMed, that is to say by locking in Partner States to 
the EU’s already economically-integrated core.  
Third, the advantages for the Commission and Council in promoting 
EuroMed through the lens of economic integration and free trade are two-
fold. From an institutional angle, it is much easier for Commission to act 
as an international economic actor than through the instruments provided 
for in the CFSP. Further, greater economic development in the Southern 
Mediterranean would suggest that migration towards the EU would be 
more limited and that economic prosperity would reduce the risks of 
economic exclusion. With these reasons as the driving force behind 
EuroMed, it would seem apparent that the Council and Commission have 
defined both the membership and the content of EuroMed according to 
their own interests. The link with migration policy is explored further in 
the following two chapters. 
Fourth, the subject matter of the Association Agreements can also 
reveal to which they are geared to Union concerns, without giving 
adequate concessions, notably in terms of market access for agricultural 
and textile products. The reforms to be undertaken by Partner States, 
including the approximation of laws in areas such as competition law, 
product standards and money laundering, appear to be one-sided. 
EuroMed has been criticised for entrenching existing inequalities between 
the North and South rather than creating ‘an area of shared prosperity 
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through sustainable and balanced economic and social development’.139 
The exclusion of the lucrative economic sectors which the Partner States 
would prefer to have access to in the EU, such as agricultural and textiles, 
demonstrates that the EU and its Member States are only prepared to 
allow economic integration in a restrictive sense. Alignment of laws with 
those of the EU has the potential double advantage of facilitating access to 
the EU market, which is the main trading partner already for most of the 
Partner States, and offering a ready-made package of laws (with technical 
and financial assistance available) for adoption thereby saving expensive 
information and research costs. Regional integration between the 
Mediterranean partners could be facilitated if they are individually 
pursuing legislative programmes relating to the adoption of parts of the 
acquis. However, this harmonisation could be at a cost if Partner States do 
not perceive that they have anything to gain, such as trade concessions or 
more liberal visa regimes, from complying with the EU’s requests for 
reform. Beyond the economic sphere, limiting migration to the EU is one 
area identified by several commentators as being key to the Member 
States’ interest in EuroMed.140 
Fifth, the proposed Free Trade Area was a means by which the 
Commission and Council could ensure that the economic reforms of the 
Partner States were ‘anchored’ and ‘locked-in’ through a stronger 
mechanism than, in particular, the WTO.141 Whilst it could be said that the 
Commission and Council have a reasonably clear agenda based on their 
interests, the Partner States do not have a collective vision towards 
EuroMed: ‘the Southern partners’ attitudes towards the relationship are 
ad hoc, disjointed, and at times contradictory’.142  
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Sixth, the power imbalance between the two sides is even clearer 
given the importance of the MEDA funding instruments. Here, the 
Commission is responsible for distributing funds and can use these 
decisions to target the areas it considers most in need of reform or which 
will bring the most perceived benefit to the EU. 
In the context of the above six observations, it should not be 
surprising that the Council and Commission have sought leadership roles 
in EuroMed. They were responsible for the creation and the drafting of the 
Barcelona Process and, in the absence of any counterpart organisation 
grouping together the Mediterranean Partner States, are the only 
institutions capable of pushing the agenda forward. Given the focus on 
establishing a EuroMed Free Trade Area (whether this is primarily for the 
benefit of the EU or not), the Commission evidently has the expertise in 
this area, and is able to point to links between economic integration and 
political stability in Europe during the past 50 years. This can be 
contrasted with the broad theme of security, which has emerged as a key 
component of EuroMed. The scope which the EU is able to act in the 
security domain is limited, since it has no security framework of its own 
to employ.143 The commitments of the Barcelona Declaration (conflict 
prevention, human rights, weapons reductions etc.) are more difficult to 
put into operation in practice. It should also be recalled that the CFSP 
objectives include the ‘strengthening the security of the Union in all 
ways’.144 Since 9/11, however, a preoccupation with security issues within 
the EU Member States and institutions has prompted greater emphasis in 
EuroMed on security issues. This includes the extensive linking of security 
to issues of migration, which has the subsequent effect of blurring the 
distinction between internal and external security and how these differ, if 
                                                                                                                                                
2008) 5. 
143
 Christiansen, Petito and Tonra (n 7) 407. 
144
 Article 11(1) TEU. 
206 
 
at all.145  
 Returning also to the values the Council is attempting to promote 
through the CFSP and within EuroMed in particular, the nature of how 
the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights are to be 
achieved merits some attention. The Barcelona Declaration contained 
provisions relating to the need of the signatories to ‘develop the rule of 
law and democracy in their political systems’ and ‘respect human rights 
and fundamentals freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate 
exercise of such rights and freedoms’. The Declaration does not state that 
these tasks fall only to the Mediterranean Partners, yet the similarity 
between these provisions and those with Central and Eastern European 
states in the 1990s support the view that the reason for inclusion of these 
principles was to enlarge certain aspects of the Union’s system of 
governance to the Mediterranean Partners. Furthermore, all of the 
Association Agreements with Partner States contain clauses relating to 
human rights and more specific areas needing improvement. The 
Constitutional Treaty and Treaty of Lisbon also contained an identical 
provision on neighbourhood relations and the aim of developing ‘a special 
relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union 
and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.146 
The importance on the EU’s values, rather than common or shared values 
between the EU and its neighbours, is thus clear.  
By emphasising the need for democracy and sustainable economic 
and social development in the Barcelona Declaration, a clear parallel can 
be drawn with the values associated with the EU as a ‘civilian’ or 
‘normative’ power. Indeed, the Mediterranean was identified as a zone of 
interest for the CFSP to promote democracy, human rights, stability and 
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security just prior to the moves towards forming the EuroMed 
Partnership.147 The correlation between these two gives an indication to 
the extent to which the text of the Barcelona Declaration reflects EU 
interests in promoting its governance system in its Southern neighbours, 
so-called ‘soft power’ projection. 
There is a conceptual problem in this domain: how does the EU 
balance the supposed cooperative nature of EuroMed with greater 
emphasis on democracy promotion? The EU institutions have been 
consistent in restating the linkage between MEDA funding and the 
promotion of democracy, but less consistent in a post-9/11 world to 
criticise Mediterranean partners for failings or shortcomings in 
democratic development. It is also necessary to distinguish between 
cosmetic changes and those which go to the heart of real changes within 
national systems of governance. Part of this stems from fears about 
Europe’s future energy needs, in particular with regard to Algeria, and the 
desire to ensure cooperation in other areas, such as migration control.148 
Bartels’ analysis of the human rights clauses in the Association 
Agreements with each partner leads him to contend that such clauses are 
of limited use, since it is unlikely that agreements would be suspended 
unless there were grave instances of human rights violations.149 Occasions 
where this could have happened have passed without sanctions.150 If grave 
instances of violations are ignored, then it does not seem that the 
potential to promote change in the EuroMed region will be realised. 
Conversely, using the human rights clauses coupled with strengthening 
civil society and political opposition (which in some Partner States is 
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Islamist) may create political instability and therefore go against the (EU 
defined) aims of EuroMed. 
Despite viewing the issues on the EuroMed agenda as being of 
primary interest to the EU side because of the domestic implications for 
Member States, it is also possible to view EuroMed in a more positive light 
when compared to policies founded on unilateralism, such as those 
favoured by the US.151 Aliboni and Qatarneh make an interesting 
comparison between EuroMed and the United States’ Partnership for 
Progress and a Common Future for the Mediterranean and Middle East,152 
which was approved by the G8 countries in 2004 but which operates in a 
much weaker institutional framework and does not emphasise 
cooperative or joint ownership initiatives.153 It could also be suggested 
that the importance of EuroMed is not grounded in strict adherence to 
terms of the agreements but ensuring the continued participation of all 
Partner States, given that EuroMed is the only framework in which all 
Mediterranean non-EU members take part. If the Union institutions began 
to suspend the agreements which took such a long time to conclude, then 
it is likely that Partner States would no longer wish to participate and 
would lead to accusations of ‘bullying’ by the Union. This could, in turn, 
harm the long-term development of the Barcelona Process and, in the case 
of the disintegration of EuroMed, would result in the Union being unable 
to fulfil the (foreign policy) goals it has promoted in the Partnership.  
If EuroMed is to become a system of governance based on joint 
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ownership, there are several significant steps to be taken. On the 
institutional front, as well as decentralising from the European side the 
institutions of EuroMed, such as the case with the Anna Lindh foundation 
in Alexandria, the Euro-centric characteristics of EuroMed could be 
reduced by introducing more ‘independent bodies’ within the institutional 
framework. The joint chairing of EuroMed Ministerial conferences and 
independent legal personality of the secretariat were two initiatives 
contained in the Joint Paris Declaration in July 2008, which may help to 
realise this. Several ministerial conferences have called for an 
institutionalised structural dialogue on human rights, this has not 
materialised and was not proposed in the Joint Paris Declaration. The 
initiative for a form of dialogue has been supported by the Arab Human 
Development Report 2003, a UN report written by individuals from Arab 
states, which recommended democratisation as a means by which the 
economic situations of the states concerned could be improved.154 The 
Commission has in particular used this report as a raison d’être to 
promote good governance and human rights from within the Partner 
States and stating that these should be central principles of the Barcelona 
Process.155 The creation of an Office for Good Governance and Human 
Rights based on the OSCE’s similar body has also been suggested as a 
EuroMed institution independent of each side.156 The potential need for an 
Office on Ethnic Conflicts, again based on the OSCE’s High Commission 
for National Minorities, has also been identified. This could have the 
function, independently of the governments and EU institutions, of 
defusing tensions and offering the possibility of avoiding potential ethnic 
conflicts. Criticism has also been made, however, of the double-edged 
nature of the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean partners, 
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especially post 9/11: on the one hand, illiberal governments are 
strengthened in order to secure cooperation on crime and terrorism yet 
the Barcelona Process commits the EU to encouraging reform.  
 
Conclusion 
The complexity of regional affairs in the Mediterranean, the strong 
economic links between the EU and Partner States and issues of human 
rights and democratisation provide fertile ground for analysis. Most of the 
literature on EuroMed concludes that it has been only partially successful 
in achieving its goals. Whilst it is largely recognised as a (potentially) good 
confidence-building measure between the North and South 
Mediterranean, the two biggest criticisms of EuroMed are that it is overly 
Euro-centric and lacking in formal institutions that would remove or 
reduce this Euro-centricity. 
In the context of the institutional framework developed under the 
auspices of the Barcelona Process since 1995, the extensive contractual 
relations under the bilateral agreements, supported by the ENP Action 
Plans as further ‘layers’, it is possible to see EuroMed as a system of 
governance. However, there is a strong note of caution which must be 
noted. The Council and Commission are both the political and financial 
driving force behind the Barcelona Process, and both the institutional 
framework and the issues under discussion within EuroMed bear the 
hallmarks of the system of governance of EU itself. As such, governance of 
EuroMed must be understood as a system which is based not on a pooling 
of sovereignty between participating states, but as one which has an 
integrated core with a periphery of Partner States. The ‘hub-spoke’ analogy 
of economic relations based around a strong centre can be seen to apply 
more generally to EuroMed. The ‘EU’ is of course not a single actor in itself 
in EuroMed because of the various roles of the Member States, 
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Commission, Parliament and Council in addition to the common EuroMed 
institutions. This differentiates it from the (internal) governance of the 
EU, which does not have the same level of strong central actors. The 
analysis of EuroMed in this chapter reveals, however, that in creating a 
system of governance through the institutionalisation of cooperation in 
the Mediterranean, the foreign policy goals of the EU are evident. The aim 
of the EU in creating EuroMed and the ENP is to ensure that the EU’s 
territory is surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’. This makes a ‘system of 
governance’ an attractive characterisation of EuroMed, but one which 
includes an element of control on the part of the EU towards the Partner 
States, and somewhat dilutes the generally positive associations the 
language of ‘governance’ enjoys with regard to the characteristics of 
openness, transparency and participation identified in chapter one. 
Nevertheless, the EuroMed Partnership represents a major step in 
relations between the EU and the other states bordering the 
Mediterranean. Unlike the previous policies towards this area, it does 
appear that the Barcelona process has enjoyed relatively sustained 
momentum. Given the geopolitical problems and issues in this area, it 
should not be assumed that this goal can be reached in the near future. It 
is possible, however, to critically examine the ways and means by which 
the EU has attempted to pursue this policy in terms of the ‘baskets’. Many 
of the commentators agree that progress on fulfilling the aims of the 
Barcelona Process has been limited, and the Euro-centric nature of the 
Process may harm the overall efficiency of EuroMed in the long term. It is 
also clear that in attempting to promote/apply its internal policies outside 
its territorial borders, the internal/external element to European 
integration become ever more blurred. In the following chapter, the issue 
of migration, which many agree is the key to the EU’s interest in the 
Mediterranean and which has now become the fourth ‘basket’ in EuroMed 




Chapter 5: Revisiting the Pillars: EU Migration Law and Policy 
Migration law and policy is one of the clearest examples of where the 
internal and external spheres of governance are most blurred. This is 
especially true in the EU’s multilevel system of governance. This blurring 
partly stems from the wide-ranging nature of ‘migration’ which can be 
legitimately discussed within any number of contexts. Migration here is 
used in a wide-sense to include all those who cross borders in a legal or 
illegal manner and remain in a state for the purpose of work, to seek 
asylum or as a refugee. As the discussion below demonstrates, these are 
not hermetically sealed categories. Examining the debate on migration 
serves to see how the links with the CFSP and the foreign policy goals of 
the EU can be made and how, in the EU’s system of governance, foreign 
policy goals can be translated into practices in other areas. 
 Legal measures and political decisions taken within a state to 
control migration flows to and from the defined territory of the state are 
close to the core notion of state sovereignty. Legal and policy measures 
one would expect to find in a national context include border control 
mechanisms, conditions for entry and residency in the territory and 
removal of those whose situation is no longer ‘regular’. There would likely 
also be more policy-oriented instruments such as guest worker 
programmes to fill labour gaps, measures to attract highly-qualified 
migrants and programmes to facilitate or improve the integration of 
migrants into society. All these measures may potentially have important 
effects on ‘outsiders’, which primarily means individuals but measures 
may also have strong effects on relations with other states. Exogenous 
forces, such as economic crises, wars or political instability, can have 
significant effects on migration flows and, by consequence, internal policy-
making as a reaction to these forces. 
For the EU Member States, policy-making in migration-related issues 
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is strongly linked to existing obligations in international law, bilateral 
arrangements with other states and a growing acquis on migration issues 
at an EU level. The latter is coupled with greater discussion of how the 
Union should react to migration issues both in its neighbourhood and 
beyond. Discussion of migration issues is often strongly linked to the 
search for security in the internal sphere and this necessitates taking into 
account factors affecting internal security but outside the physical 
borders of EU territory. Consequently, and alongside the search for an 
increased global role for the Union, migration issues are pushed towards 
the domain of foreign policy. Migration therefore merits scrutiny in the 
context of the CFSP and EuroMed, where in the latter migration has 
become the fourth ‘basket’ of cooperation since 2005, and which has 
therefore come to play a prominent role in the Barcelona Process. The 
Mediterranean is a focus of EU migration policy-making not only because 
of the relationships with the Partner States and the movement of their 
citizens, but also because of the ‘frontier’ nature of the North African 
states between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. EuroMed could, therefore, 
be seen as an ‘interface’ between these two geographical regions and 
reflecting the politicised nature of migration in relations beyond the 
Mediterranean region.  
In contrast to the free movement rights of EU citizens, legal 
measures at the EU level in relation to migration from third countries 
remain limited in scope. Competence in the regulation of migration from 
third states was traditionally understood as being almost wholly within 
the domain of Member States.1 Informal and ad hoc fora had provided an 
opportunity for Member States to discuss migration from outside the 
Community and related issues since the 1970s.2 Competence to deal with 
areas of migration law and policy became part of the Union’s ‘third pillar’ 
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of Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty on European Union, and aspects 
of visa policy for nationals of third states crossing external borders 
became covered by Article 100(c) EEC.3 Like the CFSP, the JHA pillar was 
characterised by intergovernmentalism, reflecting the sensitivity of many 
Member State governments over such ‘core’ issues of national sovereignty 
and resulting, according to de Búrca, in a complex and awkward 
constitutional structure.4 The roles of the Commission and Parliament 
were extremely limited under the TEU provisions. However, the Treaties 
of Amsterdam and Nice transferred parts of the JHA pillar to the first, 
Community pillar and the remaining issues in Title VI TEU became known 
as Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Issues of JHA are 
now more widely referred to as Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) since 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. FSJ is widely 
seen as one of the most dynamic areas of policy-making at the EU level. 
The intersection between national and EU-level migration law and 
policy coordination forms a large part of FSJ, the continued complexity of 
which has been rightly characterised by Walker as a ‘constitutional 
odyssey’.5 Whereas the CFSP was envisaged as the means by which the EU 
would gain a stronger voice in world (political) affairs to match its 
economic weight, JHA, by contrast, had no provisions for external 
cooperation until the Treaty of Amsterdam. This packaging of internal 
policies and foreign policy in three separate pillars with varied 
institutional competences and different instruments at their disposal has 
gradually been eroded. The inherent internal and external dimensions to 
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migration law and policy, especially in the context of the Mediterranean 
region, make tracking the influences between the systems of governance a 
revealing exercise. The Union institutions have gradually placed 
increasing emphasis on the need to transcend the internal and foreign 
policy boundaries when dealing with migration issues. 
The first explicit call by the Commission for the integration of 
migration issues into external policies was made even before the CFSP 
came into being.6 This need was, however, not expressly recognised in 
Council Conclusions until 1999.7 Within recent years, Council Conclusions 
have more consistently recognised the need for the integration of 
migration goals into foreign policy. The main goal associated with 
migration policies at national level in the EU is to regulate who may or 
may not enter and reside in the territory, and to dissuade third country 
nationals from attempting to enter unlawfully. This can be understood as 
an ‘arms length’ policy, which allows for some limited migration avenues 
(for example, for highly skilled workers, temporary/seasonal workers and 
family members) but attempts to ensure that those who are not wanted 
are kept far from the territory of the state they may be tempted to enter, 
whether lawfully or not. That is not to say that EU Member States only 
pursue measures which are repressive in nature, for example, the return 
of irregular migrants to their home country, since they may also pursue 
development policies in third countries which try to remove the reasons 
potential migrants may have for seeking to come to Europe. Economic 
development of the Mediterranean Partner States through the creation of 
the Free Trade Area in EuroMed is one example of this. Preventing 
irregular migration is often visible as the primary goal of European 
governments in migration policy and discourse, and this has fed into 
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migration goals at EU level. This being so, the EU would be seen to be 
going beyond the type of intergovernmental migration discussions one 
would expect to find within an international organisation and more 
towards what one would expect at the level of the nation state.  
Whether the migration goals are successfully defined and integrated 
into foreign policy or not, Council Conclusions demonstrate that the 
various dimensions of migration law and policy are part of the equation in 
the CFSP and play a key role in the construction of the EU’s identity and 
definition of its international role. Understanding the synergy between 
the governance of migration and foreign policy are means by which the EU 
can be tested on its stated aims, values commitments to the protection of 
human rights, development and the promotion of ‘good governance’ 
elsewhere in the world. 
The previous chapter examined the institutions and instruments of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and how the emerging system of 
governance can be characterised. Despite the repeated claims that the 
Partnership is the subject of joint ownership on the part of the EU and the 
Mediterranean Partner states, the Council and Commission’s interest in 
seeking a leadership role and enforcing this through the multilateral 
aspects (agenda-setting in the EuroMed institutions), bilateral aspects 
(differentiation of the partners through the Association Agreements) and 
unilateral aspects (control of MEDA/ENPI funding) was shown to be in 
evidence. The governance of migration in its differing forms and contexts 
is a good example of where cooperation takes place between the EU and its 
Mediterranean partners but where different interests can be perceived. 
Migration has become an increasing focal point in the institutional 
development of EuroMed since the original Barcelona Declaration and the 
economic, political and cultural dimension to migration means that it 
cuts across all three original ‘baskets’. ‘Migration, Social Integration, 
Justice and Security’ was added to the five-year work programme agreed at 
the 2005 Barcelona EuroMed Ministerial Conference and can be treated as 
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a separate basket within the Partnership, which continues to have 
implications for the other three baskets. Since the baskets serve to 
structure the institutional development within EuroMed, the emphasis on 
legal means to control migration within the Mediterranean context show 
how the synergy between EuroMed and migration has developed since the 
greater attention the EU institutions and Member States have placed on 
the latter in recent years. 
The purpose this chapter is to identify and explore the complex 
framework of migration law and policy at an EU level, distinguishing its 
different aspects and critically examining the legal instruments the 
governance of migration. Weight is attached to analysis of the measures 
which have particular consequences for the Mediterranean Partner States, 
which allows for an analysis of the links and interaction between the 
governance of migration and EuroMed in the following chapter. 
Migration Law and Policy at the EU Level 
Within the context of the cross-pillar nature of migration policy-making at 
EU level, tracking the respective competences of the EU institutions and 
the Member States is complex. ‘Migration’ here is understood as a broad 
term, encompassing the governance of legal/regular and illegal/irregular 
forms of migration to the EU in terms legislative and policy measures.8 As 
noted above, many aspects of this area of policy-making go to the heart of 
state sovereignty and identity. However, because of the importance of 
migration issues within national debates (particularly in evidence during 
domestic elections), rhetoric from Member State governments and media-
led assumptions often blur the reality in which the EU acts in this area. 
Despite rhetoric from some Member States concerning sovereignty which 
suggests that progress in forging a common EU approach to migration 
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matched with a legal framework would be impossible, this area has seen 
greater cross-pillar transfers of competences to the EU institutions, than, 
for example, for the CFSP. The nature of these transfers has, however, 
been uneven. The existence of an ‘intergovernmental brake’ within FSJ 
has prevented more comprehensive transfers of competence to the EU.9 
The recurrent theme in both the transfer of competence and the 
ability of the institutions to create coherent legislation and policy is the 
resistance of (some of) the Member States in going beyond minimum 
levels of standard setting in migration policy. The need for Member States 
to demonstrate to domestic political audiences that they are ‘in control’ is 
more evident in terms of irregular migration, which complicates the 
forging of comprehensive migration policies at EU level, despite the tone 
of the Treaty dispositions and successive Council Conclusions. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere Conclusions and the 
Hague Programme 
A starting point in exploring migration governance in the EU is the 
different relationship between citizenship of the Union for nationals and 
the status of non-nationals of the Member States. The Treaty on European 
Union granted citizenship of the Union to nationals of Member States10 
but third-country nationals resident in the EU were not covered by these 
provisions. In spite of the traditionally limited competences for the EU 
institutions regarding the status of third-country nationals, the latter 
were affected by the abolition of border controls in the Schengen Area and 
the completion of the Single Market. With national borders effectively 
rendered invisible in the Schengen Area, it would be impossible to check 
the movement across internal frontiers by those not holding citizenship of 
the Union. 
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With the creation of Justice and Home Affairs dispositions in the 
TEU, various aspects of migration to the EU were the subject of third 
pillar instruments. These included family reunion and unaccompanied 
minors, and a Joint Action on uniform residence permits.11 The most 
significant advance in this area was, however, the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
The Treaty invigorated the domain of Justice and Home Affairs by 
transferring competences to the Community pillar and thus allowing the 
Commission a stronger role. The insertion of the new Article 63 EC was 
equally significant. This article laid down the obligation for the Council to 
adopt measures in asylum, refugee, entry and residence and immigration 
policy within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty.12 These 
dispositions cover the main forms of migration to EU and can in many 
ways be seen as a ‘catch-up’ to the mobility rights enjoyed by EU citizens 
internally. By working under the assumption that the lack of internal 
border controls necessitates the coordination or harmonisation of 
dispositions regarding the external border and the conditions of third-
country nationals in the EU, the Treaty of Amsterdam set a relatively 
ambitious programme for action. 
The conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council in 
Tampere in October 1999 served as a guide to the ‘milestones’13 to be 
created towards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice.14 These 
included a Common EU Asylum and Migration System,15 elevating the 
legal status of third-country nationals to those of EU citizens through non-
discrimination and allowing for a uniform set of rights ‘as near as possible 
to those enjoyed by EU citizens’.16 The document also stressed the 
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importance of readmission agreements and technical cooperation at the 
EU’s borders, foreseeing the eventual adhesion of the (then) candidate 
states in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean who would 
constitute large parts of the enlarged Union’s external border. The initial 
‘milestones’ which appeared as legislative proposals soon after the 
Tampere Council were adopted in some cases, and dropped or watered-
down in others.17 The legal instruments which have come into being since 
Tampere are treated below according to their subject matter. 
 The Tampere Programme was followed in 2004 by the Hague 
Programme on strengthening FSJ in the EU and accompanied by an 
Action Plan.18 Despite the suggestive implications of an ‘Action Plan’ for 
further concrete measures, the Hague Programme merely listed priorities 
for action and further discussion. The Hague Programme was therefore 
notable for launching the second phase of a forging a common policy in 
the asylum, migration and borders19 but not for outlining a future 
legislative programme in the field of migration as had been the case at 
Tampere. It also did not call for a shift to qualified majority voting (QMV) 
in the Council for legal migration, meaning that is still subject to 
unanimity voting in the Council with only consultation of the European 
Parliament.20 Taken as a whole, the Hague Programme reflects the 
Member States’ preferences for maintaining national asylum systems and 
their respective legal migration channels rather than create a fully 
European system.21 This perhaps explains why the general progress of 
implementation of the Hague Programme and the legal instruments was 
described by the Commission in July 2008 as ‘mixed’ at best.22 Under the 
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Treaty of Lisbon, all provisions pertaining to JHA would be brought 
together under Title IV ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ and the 
reformed Article 63(a) would require the Union to develop ‘a common 
immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient 
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals 
residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced 
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human 
beings’.23 The co-decision procedure would be extended to legal migration, 
and harmonisation measures could go beyond minimum standards.24  
With a basic legislative framework in place as guided by the Tampere 
Conclusions, and in spite of the absence of a fully Europeanised system of 
governance of migration, the EU has begun to view the different aspects of 
migration beyond the technical and to outline a more coherent 
programme for migration at an EU level. This is in evidence in the 
increasing use of the term ‘policy’ rather than ‘measures’ in proposals and 
documentation since the Treaty of Amsterdam and Tampere 
Conclusions.25 An integral part of this process has been the linkage 
between migration and economic development (of both the EU and 
sending countries) and security. There has also been a more explicit 
linkage between EU and Member State level policies on migration: the 
JHA Council Conclusions in July 2008 noted, for example, that the 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum contains ‘common principles 
that are to guide migration policies at national and EU level’.26 The 
Mediterranean region and the EU’s relationships with the Partner States 
form a key component in the institutional policy-making process. 
                                                   
23
 Article 79(1) TFEU, as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(66). 
24
 Article 79(2) TFEU, as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2(65). 
25
 A Niemann, 'Explaining Visa, Asylum and Immigration Policy Treaty Revision: Insights 
from a Revised Neofunctionalist Framework' (2006) University of Bath, 
Constitutionalism Webpapers ConWEB No. 1/2006 
<http://www.bath.ac.uk/esml/conWEB/Conweb%20papers-filestore/conweb5-2006.pdf> 
(accessed 25 July 2008) 16. 
26
 Council of the EU, ‘2887th Council Justice and Home Affairs Meeting Conclusions’, 19-
24-25 July 2007, 8. 
223 
 
Borders, the Schengen Area and third-country nationals 
 
Most Member States of the EU are part of the Schengen Area.27 This has 
important consequences for their own national borders and immigration 
systems.28 Within this space, internal frontiers effectively disappear by 
becoming ‘weightless’.29 Third-country nationals who need visas for short-
term visits to a Schengen Member State are granted visas which are valid 
across the Schengen Area.30 Measures do not yet extend, for example, to 
allowing third-country nationals similar rights in terms of employment 
through the limited means described below. 
The Schengen Borders Code,31 a Regulation which entered into force 
in October 2006, lays down the principle of the absence of border controls 
between EU Member States and the rules governing the EU’s external 
borders.32 The Schengen Information System (SIS) is used for surveillance 
cooperation between the Member States and a more extensive SIS is 
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currently in the planning stages.33 Coordination of the strengthening of 
the EU’s external borders is the task of Frontex, an EU agency based in 
Warsaw which begun work in 2005.34 Its task is to coordinate operational 
cooperation between Member States with respect to the training of 
officials, joint operations and technical assistance.35 Evaluating the work 
and role of Frontex is premature; however, its creation as an external 
border agency suggests that the Member States find agreement and 
cooperation through delegation to an EU agency easier when there is a 
perceived ‘external’ threat. The emphasis on border control reveals a 
prioritising of the strengthening of frontiers because of perceived ‘risks’ to 
the EU’s territory. A similar point is in evidence with the establishment of 
the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) by a Regulation.36 Given 
the proximity of the Mediterranean, these measures are bound to have a 
strong impact on EuroMed and the relationships and identities of the EU 
and its Partner States. The nature of ‘thicker’ external borders is returned 
to below with specific consideration of the Mediterranean. 
Migrant workers and economic migration 
Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, membership of the EU does 
not allow third-country nationals the right to work in any Member State of 
the EU. In fact, there are only limited means by which third-country 
nationals may seek employment in the EU. Many Member State 
governments have found themselves stressing the positive benefits of 
immigration (whether this is from the new Member States or outside the 
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EU) whilst simultaneously attaching important to measures designed to 
keep people ‘out’ and protect both welfare systems and national identities 
which are often claimed to be threatened. Member States seem to prefer 
this course of action rather than that of recognising that the decisions of 
their neighbours already have an impact on internal migration flows of 
third-country nationals within the EU.37 Whilst the EU as a whole is facing 
long-term problems relating to an ageing population, common and 
comprehensive solutions at the EU level have not been forthcoming.  
  A directive covering admission to the EU for the purposes for 
employment and self-employment was proposed in 2001 as a consequence 
of the launch of the Tampere agenda. The proposal was not fully discussed 
in the Council as it attracted little support amongst the Member States.38 
The draft directive was accompanied by a communication on a QMV 
disposition for economic immigration policy.39 Specific directives were 
successfully created in relation to researchers40 (justified by reference to 
the Lisbon Agenda of making the EU a competitive knowledge-based 
economy)41 and for the admission of students, pupils, trainees and 
volunteers.42 Aside from family reunification, as examined below, the 
most significant directive in this area in terms of the number of 
individuals potentially covered has concerned migrants already resident 
in the EU, rather than those seeking entry. The Long-Term Residents 
Directive allows a third-country national who has been legally and 
continuously resident and working in a Member State the right to reside 
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in the same Member State or any other Member State.43 A number of 
exceptions are provided for in the Directive, which suggests that if used, 
they would constitute limitations and a ‘significant departure from the 
goal, as formulated in Tampere, of giving third-country nationals a 
comparable legal status to EU citizens’.44 This is especially the case for 
employment and the right to social benefits, and as such the Directive has 
attracted criticism for maintaining long-term residents in a status of 
‘second class citizens’.45  
 The Constitutional Treaty proposed some majority voting in legal 
migration issues, but maintained the right of the Member States ‘to 
determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from 
third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed 
or self-employed’.46 This provision was retained by the Treaty of Lisbon 
and would improve the facilitation of legislation in this area.47 The 
constant difficulty appears to be in agreeing what migration should be 
allowed, in what quantities and how.48 A proposal for a directive 
establishing a ‘blue card’ system for non-EU nationals who would be able 
to work in highly skilled jobs was proposed by the Commission in October 
2007,49 but as with previous proposals of this type, faces lengthy 
discussions in the Council.50 Without dispositions on legal and regular 
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migration to the EU the ‘central plank’ of an EU migration policy is 
absent.51 An immediate point of comparison can be made with asylum law 
and policy.  
 The absence of general competences of the part of the EU to deal 
with migration suggests that there is no scope for the EU to employ means 
to manage migration flows. However, the main sources of provisions for 
third-country nationals at an EU level to exercise an economic activity in 
the EU are found in the bilateral agreements with third states. Here, the 
Commission has succeeded in gaining influence on migration policy. Such 
agreements with third states include those in the EU’s neighbourhood 
such as those in the European Economic Area, pre-accession states and 
Russia. Turkey and the Maghreb Mediterranean Partner States have 
clauses in their Association Agreements which also allow for limited 
migration rights. There are a number of agreements with Turkey and their 
dispositions have frequently come under the scrutiny of the ECJ. The 
main status of Turkish workers in the EU is the Association Agreement 
1963, the 1970 Protocol to the Association Agreement, and Decisions 2/76 
and 1/80 of the Association Council concerning access to employment. For 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the bilateral agreements provide for equal 
treatment in social security for workers and family members and equality 
in working conditions. These rights were provided for in the original 
treaties in the 1970s and remained largely unchanged in the new 
agreements.52 
Family reunification 
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The reunification of third-country family members has become the most 
significant form of migration to the EU Member States in numerical 
terms.53 This form of migration accounts for more than 50% of the total 
migration to some EU Member States.54 Some of the Mediterranean 
Partner States have been amongst the major sending countries of migrant 
workers to the EU and, as a consequence of reunification, their family 
members.  
 Two situations for third-country family members coming to and 
residing in the EU require outlining here as each is treated under distinct 
legal frameworks. The two situations are for the family members of EU 
citizens, and family members of third-country nationals resident in a 
Member State of the EU. Family reunification can also be affected by the 
law on asylum and refugees, depending on the status of the applicants. 
The legal situation of third-country family members of a national of a 
Member State has been covered by Community law as far back as 1961.55 As 
a general rule, however, EU law has only been relevant as to their 
situation once rights to free movement within the EU have been exercised. 
Currently, third-country nationals who are family members of an EU 
citizen exercising his or her free movement rights ‘may provide more 
favourable immigration rights, especially for members of a migrant 
workers’ family, when the free movement principle has been triggered 
legally’.56 
The current legal framework for the non-EU citizen family members 
of a Union citizen resident in another Member State is provided for by 
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Directive 2004/38/EC, which came into force in 2006.57 Family members 
are defined as spouses or registered partners (if such partnerships are 
recognised in the host Member State), direct descendants under the age of 
21 and dependant direct relatives.58 They are granted the right of entry to 
the Member State with only an entry visa (if one is required),59 and benefit 
from residency rights so long as the Union citizen is working, studying or 
has sufficient resources so as not to be a burden on the host Member 
State’s social assistance system. Citizens of all the Mediterranean Partner 
States except Israel require visas when crossing external borders of 
Member States.60 
For the reunification of third-country nationals and their family 
members, the legal regime is covered by the Directive on Family 
Reunification adopted on the basis of Article 63(3)(a) EC.61 This directive 
does not apply to the UK, Ireland or Denmark,62 or to the family members 
of EU citizens.63 The directive allows a right to family reunification of 
third-country nationals legally resident in a Member State. ‘Family’ is 
given a restricted definition and includes spouses and unmarried minors, 
though Member States are free to be less restrictive in their transposition 
of the Directive if they wish. Family members must be granted the same 
access to employment and education as the sponsor,64 though Member 
States may invoke a delay before authorising family members to gain 
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employment (Article 14(2), a potential further barrier to integration.65 
Family relationships may have also commenced after the sponsor entered 
the Member State,66 and after five years the family members gain long-
term autonomous residence rights,67 mirroring those in the Long Term 
Residents Directive examined above.68 Restrictions and limitations on the 
rights established by the directive are possible (Article 16) and a wide 
discretion is left to the Member States as to whether they use them or not. 
One example is the Dutch government’s requirement that incoming family 
members pass an ‘integration’ test at a Dutch Embassy prior to arrival.69 
This directive also covers family members of refugees, the legal situation 
of which is examined below. 
 Returning to the issue of the intersection between EU law and 
human rights provisions, the European Parliament challenged certain 
aspects of the Family Reunification Directive,70 specifically, that there 
may be additional conditions for integration for unaccompanied children 
over the age of 12 where there is national legislation to such effect, and 
applications for reunification must be submitted before a child reaches 
15.71 The ECJ dismissed the action as no absolute right for a third-country 
national to reside in a state could be found in the ECHR or other 
international treaties (including the Geneva Convention in the case of 
refugees)72 and nothing in the Directive prevents Member States from 
authorising family reunification on grounds other than the Directive. 
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The issue of asylum has been pushed up the national political agendas in 
many Member States, and mainstream asylum policies in recent years 
have reflected a hardening of attitudes.73 In fact, asylum figures in Member 
States in the mid-2000s are higher than in the mid-1980s, but contrary to 
public perceptions have continued to decline steadily each year since the 
peak during the early 1990s.74 
Despite the argument that those seeking asylum and refugee status 
through forced displacement are fundamentally different from ‘economic’ 
migrants,75 Article 63 EC also provided for measures to be taken. This is 
explained by the need for comprehensive measures due to the crossovers 
in legal status which can often occur for those seeking migration options 
to the EU.  
All Member States of the EU are parties to the Geneva Refugee 
Convention.76 The principle, according to Article 33 of the Convention, is 
that no state shall expect or return (‘refouler’) a refugee to a territory 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
ECHR Article 3 on the prohibition of ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ 
could apply in cases where refugees are refused entry or expelled.77 The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also recognises the right to 
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Unlike third-country nationals in the EU, no legislative measures 
were taken at the EU level which specifically addressed their legal 
situation before the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.79 
Greater coordination was discussed in the Council at the end of the 1980s 
to prevent multiple applications for asylum in the Member States, or 
‘asylum shopping’.80 Unlike for economic migration, Member States have 
recognised and acted on the need for common action on asylum policy. 
The Dublin Convention 1990 created a framework to designate which 
Member State was responsible for dealing with individual asylum 
applications. The measures on asylum to be adopted within five years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam covered the 
responsibility of the Member States for considering an application for 
asylum, minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers, 
minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third 
countries as refugees, and minimum standards of procedures in Member 
States from granting or withdrawing refugee status.81 Article 63(2) EC also 
stated that measures on refugees and displaced persons must be 
concluded vis-à-vis temporary protection to displaced persons from third 
countries as well as measure to promote a ‘balance of effort’ between 
Member States in bearing consequences of receiving displaced persons.82 
Key to this Article is the emphasis on minimum standards rather than full 
harmonisation. Member States may therefore continue to adopt ‘national 
provisions which are compatible with this Treaty and with international 
                                                   
78
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), Article 18.  
79
 Guild notes that the only reference pre-1999 to refugees was found in Council 
Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the 
Community (Social Security Regulation) [1971] OJ L 149/2, Article 1(d): E Guild, 'The 
Europeanisation of Europe's Asylum Policy' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 630, 631. 
80
 E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 196. 
81
 Article 63(1) and (2) EC, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
82




The Tampere European Council Conclusions stated the aim of 
creating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to include clear and 
uniform rules and standards on procedures, and recognition and 
reception of asylum seekers.84 Coupled with the CEAS, the Tampere 
Conclusions identified partnerships with sending countries,85 the fair 
treatment of third-country nationals86 and the management of migration 
flows87 as the constituent parts of a common EU Asylum and Migration 
Policy. Commission proposals were made in 2000 and the first phase 
measures were adopted by 2005. The Dublin Convention 1990 was placed 
within the Union’s legal framework by a Regulation, thereby reinforcing 
the hierarchy of criteria used to establish the Member State responsible 
for an asylum application.88 The Regulation stressed the ‘continuity’ of the 
new Regulation (labelled ‘Dublin II’) with the original Dublin 
Convention.89 In the Mediterranean context, some Southern EU Member 
States have objected to the ‘gate-keeping’ function of Dublin II, as they are 
most likely to be the first state of arrival.90 
 Article 67(1)(b) EC was the legal basis for the Minimum Reception 
Conditions Directive.91 The Directive applies to persons claiming Geneva 
Convention refugee status in a Member State and lays down minimum 
standards only. Such provisions include, for example, informing asylum 
seekers as to ‘at least any established benefits and of the obligations with 
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which they must comply relating to reception conditions’ within a 
maximum 15 day period,92 access to the education system for minors,93 
and ‘material reception conditions to ensure a standard of living adequate 
for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence’.94 
As is the case with other Directives below, Member States are free to offer 
more favourable conditions,95 but it appears that many states only offer 
the minimum and may take advantage of the vague terms of the Directive 
(for example, the special duties with respect to persons with special 
needs)96 to avoid making substantially more beneficial reception 
conditions. 
 The Qualifications Directive agrees the minimum standards for the 
qualification of a third-country national as a refugee or someone in need 
of international protection, and the content of the protection.97 Many in 
need of protection fall outside the category of ‘refugee’ and may benefit 
from ‘subsidiary protection’. This would seem to suggest that subsidiary 
protection is an inferior form of protection to that of the Geneva 
Convention, and NGOs including the Refugee Council in the UK have 
called for the use of ‘complementary protection’ as a preferred term.98 Yet, 
fixing narrowly-defied categories of protection runs the risk of creating 
new groups of unprotected persons.99 
In elaborating the definition of refugee for the purposes of EU 
asylum law, Articles 9 and 10 of the Directive refer to the forms of 
persecution which can give rise to protection. These include acts of 
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physical, mental or sexual violence or denial of judicial redress, 
prosecution or punishment which is ‘disproportionate or 
discriminatory’.100 The reasons for persecution also cover religious beliefs, 
sexual orientation and gender-related aspects, as these may constitute 
‘membership of a particular social group’.101 Persecution or fear of 
persecution must be sufficiently serious102 and well-founded.103 Whilst this 
definition of status is relatively broad, the exclusion clauses allow for a 
revocation of status, meaning that the rights of individuals to move, work 
or receive benefits would be restricted.104 
 The most contentious legislative instrument which has come out of 
the Tampere programme is the Asylum Procedures Directive.105 First 
proposed in 2000, the Directive aims to ‘establish minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee 
status’.106 The Directive applies to individuals seeking refugee status under 
the Geneva Refugee Convention, and it may also apply to other asylum 
seekers if the Member State so wishes.107 The procedural rights include 
being informed of decisions in writing, and in the case of a negative 
decision, to be informed of the factual and legal reasons for denial of 
asylum.108 Despite criticism that the measures will protect asylum seekers 
insufficiently, minimum standards should (if properly enforced) raise the 
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standards in operation in some Member States. For example, the Directive 
limits the grounds for rejecting claims as inadmissible only where the 
asylum seeker should seek protection elsewhere or repetitive/multiple 
applications have been made. Some Member States, including Spain and 
Portugal, operate much wider categories which has resulted in three-
quarters of all applications being rejected as inadmissible.109 The Directive 
has also been subject to criticism for the limited safeguards regarding 
appeals against decisions and the lack of a right to the suspensive effect of 
appeals.110  
 A related point, and of particular interest here in the context of the 
Mediterranean, are the dispositions on the nature and definition of ‘safe 
countries of origin’ to which individuals may be returned without a 
substantial examination of their application. Article 29 obliges the 
Council to produce a ‘minimum common list of third countries which 
shall be regarded by Member States as safe countries of origin’. Inclusion 
of a country on this list would give Member States the option, as per 
Article 36, of not examining (at all or only in part) the asylum application 
of a person who has entered or is seeking to enter the territory from a 
country on the ‘safe’ list. The UNHCR has voiced serious concerns about 
the compatibility of these provisions with the Geneva Convention.111 In 
any event, a common minimum list has not been agreed and following an 
action by the European Parliament, the ECJ annulled the provisions 
relating to the ‘safe country list’ due to the exclusion of the Parliament 
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from the process.112 
The above four pieces of legislation form the backbone of the post-
Tampere framework of asylum and refugee law at the EU level. The dates 
of adoption of the legislative measures demonstrate the extremely slow-
moving process in the passing of FSJ legislation, even when only 
minimum standards are at stake. This was foreseen by some 
commentators at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam,113 
and demonstrates both the nature of the agreement by wary Member 
States and the exclusion of major roles for the European Parliament and 
ECJ. To this section a further directive must be added. The Mass Influx of 
Persons Directive was the first legislative instrument passed following the 
Tampere programme, and it covers the scenario for temporary protection 
for a mass influx of displaced persons, enhancing and promoting burden-
sharing between the Member States.114 The temporary protection 
measures may last only for one year, though provisions are made for 
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extensions by QMV if the Council so wishes.115 ‘Mass’ and ‘large’ are not 
given a definition, which mirrors the situation in UNHCR instruments.116 
However, the Directive states that the influx must come from a specific 
country or geographical area.117 The Directive details the levels of 
protection to be afforded, including family reunification, employment and 
welfare provision, which are less extensive than those in the legislation 
examined above.118 Although this chapter returns to the question of 
burden-sharing, within the Mediterranean context, it must be noted that 
this Directive has not been used. Neither are the burden-sharing 
mechanisms particularly extensive, even in the event that this Directive 
was used, since there no obligation to share the financial burden of a mass 
influx of persons.119 
Irregular migration, returns, expulsions and readmission 
agreements 
Article 63(3)(a) and (b) covers measures on immigration policy relative to 
conditions of entry and residence, standards on procedures for the issue 
by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits (including 
those for the purpose of family reunion) and illegal immigration and 
illegal residence, including repatriation. ‘Illegal’ immigration is a 
problematic term, since it does not have a common definition and carries 
connotations of criminality rather than irregularity.120 ‘Illegal’ immigrants 
are not only those who enter the EU by clandestine means but also 
individuals who enter and stay legally, for example as a tourist or under a 
work scheme, but do not leave when they should, and those whose asylum 
application fails. As such, although the Commission and Member States 
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tend to speak of illegal (im)migration, here the term ‘irregular’ is 
preferred. Given the nature of irregular migration to the EU, exact 
statistics on numbers are not available. However, it is estimated that 90% 
of asylum seekers are forced to enter the EU via irregular means.121 Figures 
on those who enter the EU and do not claim asylum are highly contested. 
 The ‘fight against illegal immigration’ is manifested in both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ legal instruments and in operational elements used to 
strengthen borders, to the increasing involvement of third countries 
through readmission agreements and policy initiatives such as extra-
territorialisation. Human trafficking has been the focus of a number of 
legislative instruments, using preventive, dissuasive and punitive 
measures.122 These include creating rules for deciding which Member State 
is responsible for prosecution,123 and granting limited rights to a residence 
permit to victims of trafficking.124  
For the Commission, a returns policy is, ‘an integral part of a 
comprehensive Community immigration and asylum policy’.125 Of the 
legislative instruments passed specifically with regard to returns, a 
Directive passed in 2001 provides for the mutual recognition of decisions 
on the expulsion of third-country nationals.126 The Directive defines 
expulsion as third-countries who no longer fulfilling legal conditions for 
residence and for those whose expulsion is based on a ‘serious and present 
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threat to public order or to national security and safety’.127 A Directive on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returns was 
proposed by the Commission in 2005, which would repeal Directive 
2001/40 and replace it with a harmonisation of common rules, rather than 
mutual recognition only.128 Frontex has a role to play in providing 
‘necessary assistance’ to the Member States and collating best practices.129 
 The legal basis for Member States to cooperate in organising joint 
flights for returning third-country nationals to non-Member States is 
provided by a Council Decision.130 With its appendix outlining guidelines 
for ‘security provisions’ before, during and after the flight, the Directive 
covers the operational means by which Member States open to other 
Member States participation in a joint removal of third-country nationals. 
This procedure has been criticised as creating charter flights full of 
returnees, which appear to be collective returns and therefore against the 
principle of non-refoulement.  
 Readmission agreements between the EU Member States and third 
countries are not new phenomena,131 but they have become more 
widespread at Union level since 2000. Member States maintain their own 
‘safe country’ lists, which may involve people being sent back on a 
bilateral basis and therefore without engaging the Dublin II Regulation. 
These lists differ from Member State to Member State. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam granted Community competence to conclude readmissions 
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agreements,132 which was endorsed as a way forward by the Tampere 
Conclusions.133 A bilateral readmission agreement requires parties to 
readmit, upon application and without any further formality, their 
nationals if they do not (or no longer) fulfil the conditions for entry to, 
presence or residence in the territory of the requesting state.134 
Readmission agreements are beginning to constitute a core instrument in 
the EU’s policy on irregular migration.  
 The Council authorises the Commission to negotiate a readmission 
agreement. So far, agreements have been concluded with a number of non-
EU jurisdictions, including Russia, Albania, Sri Lanka, Macao, and Hong 
Kong. For the EuroMed partners, readmission agreements are clearly 
envisaged and negotiations have begun with Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia.135 Libya, not yet a EuroMed partner, is also an intended candidate 
for a readmission agreement.136 The criteria for the authorisation to seek a 
readmission agreement were agreed at the Seville European Council 
2002.137 The criteria include: the extent of (relative) migratory pressure on 
the EU, states which have already signed an association or cooperation 
agreement, states adjacent to the EU, states where a readmission 
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agreement would ‘add value’ to Member States’ bilateral agreement, and 
‘geographical balance’. There is no explanation of how the criteria were 
applied to the individual cases, but it appears from the extent to which 
the readmission agreements have been concluded that not all of the 
criteria need to apply in every case. The emphasis on neighbouring 
countries is clear since all, except Libya, have signed EuroMed Associated 
Agreements as the basis of their deepened ‘partnership’ relationship. 
The tone of the readmission agreements seems also to be indicative 
of the way in which they are used by the EU in the pursuit of ‘thicker 
borders’. Although readmission agreements are in theory to work on a 
two-way basis, in practice it is the EU which seeks to ensure that third 
countries accept the return of their nationals (and also non-nationals who 
have passed through the state in question) with a minimum of procedural 
formalities. Given that the perceived advantages of a bilateral readmission 
agreement are weighted towards the EU, incentives for third states to 
enter into a readmission agreement are an integral part of the negotiation 
process. For the Mediterranean partners a more accessible visa regime for 
lawful entrance to the Union’s territory is often a key request.138 In the 
context of the difficulties of reaching a common approach to lawful 
migration at the EU level, however, this request is strongly resisted by 
Member States in the Council.139 Part of this resistance stems from the fear 
that it would be used not only by the citizens of Partner States but serve as 
an inducement for those from further South in Africa to attempt to enter 
the EU.140  
The nature of the countries with which readmission agreements have 
been concluded or foreseen also raised important questions about the 
respect for human rights that the EU proclaims as one of its core values. 
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Many of the third states have been the accused of serious human rights 
failings (including by the EU institutions and Member States), which 
suggests that those seeking asylum may have a valid case to present and 
returning them to a ‘safe’ country would undermine the whole platform of 
the EU’s stated values.141 Whilst it is probable that the political situation 
in the destination state may be more closely monitored, this is by no 
means automatically the case. Furthermore, readmission agreements raise 
legal and practical issues with regard to the administrative infrastructure 
and training of officials in human rights protection. This is particularly 
true where individuals are removed to a third state which they are not a 
national of, as this situation does not fall within the existing parameters 
of international law and the destination state may be ill-equipped to deal 
with subsequent asylum requests by those individuals.142 This point is 
made by Kruse in relation to the readmission agreement with Albania, 
which entered into force in May 2006. Albania is now a EuroMed Partner 
State since late 2007, and its readmission agreement is now likely to hold 
important lessons for future agreements with states in North Africa and 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean.  
Externalisation 
One of themes of this thesis thus far is to demonstrate that the pillar 
structure is longer an adequate means by which the competences of the 
EU institutions can be fully understood. To this must be added a further 
consideration which draws together the legislative provisions introduced 
under the auspices of the Tampere and Hague Programmes in the 
migration domain, that of the increasing externalisation of JHA and 
migration law and policy in particular. 
 It has already been stated above that any migration policy, by its 
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very nature, incorporates an external dimension. However, it is evident 
that in an EU sense, law and policy output on migration with a specific 
externalised focus has increased dramatically since the Tampere 
Conclusions in 1999. This express desire on the part of the European 
Council to integrate migration policy measures taken in the internal 
sphere with the external sphere has helped to overcome the institutional 
divisions caused by the pillar structure.143 After Amsterdam, the 
Commission gained a more significant role in negotiating agreements with 
third states on migration issues. Externalisation was given an even more 
explicit focus in the Hague Programme 2004 by emphasis on cooperation 
with third countries in the ‘fight against irregular migration’. More 
recently, the European Pact on Immigration was proposed by the French 
EU Presidency and informally discussed by Member States on 7 July 2008. 
The Pact does not have legal force but may signal the way in which 
immigration (and border) policies may develop: Member States have 
agreed to refrain from large-scale regularisations (such as that which 
occurred in Spain in 2005) and to explore ‘blue card’ initiatives to 
encourage highly skilled (and discourage low-skilled) third-country 
workers to the EU.144 
 There are three dimensions to the externalisation of migration 
measures. All three contribute to a vision of the EU as ring-fenced by 
‘thicker borders’ and can be said to concern regular and irregular 
migration. The first is in the literal sense of strengthening the borders by 
stepping up surveillance efforts and promoting cooperation between the 
Member States in land and maritime operations. Frontex is one example 
of this capacity-building on the part of the EU to control migration. As a 
strong feature of the enlargement process in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Commission has used the accession process as a means of requiring 
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new Member States to ameliorate their border controls in preparation for 
entry into the Schengen Area. Seeking the cooperation of non-accession 
third states in the EU’s vicinity is vital: for example, in the maritime 
operations carried out since 2006 along the Southern Mediterranean 
coastline.145  
Second, externalisation of JHA and migration policy can be 
characterised by more express cooperation with third states. The 
negotiation of readmission agreements with third states, so that migrants 
who do enter the EU irregularly will be returned to their home or transit 
state with fewer procedures hurdles, are a current (and growing) example 
of this. Similarly, regular migrants are also affected by the ‘thicker 
borders’ notion within the context of a gradual tightening of opportunities 
for economic migration from outside the EU. The ‘thicker borders’ concept 
points to the criminal dimension of irregular migration and attempts to 
prevent irregular migrants from reaching the EU by pursuing initiatives 
such as the extra-territorialisation of immigration controls in third states, 
including in processing centres. Measures, including penalising employers 
in the EU who employ irregular migrants,146 also form part of this vision. 
The third dimension to the externalisation of migration measures 
also stems from a thickening of the EU’s border, but in a less physical 
sense. Various initiatives have arisen during the lifespan of the Tampere 
and Hague Programmes which attempt to tackle the motivations for both 
regular and irregular migration. Examples of these include the revisiting 
of the guest worker programmes which were phased out in Member States 
such as Germany in the late 1970s. An EU ‘blue card’ has also been 
proposed based on the perceived success of the US green card system, but 
for highly skilled workers only. Other ideas include the creation of job 
centres in certain African countries which are the major sources of 
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irregular migrants: these would advise potential migrants as to the 
(limited) means of lawfully entering the EU and seeking employment.147 
The running theme in these initiatives is, however, to select only those the 
Member States desire to enter their territory and to ensure that they 
return home afterwards. This renewed emphasis on ‘circular migration’ 
has appeared as a priority in the relationship between migration and 
development policy in the Council, and therefore in the relationship 
between the EU and third states, including EuroMed Partner States and 
developing countries elsewhere.148 
 The extent to which migration control and its externalisation is 
now discussed at EU level serves as an example of the changing nature of 
policy areas. In spite of the characterisation of JHA as an 
‘intergovernmental’ pillar, and the perceived sensitivity of Member State 
governments over the area of immigration, control measures have since 
1992 moved from individual Member State level, to the intergovernmental 
sphere and eventually towards the supranational.149 This is remarkable 
given the time period for these shifts in migration governance. Herein, 
however, is revealed a gap in whether these shifts can be viewed as a 
success. The Commission lauds the development of JHA as one of the most 
dynamic in European integration after the completion of the Single 
Market. Yet Member State governments have not been forthcoming in 
praising the achievements as seen by the Commission, and many remain 
attached in their discourse to ideas of national control as protecting the 
state from external threats linked to migration, hence ignoring the moves 
at European level. Furthermore, the externalisation of migration control 
via the means identified above demonstrates that decision and policy-
making has moved not only upwards, but also outwards into the realm of 
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foreign policy. Hence, an interface between the CFSP and JHA policy-
making spheres becomes visible. For example, as ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs’ has given way to the creation of an area of ‘Freedom, Security and 
Justice’, analysis of the documentation from EU institutions and Member 
States emphasis that the FSJ is of the Union territorial space only. The 
significance of this is that in order to ensure that the EU becomes and 
remains an area of FSJ, greater weight is to be attached to asylum and 
immigration policy, and effective protection of the Union’s external 
borders. One example is the 18-month Presidency plan for the German, 
Portuguese and Slovenia Presidencies for 2007-2008, which foresaw the 
strengthening of FSJ via protection of the external borders and placed the 
Barcelona Process with the framework for cooperation in the ‘external 
role’ of the EU in security.150 This attachment to the EU as an area of FSJ, 
rather than promoting Freedom, Security and Justice more generally 
(including, for example, in the Mediterranean space) creates a distinction 
between the EU and its Partner States.  
Identifying how and why this move has occurred is important in 
framing the discussion in the next chapter of the interaction between 
EuroMed and migration policy. How can the externalisation of migration 
policy and measures to control migration at the EU level be explained? 
According to Lavenex, the ‘shifting up and out’ of migration policy (from 
state sovereignty to intergovernmental cooperation, towards 
supranational governance and finally foreign policy) can be explained by 
two factors. First, the move is a consequence of deepening European 
cooperation on migration control and the growing perception of 
migration as a threat to security through terrorism, fundamentalism and 
organised crime. This pre-dates the Treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht 
as interior ministries in Member States began informal discussions on 
migration control in the 1970s, although it is only much more recently 
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that institutionalisation through the Treaties has taken place.151 The focus 
therefore shifts to the external in order to combat these issues, and 
especially since the ‘threats’ are strongly associated with the EU’s 
neighbourhood.152  
Second, the dominant actors in migration decision-making are 
national government representatives in the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council, working in an institutional format which allows them to 
‘increase their autonomy vis-à-vis other actors in the domestic and 
European policy arenas’.153 What this means is that national government 
representatives avoid domestic constraints to reform, such as other 
political (opposition) parties or the courts, and hence increase their 
autonomy by gaining information advantages over domestic counterparts 
and acting as gatekeepers.154 More recently, the increasing power of the 
supranational institutions via the communitarisation of JHA has meant 
that these domestic constraints are now visible at the EU level too, 
primarily due to the increased role of the Parliament. Thus, seeking a 
limited but growing European approach to migration can be perceived and 
this is largely due to the supranational actors such as the Commission and 
Parliament (who are not faced with the same electoral pressure as 
national government representatives) than the Council, where national 
representatives are more concerned with gaining possibilities that would 
be difficult to achieve at the national level. In a more concrete fashion, 
this means that repressive measures could be pursued at the Union level 
by JHA officials outside of the ‘humanitarian policy frames’ at the 
domestic level.155 The shift towards migration policy in the external arena 
has the further advantage for the national governments of maintaining 
the intergovernmental characteristics associated with foreign policy and 
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away from the stronger roles for the Commission and Parliament in the 
Community Method, which has now taken away from much of the initially 
intergovernmental third pillar. Hence, the transition of migration control 
and policy from the internal to the external becomes clearer. 
The externalisation of migration control and the emergence of these 
issues in foreign policy depend much on the different interests of the 
institutions involved. Measures which can be seen as preventing or 
controlling migration, particularly irregular migration, to the EU are 
closely linked to the national interests of the Member States in the JHA 
Council. The synergy between migration control in the external sphere 
and foreign policy as intergovernmental frameworks is evident, and 
Member States are able to prevent, or rather bypass, the different interests 
of the Commission and Parliament. By contrast, holistic or 
comprehensive approaches to both regular and irregular migration (such 
as addressing root causes of migration in third countries) are more 
associated with the supranational institutions such as the Commission 
and Parliament. Discussion of the preservation of Member State interests, 
or even sovereignty, brings back in the potential role of the new modes of 
governance since here too the Member States are not bound by legally-
enforceable pieces of legislation but ‘softer’ forms of governance including 
the Open Method of Coordination. With an emphasis on ‘control’, new 
modes of governance would gain an overall ‘goal’ that was identified as 
problematic when considering the application of new modes of 
governance to foreign policy more broadly defined. 
With these competing institutional interests in mind, the 
externalisation of measures on migration further blurs not only the 
internal and externals spheres of governance and policy-making, but also 
the frames for external action of the EU. The focus of the EU’s foreign 
policy-making sphere is the CFSP, but the measures taken in relation to 
migration are not concluded under specific the CFSP articles in the TEU 
(11-28). However, Article 24 TEU states that, ‘When it is necessary to 
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conclude an agreement with one or more States or international 
organisations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting 
unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission 
as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect’. Agreements, whilst not 
implying a formal transfer of sovereignty from the Member States,156 can 
be concluded in pursuit of matters covered by JHA.157  
In this light, the CFSP is neither irrelevant nor meaningless, but 
rather the Council, in adopting measures under the CFSP, becomes able to 
link migration more explicitly to the CFSP goals. The stated goal of the EU 
in the Mediterranean, according to the Common Strategy of 2000 is to 
‘help secure peace, stability and prosperity in the region’158 and it goes on 
to list migration as an area for action.159 This is reflected in linking 
migration discourse with security; for example, the European Security 
Strategy is ‘a further indication of the Union’s move towards the 
integration of JHA objectives and instruments in its foreign and security 
policy agenda’.160 High Representative Solana’s speech to the EuroMed 
Ministerial Conference in November 2007 noted that migration is ‘very 
important for security’ and as such deserves greater cooperative 
measures.161 The link between security and controlling migration (which 
was present even before 9/11)162 further reinforces the place of migration 
policy within foreign policy, and again highlights the place of this with 
Mediterranean relations via EuroMed. 
 The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
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have begun to feature discussion of cooperation in migration (particularly 
irregular migration) and security strongly in the institutional framework, 
to the extent that it has become the most dynamic issue for discussion in 
EuroMed.163 This has been supplemented by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, expressed through the bilateral Action Plans, as an additional 
‘layer’ to the system of governance in EuroMed. Indeed, although the 
Barcelona Process was not initially created with migration as an express 
area for discussion and cooperation, by the time of the launch of the ENP 
in 2004, this dimension of the EU’s relations with its neighbours had 
begun to be more explicitly recognised, and migration issues have fed back 
into EuroMed. Migration and security were together placed at the heart of 
the Barcelona Process in 2005 when cooperation in these areas became a 
separate area for action in the partnership. Insofar as EuroMed is a 
partnership between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners, this provides 
an opportunity for the EU institutions to pursue migration goals within a 
cooperative framework of governance, albeit a system of governance in 
which the EU institutions and Member States play a more dominant role. 
The ‘partnership’ aspect of EuroMed fits with the emphasis on partnership 
with third countries which are ‘sending’ or ‘transit’ points for migrants, 
particularly irregular migrants. ‘Partnerships’ with such countries were 
stressed in both the Tampere and the Hague Programmes. The 
institutionalised forms of cooperation which have begun to appear in the 
Barcelona Process demonstrate the extent to which externalisation of 
internal policies in the EU has occurred. Whilst the foreign policy of the 
EU could be said to serve a purpose of pursuing external goals for internal 
purposes, the reverse could also be said to be true, that is by using internal 
measures to satisfy foreign policy goals. 
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There is little doubt that migration has begun to feature more 
prominently in the CFSP, EuroMed and the external relations of the EU 
more generally. Migration and foreign policy are two prominent areas 
which Member States are extremely reluctant to pool sovereignty, even if 
common challenges which could be confront together at the EU level are 
recognised. The analysis of migration measures which have been put into 
place reveal that even with the length of time involved, measures to 
prevent irregular migration have been more successfully put into place 
than policies on regular migration control. This involves both internal 
measures concluded via the Community method, and increasingly 
external elements, including the involvement of third countries. The 
latter contributes to the externalisation of migration control in both the 
physical sense (such as extra-territorialisation and control methods) and 
also in an EU policy-making sense as the moves to control migration shift 
from the internal policy-making sphere to the external, foreign-policy 
making sphere, where the Council (and hence the Member States) remain 
largely in control.  
 Externalisation and all of the above measures and practices 
concluded at EU level have strong effects on EuroMed. Due to the location 
of the Mediterranean Partners as both sending and transit countries for 
both regular and irregular migrants, measures concluded in the area of 
migration have often been the result of issues in the Mediterranean. 
Migration has become a highly politicised issue, and third countries are 
increasingly sensitive to efforts by the EU to create ‘thicker borders’ and 
shift migration problems further afield. Operational elements, identified 
in earlier chapters as being crucial to the understanding of the system of 
governance, are observable in the Mediterranean space. Since cooperation 
between the EU and Partner States is vital in carrying out the operational 
elements, there is a tension between the migration goals pursued by the 
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EU and the ‘partnership’ approaches underlying EuroMed. The following 
chapter identifies the specific nature of migration law and policy in 
EuroMed and the interaction between the CFSP, JHA and EuroMed in 
understand to understand the relative importance of the latter and to 
ascertain how the practice elements of migration foreign policy reveal the 




Chapter 6: Interaction between EuroMed and Migration 
Governance 
The discussion in chapter five on Justice and Home Affairs and its 
external dimension demonstrates that the foreign policy of the European 
Union is not hermetically sealed within the CFSP. Decision and policy-
making in migration has moved upwards in recent years from the national 
level, through an intergovernmental frame towards supranational 
governance. The EU’s competence in migration law and policy-making has 
become impossible to ignore, and with this competence has come a clear 
tendency to point to the foreign policy dimension of migration policy and 
control. 
 The two facets to this externalisation of migration policy and 
control, namely the strengthening of borders through physical means and 
the pursuing of policies designed to reduce migratory pressures on the EU, 
require to varying extents the cooperation of third states. EuroMed, 
within its institutional framework exhibiting multilateral, bilateral and 
unilateral features, would seem to be an ideal forum for cooperation, since 
it involves most state actors around the Mediterranean within its system 
of governance. The practical expressions and operational elements of 
migration management and control at the EU level can be analysed to see 
to what extent policies and practices are motivated by the management of 
migration through repressive or cooperative measures.  
The identification of the most pertinent issues in the EU’s migration 
policy towards the Mediterranean reveals that external border security 
and methods by which irregular migrants can be expelled from Europe, or 
prevented from arriving in the first place, are the current themes. This has 
been termed the EU’s ‘logic of exclusion’1 and can be identified by the 
prioritisation of the language and instruments more commonly found in 
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police work, prosecution and penal policy than in the rights and freedoms 
of migrants.2 The different interests and identities of the EU institutions, 
Member States, Partner States and actors in the other EuroMed 
institutions, such as the EMPA and Civil Forum, can be discerned from 
the language used in EuroMed documentation. 
The Mediterranean Partner States are affected to varying extents by 
any migration measures taken by or within the EU (including those 
examined in chapter five), whether this involves their cooperation or not. 
The theoretical approach set out in chapter three placed the emphasis on 
how, in an institutional framework, logics of appropriateness arise which 
(can) influence behaviour. As such, attention is not only paid to the 
strategies and discourse of the EU institutions and Member States within 
EuroMed, but also in their approaches to how to deal with migration in 
this context.  
It is essential in this chapter to look at three dimensions of the 
relationship between the governance of migration and EuroMed. First, the 
place of migration in the Barcelona Process will be analysed. This covers 
how the place of migration in EuroMed has evolved during the lifetime of 
the Barcelona Process, including through the addition of the ENP as a 
further layer to the EuroMed system of governance. Second, how and to 
what extent the documentation on migration governance emerging from 
EU actors (including the Member State holding the Presidency) reveals an 
emphasis on partnership/cooperation approaches across the 
Mediterranean with Partner States and whether this language stresses 
prevention and repression as responses to challenges. In other words, 
does the stated aim of a EuroMed ‘partnership’ figure strongly in 
migration law and policy at the EU level, or is consideration of it absent? 
This necessitates consideration of general policy and programmes such as 
the Global Approach to Migration, the Tampere and Hague Programmes 
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and Council Presidency Programmes as well as more specific bilateral 
agreements, such as readmission agreements. Wider consideration in the 
context of the general moves towards migration policy-making at EU level 
can reveal whether anything emerging from the institutional framework 
of EuroMed could be seen as ‘spillover’, given that migration is a policy 
area which operates across the institutional logics of the EU. Third, the 
increasing number of practical expressions of migration policy through 
the creation of Frontex and Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs), 
the conclusion of readmission agreements with the Partner States and the 
discussion of extra-territorial processing centres reveal how, in practice, 
the weight of the measures taken rely on principles of prevention, 
partnership/cooperation or repression. 
Migration and the Barcelona Process 
Migration of peoples has always been a hallmark of the Mediterranean 
region. Indeed, Braudel’s classic characterisation of the Mediterranean 
was as an ‘espace de mouvement’.3 The Mediterranean Partner States, 
particularly those in the Maghreb, are a major source and transit point for 
migrants entering to the EU. With only limited means to enter through 
regular channels for the purposes of finding employment, the context of 
many measures taken with the Mediterranean in mind is that of irregular 
migration.  
Migration issues in the Mediterranean are not only the concern of 
the Member States in the Southern part of the EU: Northern EU Member 
States have growing communities of peoples from the Mediterranean 
Partner States, and these Member States have demonstrated a keen 
interest in the future governance of Mediterranean migration. Once again, 
although reference is made to the Partner States as a group, not all are 
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seen as sending or transit countries of migration. North African states are 
often the focus of the EU’s discussion of migration issues. Israel is a 
particular exception amongst the Partner States as a destination country 
for migrants, regular and irregular.4 To this picture of migration in the 
Mediterranean are added the large numbers of Palestinian refugees found 
in a number of Partner states in an uncertain legal situation,5 and non-
Palestinian refugees from elsewhere in the Middle East in Mediterranean 
Partner states.6 Sub-Saharan Africa is the primary location of states 
suffering from ‘protracted’ refugee situations which contributes to 
migrants seeking asylum and/or using illegal and often dangerous 
migration routes to reach the EU. Migration in the Mediterranean is 
therefore not a simple picture of EU Member States ‘receiving’ nationals of 
the Mediterranean Partner States. 
EU states in the Mediterranean have been in the media spotlight 
with regard to the situation of irregular migrants attempting to reach the 
EU in recent years. Malta, Spain and Italy have been the most vocal in 
pressing for EU help on dealing with the numbers of migrants entering, or 
attempting to enter, their territories. Irregular migration has also become 
a humanitarian issue as an increasing number of people risk their lives in 
crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe by sea, and, once in the EU 
live beneath official radars and (especially in the case of trafficked 
individuals) potentially deprived of basic rights. The legislative 
instruments examined in the previous chapter have strong implications 
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for the states in the Southern part of the EU as transit points for people 
heading elsewhere in the Union.  
With migration issues high on the political agendas of the Member 
States, it would be logical to suggest that the Barcelona Process would be 
an appropriate framework for discussion of the issues. The lifespan of the 
Barcelona Process is interesting because it straddles important 
developments in the context of EU competence in migration and 
important changes in the nature of Mediterranean migration patterns. 
The first ten years of EuroMed were punctuated by the events of 9/11, the 
aftermath of which has had important effects on the discourse and 
practice of EU migration policy towards the Mediterranean, often 
emphasising the ‘security’ aspects of migration. 
The first EuroMed Ministerial Conference in 1995 produced the 
Barcelona Declaration, and contained only one express mention of the 
migration issue in the text: 
In the area of illegal immigration they [the 
EuroMed participants] decide to establish 
closer cooperation. In this context, the 
partners, aware of their responsibility for 
readmission, agree to adopt the relevant 
provisions and measures, by means of bilateral 
agreements or arrangements, in order to 
readmit their nationals who are in an illegal 
situation.7 
This was supplemented in the Work Programme attached to the 
Declaration with the following provisions: 
Given the importance of the issue of migration 
for Euro-Mediterranean relations, meetings 
will be encouraged in order to make proposals 
concerning migration flows and pressures. 
There meetings will take account of experience 
acquired, inter alia, under the MED-Migration 
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programme, particularly as regards improving 
the living conditions of migrants legally 
established in the Union.8 
and 
Officials will meet periodically to discuss 
practical measures which can be taken to 
improve cooperation among police, judicial, 
customs, administrative and other authorities 
in order to combat illegal immigration. These 
meetings will be organised with due regard for 
the need for a differentiated approach that 
takes into account the diversity of the 
situation in each country.9 
The limited references to migration in the Barcelona Declaration 
were nevertheless indicative in their content of a both a multilateral and 
bilateral framework based on partnership and cooperation, and 
potentially covering both regular and irregular migration. The cross-
cutting nature of migration issues meant that it would be within any or all 
of the three ‘baskets’. The passage from the Barcelona Declaration cited 
above in interested because of the emphasis it places on the obligation on 
the partners’ awareness ‘of their responsibility for readmission’. This 
suggests from the outset that the EU, primarily the Council in this 
context, envisaged the conclusion of readmission agreements from the 
outset. It has already been noted in chapter four that the Barcelona 
Declaration reflected the far greater input the EU had into its content 
than the Partner States. Readmission of nationals who are in an irregular 
situation between the EU and the Partner States is in practice not a two-
way process: the return of citizens of Partner States and other third states 
to the partners is the main purpose of such agreements. Readmission 
agreements are a means by which the EU and its Member States can seek 
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to control migration flows. This provision in the Barcelona Declaration 
reveals that the basis of cooperation from the outset in EuroMed can be 
seen to be based on likely demands by the EU on the Partner States, of 
which readmission agreements was one. At the time of the Barcelona 
Declaration, Partner States (particularly those in North Africa) were the 
source of a higher proportion of migrants to the EU than ten years later.10 
The placing of migration at the heart of EuroMed in 2005 is also indicative 
of how these patterns have changed: Partner States have become 
increasingly used as transit points to Europe but they have also become 
destinations for migrants. The place of migration in EuroMed has shifted 
in order to reflect a growing perception of a shared problem between both 
the EU and the Partner States.11 The original discussions on migration 
centred on economic development of the Partner States as a means to 
remove the need for Partner State citizens to try to enter Europe. Now, 
this dimension of migration has given way to linkage of migration to 
security, which is also presented as a common concern to both sides of the 
Mediterranean. 
 Following the events of 9/11 and subsequent terror attacks in Europe 
and in the Partner States, cooperation on migration at the EU level found 
a new impetus. Cooperation became grounded in measures taken to 
combat terrorism, which similarly was not given a prevailing presence in 
the original Barcelona Declaration. Whereas migration was, at the time of 
the Barcelona Declaration, seen as a ‘soft security’ issue, the redefinition 
of security and the subsequent acts of terrorism in Madrid and London 
demonstrate that migration can have ‘hard security’ issues, although not 
in a traditionally defined way (i.e. threats from individuals motivated by a 
particular ideology, rather than from external states). This has evolved 
during the lifetime of the Barcelona Process to such an extent that some 
claim that security, rather than development, has become the core 
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concern of the EU institutions and Member States.12  
The European Neighbourhood Policy places much more weight on 
counter-terrorism issues that had been the case in EuroMed.13 Through the 
reinforcement of the system of governance in EuroMed by the ENP, 
references to migration in EuroMed often stress the link between the fight 
against terrorism on both sides of the Mediterranean. Council 
Conclusions, such as those at Laeken immediately following the attacks in 
the United States in 2001, emphasised the strengthening of external 
border controls in order to ‘help in the fight against terrorism’. An Action 
Plan was adopted in Valencia in 2002 that gave further impetus to 
reinforced cooperation in the Mediterranean for migration.14 
The linking between migration and security by the EU has been made 
not only in relation to security within its own borders, but of the internal 
security of the Partner States. By pointing to the occurrence of terror 
attacks in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, the Commission and Council 
have attempted to link security with migration issues and therefore 
convince the Partner States that there are benefits for all in increased 
security cooperation. However, there is an important difference identified 
by Collyer: 
… migration is not universally considered as a 
security risk, but most frequently associated 
with terrorism in wealthier parts of the world. 
Migration did not figure in explanations of the 
attacks outside Europe or North America, such 
as those in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, or the 
regular attacks in Iraq. Associations with 
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migration were not significant, and responses 
have not focused on border control, even when 
the perpetrators were actually identified as 
international migrants. In Europe the reverse 
has been true. Bombs in Madrid and London 
were immediately associated with migrants in 
the press even when this was shown not to be 
true in London.15 
The subsequent effects of terror attacks and the fear of attacks has 
been a linkage of security discourse with migration policy and, in the 
operational field, border control measures. Collyer notes that during the 
British Presidency of the European Council in 2005 border control 
measures were the usual solutions proposed as responses to terrorism.16 
Despite the emphasis on strategic approaches to tackling migratory 
pressures which would seem to indicate a preventative approach with the 
full involvement of the Mediterranean Partners, the linking of security 
and migration within the Work Programme and insistence that this is for 
the benefit of all is problematic. By linking migration and security 
together under the justification that it would benefit all the EuroMed 
participants, the agreement actually attempts to ensure that Partner 
States’ cooperation can be engaged in the pursuit by EU actors for a 
‘thicker border’, ensuring that would-be terrorists are prevented from 
entering the EU.  
The implications for EuroMed and the foreign policy of the EU in the 
Mediterranean in the context of the legislative instruments adopted is a 
growing link with security and the thickening of borders. The Barcelona 
Process is therefore faced with an apparent paradox: as a means by which 
the two sides of the Mediterranean can cooperate across the baskets, there 
is both a decline in the importance of borders (which the conclusion of a 
Free Trade Area in particular implies) and a thickening of borders, driven 
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by the desire both to limit (irregular) migration and fight terrorism. The 
legal measures and operational elements under discussion and in practice 
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners demonstrate this paradox. 
In the preliminary years of the Barcelona Process, the emphasis on 
economic development and a Free Trade Area as a means to promote 
prosperity on both sides of the Mediterranean, seems to have given way to 
a desire to seek cooperation based on security concerns. Calls for 
reinforcing or ‘better managing’ the EU’s external border implies that 
whilst cooperation is needed from third states, this will be undertaken by 
a ‘give and take’ approach on a bilateral basis, rather than through a 
partnership of equals. 
By the time of the tenth anniversary of EuroMed, the competences of 
the EU institutions in migration had become more developed, as explored 
in the previous chapter, and a gradual European approach to different 
aspects of migration had begun to tentatively take shape. Employing again 
Lavenex’s paradigm of ‘shifting up and out’, migration had begun to move 
towards the realm of foreign policy. The linkage between migration 
policies and the EU’s foreign policy was made in the conclusions of the 
Feira European Council 2000.17 This represented a shift from the Council’s 
view that the establishment of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
did not bring with it the aim to have a specific ‘JHA’ foreign policy.18 It 
also demonstrated that despite reluctance of the part of Member States to 
communautarise migration policy, an external impetus for cooperation 
existed without ‘compromising national asylum and immigration 
systems’.19 ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ has become ‘Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ in the internal sphere of governance, but in linking security 
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discourse with measures designed to thicken the external border of the 
EU, it appears that the FSJ applies primarily to the territory of the EU, 
and not the Mediterranean space as a whole. 
The EuroMed Work Programme 2005 elevated migration to the 
fourth major area for cooperation in addition to the three existing 
baskets. The objectives in migration cooperation are, in an identical way 
to cooperation in the other three baskets, divided into objectives and 
followed by the means by which these objectives are to be met. It is 
interesting to note that the promotion of ‘legal migration opportunities’ is 
the first objective identified in the programme, but the means by which 
this objective is to be met in practice contains no further details.20 By 
contrast, combating illegal migration is accompanied by specific actions 
to be undertaken involving ‘all aspects’ of this form of migration including 
readmission agreements and capacity building. It is also interesting to 
note that in the Commission’s proposal for the content of the Work 
Programme, migration issues do not feature strongly in its express ‘short 
to medium term challenges’ of human rights and democracy, sustainable 
economic growth and reform and education. Initiatives on discussion of 
migration issues and ‘programmes and actions aiming at encouraging ... a 
joint approach to the management of migratory flows should now be 
realised’ are mentioned along with noting the ‘sensitive’ nature of 
migration and the social integration of migrants.21 The Programme links 
legal and illegal migration in the same part of the programme: 
Rather than focussing on reducing migratory 
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pressures partners should agree on a more 
strategic approach that aims to optimise the 
benefits of migration for all Partners. Such an 
approach would include intensified 
cooperation aimed at preventing human 
tragedies that take place in the Mediterranean 
as a result of attempts to enter the EU illegally. 
Preventing further loss of life needs to be a 
clear priority in the framework of the 
partnership.22 
It appears, therefore, that the Commission’s approach to migration is 
more strategic and long-term, yet this does not appear to have translated 
strongly into the final work programme. As it is unlikely to be the Partner 
States that point to the need for readmission agreements, it can be 
surmised that the Council has been more active in promoting solutions to 
the challenges of irregular migration than longer term solutions which 
focus on shared benefits and an overall reduction in migratory pressures 
through economic development. This point is supported by the proposal 
by the French Presidency to the Council for a European Pact on 
Immigration, which overlapped with existing Commission strategies for 
immigration and asylum, but which used much stronger terms including 
‘zero tolerance’ (for trafficking in human beings) and a ‘visa policy which 
serves the interests of Europe and its partners’ under the heading of 
‘security’.23 
Drawing out the EU’s approach to migration in the Mediterranean 
can be discerned by the language contained in the multilateral and 
bilateral dimensions of the Barcelona Process, where the institutions of 
the EU and the Member States through the Presidency and Council have 
pursued policies which have the characteristics of partnership, but which 
are often pursued in order to ‘thicken’ the EU’s external border. It is also 
useful to examine the language of the documentation outside the scope of 
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the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in order to evaluate to what extent 
the policies pursued through the frame of JHA set the context for the 
pursuit of the CFSP goals, and the place of EuroMed as part of a more 
holistic approach to migration issues within the EU. As such, the 
following scope of analysis is wider than the practices arising from the 
EuroMed institutions. 
EuroMed Ministerial Conferences 
The annual EuroMed Ministerial Conferences between the foreign 
ministers of the EuroMed participants, the Commission and Council have 
gradually attached more weight to discussion of migration issues. 
However, it was only in late 2007 that a specific ministerial meeting was 
held on migration following the provision in the 2005 five year work 
programme agreed in Barcelona for Ministerial level dialogue.24 This 
stands in contrast to the more extensive contacts between ministers 
holding portfolios dealing with economic, science and technology, fishing 
and cultural issues which have occurred since the early days of the 
Barcelona Process.25 The preparation of the first meeting on migration 
took much longer and was more complex than all other ministerial 
conferences in EuroMed: preparation began during the German 
Presidency in early 2007, but the meeting did not eventually occur until 
during the Portuguese Presidency later in the year.26  
Migration did not feature strongly in the early Ministerial 
Conference Conclusions and was generally only found within the third 
basket of social, cultural and human affairs. The weight of the discussions 
on migration was thus grounded within the integration of migrants and 
cultural dialogue, rather than as a political or security issue. Experts and 
                                                   
24
 EuroMed Work Programme 2005, 12(a). 
25
 These all figured in the evaluation of the first full year of the operation of Euromed: 
Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Presidency Conclusions (Malta, 1997). 
26
 Interview of Council Official (Brussels, September 2008). 
268 
 
officials held sporadic meetings on migration during the early years of the 
Barcelona Process, which were recognised in the Ministerial 
Conclusions.27 
 A shift in the focus language of the Ministerial Conference 
conclusions can be perceived from 2000 onwards. By this time, the 
Council’s the CFSP Common Strategy of 19 June 2000 had defined the 
CFSP objectives of the EU in the Mediterranean, which included greater 
emphasis on tackling irregular migration, in particular ‘through the 
establishment of readmission arrangements relating to own and third 
country national as well as persons without nationality’.28 The Tampere 
Conclusions in 1999 heralded the beginning of the legislative measures 
described in chapter five and the development of the external dimension 
of JHA. As such, the EuroMed Ministerial Conclusions gradually moved 
from emphasis on migration issues within the context of the ‘integration 
of third-country nationals residing legally in the territory of the Member 
States’ as part of the social, cultural and human affairs basket towards 
placing migration within the political and security basket. Although not 
referring to migration, but rather ‘illicit trafficking of all kinds’, the 
EuroMed Marseille Conclusions 2000 pointed to the need for measures for 
the common security of all in the Mediterranean.29 
The Commission’s Communication in preparation for the fifth 
EuroMed Conference 2002 noted that ‘migration and human exchange are 
of vital importance to the Partnership ... the migration issues need to be 
addressed in a comprehensive way in which partners have an open eye for 
the causes of migration and the need to respond in a global manner that 
will include an active policy in the area of socio-economic cooperation, 
legal migration and illegal migration’.30 The Ministerial Conclusions 
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permitted the Commission to take forward the implementation of a 
regional cooperation programme including concrete measures on JHA 
issues, including migration, as part of the Valencia Action Plan. The JHA 
Commissioner considered the JHA mandate to cover ‘the entire field of 
Justice and Home Affairs’31 and as an endorsement for multilateral and 
bilateral cooperation with Mediterranean partners, through the 
Association Agreements.32  
Whilst migration remained formally within the third basket in the 
Valencia Action Plan, it appears that this was as the result of the 
Commission’s attempt to ‘import’ JHA goals within the EuroMed 
framework, since it would be the Commission’s role to take forward the 
cooperation measures with the Mediterranean Partner States. The 
language of the Framework Document endorsed by the Ministerial 
Conference in 2002 is of a ‘comprehensive and balanced approach’.33 Yet, 
the presence of measures in the form of readmission agreements (to be 
promoted ‘as far as possible’ between the EU and Partner States and 
between Partner States themselves),34 and assistance measures designed 
to build up institutional capacities dealing with asylum applications in 
Partner States, are indicative of more repressive aims.35 It appears the 
initial focus in the Ministerial Conclusions in the early years of the 
Barcelona Process on migrant’s rights, where there could exist genuine 
partnership efforts, had given way to the insistence on the part of the 
Commission, Council and Member States to include ‘concrete measures’ 
more linked to security and the fight against terrorism within the social, 
cultural and human affairs basket. The Commission recognised the 
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concerns from Partner States over the rights of their citizens resident 
(regularly or irregularly) in the EU,36 but the prioritising of certain aims 
linked with security reinforces the view advanced in this thesis of a 
system of governance in EuroMed with the EU institutions as stronger 
central actors.  
 The Naples and Dublin EuroMed Ministerial Conferences in 2003 
and 2004 substantially increased the time devoted to discussion of 
migration issues. Again, the Conclusions demonstrate a mixture of 
cooperative and partnership approaches within a desired ‘global 
approach’, but with an increasing linkage to the consideration of ‘security 
concerns’ and ‘the management of migratory flows’.37 Although this was 
balanced with consideration for the facilitation of the legal movement of 
persons and social integration, it is telling that the only concrete measure 
referred to at Naples was the combating of illegal migration through 
readmission agreements.38 The Conclusions of the Mid-term meeting at 
Dublin in 2004 were even more explicit in that, ‘Ministers renewed their 
commitment to the conclusion of readmission agreements’.39 This 
approach is justified within the Conclusions by reference to the need of all 
partners to prevent loss of life in the Mediterranean by migrants 
attempting to reach Europe by irregular means.40 Demonstrating the 
synergy between the EuroMed Ministerial Conclusions and the Council 
Conclusions, readmission agreements and technical assistance for 
management of migration through border controls were listed as 
priorities in the Mediterranean for the EU in its Strategic Partnership 
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with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, prepared by the CFSP High 
Representative and approved by the Council in June 2004.41 
 Migration issues in the EuroMed Ministerial Conference 
conclusions post-2004 reflect the bilateral approaches favoured by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans in putting into practice 
cooperation on JHA matters. The initial neighbourhood policy initiative 
‘Wider Europe’ (which eventually became the ENP) also made explicit 
references to the impact of migration on the Union’s neighbourly 
relations.42 The externalisation of border controls towards the Partner 
States, by emphasising the need for border management and capacity 
building particularly in the Maghreb states, has begun to be more 
prominent and couched in terms of addressing the root causes of 
migration in African sub-Saharan states.43 The origin of these points in the 
Conclusions is evident when one looks at the input of the EU Member 
State holding the Presidency, and the Commission. The joint programmes 
of the Luxembourg-UK (2005), Austria-Finland (2006) and Germany-
Portugal-Slovenia (2007-8) Presidencies all point to the increased need to 
‘focus on practical measures to improve cross-border cooperation, 
strengthening the security and management of the external border and 
increasing cooperation’.44 For its part, the Commission’s submission to 
the EuroMed Conference on the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process 
linked cooperation in JHA, including migration, between the 
Mediterranean Partner States with the drive to bring them ‘closer to the 
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EU’. This aim formed part of the five-year work programme for the 
Barcelona Process and was adopted by the Ministerial Conference at 
Barcelona in November 2005.45 The language here reveals that the strategy 
of the EU Member States, Council and Commission in promoting both 
migration and foreign policy goals through Euromed’s multilateral 
institutions results in Conclusions which the Mediterranean Partner 
States have only limited input. The 10th anniversary of EuroMed coincided 
with two important developments: the establishment of Frontex, the EU’s 
External Border Management Agency, and the publication of the EU’s 
Global Approach to Migration, adopted by the Council in December 2005. 
In confronting migration issues, the latter envisaged a role for EuroMed 
within the following terms: 
Use all available frameworks for cooperation 
with Mediterranean partners ... to prevent and 
combat illegal migration and trafficking in 
human beings, build capacity to better manage 
migration, and explore how best to share 
information on legal migration and labour 
market opportunities, for example through the 
development of migration profiles and through 
strengthening sub-regional fora.46 
 A specific Ministerial-level meeting on migration in EuroMed took 
place during the Portuguese EU Presidency in November 2007.47 As 
discussed above, issues were not restricted to irregular migration, but also 
indicated future projects for cooperation in legal migration (such as pre-
departure training courses for migrant workers and job centres in Partner 
States on legal opportunities for work in EU Member States). Nevertheless, 
the most concrete proposals were again found in the section on illegal 
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migration, where Partner States were offered assistance in improving 
technical standards in national travel documents, the supporting of any 
EuroMed initiatives by Frontex, and, once again, readmission agreements 
with both EuroMed partners and source countries. 
Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) and 
EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform 
The EMPA, the development of which was analysed in chapter four, has 
also discussed migration issues within its multilateral setting. Unlike the 
Ministerial Conferences, the EMPA plenary sessions have been held at the 
end of an annual presidency held alternately by an EU Member State 
parliament (or the European Parliament) and the national Parliament of a 
Partner State.48 As a result, the language of the official documents of the 
EMPA sessions is markedly different from those of the Ministerial 
Conferences. Parliamentarians have consistently opted in their 
Declarations for emphasis on the rights of migrants including the 
promotion of integration and especially as regards women.49 The 
Parliamentary Forum50 at Bari in 2002 passed a resolution on migration,51 
which placed far more emphasis on the rights of non-EU citizens in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the development-related aspects of 
migration, such as combating poverty and the ‘brain drain’ from countries 
in the South. Whilst externalisation measures such as readmission 
agreements were noted as to their importance in fulfilling obligations of 
partners, the place of this within the context of solidarity and respect for 
rights was stressed. Given the inherently political and sensitive nature of 
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discussions on migration, it is likely that some Parliamentarians from 
Partner States are unwilling to give strong views on migration policy in 
order to avoid contradiction with national governments.52 Nevertheless, 
further evidence of parliamentary opinion was provided by the clear 
opposition to extra-territorial processing centres in the conclusions of the 
EMPA plenary session in Cairo in 2005: 
‘[The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly] expresses concern over the 
establishment in the Mediterranean countries, 
at the request of some Member States of the 
Union, of ‘initial reception centres’ for 
immigrants targeting the Union’s territory, 
which fail to provide minimal guarantees for 
the fundamental rights of the persons 
concerned; recalls that management of 
migration flows should be based not 
exclusively on security considerations, but also 
on the management of sustainable and social 
development of the Mediterranean countries’53 
The institutionalised forum for NGOs and civil society within 
EuroMed, which in 2005 become the EuroMed Non-Governmental 
Platform, has unsurprisingly been critical of the measures pursued to 
control/manage migration in the Mediterranean. The Platform’s Malaga 
Meetings in 2005 evaluated the 10 year existence of the Barcelona Process 
and was critical of the lack of emphasis placed within the social, cultural 
and human basket on migration. In particular, the contributing NGOs 
from both sides of the Mediterranean lamented the ‘current treatment of 
migration issues – exclusively security based – and of cultural exchanges – 
marginalized’.54 This was reiterated at the Civil Forum in Marrakech in 
                                                   
52
 Interview with European Parliament Official (Brussels, September 2008). 
53
 Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, Final Declaration of the Presidency, 
(Cairo, 12-15 March 2005) 
54
 EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform, ‘Malaga Meetings: General Conclusions’ (2005) 
<http://www.euromedplatform.org/spip/IMG/pdf/Malagua_meetings.pdf> accessed 25 
July 2008, 5. 
275 
 
2006, which expressed strong opposition to the use of the multilateral, 
bilateral and unilateral dimensions of EuroMed and the ENP to transform 
the Mediterranean Partner States into ‘frontier zones’.55 
Bilateral EuroMed relations 
The importance of the bilateral relationships and the ‘grid’ of Association 
Agreements and Action Plans between the EU and each of the 
Mediterranean Partners as constituent parts of the system of governance 
in EuroMed was explored in chapter four. By concluding agreements with 
each of the partners, diverse and specific goals in migration can be 
pursued, depending on ‘which are most salient for the partner in question 
and for the EU’.56 Algeria, for example, has more provisions on justice, 
freedom and security, as the Commission recognised in its Tenth 
Anniversary review of EuroMed.57 This reflects both its size and 
population (and hence more potential migrants coming from and 
transiting through its territory) and generally weaker relationship with 
the EU than its neighbours Morocco and Tunisia. 
Similar provisions apply in the area of migration, where provisions 
for readmission agreements for nationals illegally resident in the territory 
of either party are included in some of the Agreements. These are found in 
the agreements with Algeria (Article 84), Egypt (Article 68), Lebanon 
(Article 68), but not with Jordan or Israel. The clauses are the launch pad 
for further, more detailed agreements on readmission and combating 
irregular migration.58 Legal migrant workers in the EU from Tunisia and 
Morocco benefit from non-discrimination clauses. Article 64 of both the 
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EC-Tunisia and EC-Morocco Association Agreements reads as follows: ‘The 
treatment accorded by each Member State to workers of 
Tunisian/Moroccan nationality employed in its territory shall be free from 
any discrimination based on nationality, as regards working conditions, 
remuneration and dismissal, relative to its own nationals’. These 
provisions have been held to have direct effect by the ECJ.59 
The specific legal basis for the conclusion of readmission agreements, 
Article 63(3)(b) EC, was examined in chapter five. Agreements have begun 
with several states in North Africa and it is likely that further agreements 
will be sought with the other EuroMed sending and transit states. As 
readmission agreements first appeared during the 1990s with prospective 
EU Member States, this practice has continued with more recent 
agreements concluded with neighbouring states of Albania, Moldova and 
Ukraine. The neighbourhood is very much the priority focus of this tool, 
which can be explained by the scope of the readmission agreements which 
include not only nationals of the neighbouring states but also nationals of 
other states who have transited through state(s) in the Union’s 
neighbourhood. Given the numbers of citizens of EuroMed Partner States 
in the European Union, the readmission agreements, once concluded, may 
potentially affect more than any of the current agreements the EU has 
concluded which are in force. However, readmission agreements have not 
yet been successfully concluded with any of the Partner States, except 
Albania. Albania is however an unusual case in the EuroMed context since 
EU membership is potentially open to it in the future, and the 
readmission agreement was concluded before it was invited to join 
EuroMed. It should be seen more as a pre-cursor to eventual enlargement 
negotiations. More telling are the lengthy discussions with the Maghreb 
states on readmission agreements which have either failed or resulted in 
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numerous difficulties and points of contention.60 In particular, the 
situation of non-nationals of the EuroMed Partner States being returned 
to the Partner State they transited through would, in sufficient numbers, 
cause a strain of the resources and capacity of institutions to deal with 
them.61 A Commission document appraising the progress of the Global 
Approach to Migration notes that since obtaining mandates to negotiate 
readmission agreements with Morocco and Algeria in 2000 and 2002 
respectively, the Commission has not yet succeeded in concluding 
negotiations. The Commission cites the main problem with Algeria being 
the latter’s refusal to consider readmission at EU level. 
 As discussed above, the inducements that the EU offers in order to 
conclude readmission agreements have occasionally included visa 
facilitation for (regular) third-country nationals to enter the EU. However, 
the instances where this has occurred is with jurisdictions not envisaged 
as future EU members, such as Hong Kong and Macao. These are also not 
jurisdictions which are a major source of migration flows to the EU. It 
would be logical to assume that a more liberal visa regime would not an 
inducement likely to be offered to EuroMed Partner States, especially 
states such as Algeria and Egypt which are both populous and, in the 
context of the security measures taken in a number of Member States in 
recent years, seen as likely to facilitate entrance to the EU’s territory of 
individuals seen as ‘security risks’. The Council is also wary of putting in 
place visa facilitation measures for students and business representatives 
which could be exploited.62 The Austrian Presidency of the Council in 
2005 proposed that visa facilitation for all EuroMed, ENP and Western 
Balkan states should be undertaken as a means to conclude readmission 
agreements, but this was not included in the final Council Conclusions 
                                                   
60
 Commission (EC) ‘Interim Progress Report on the Global Approach to Migration’ (Staff 
Working Document) SEC (2007) 1632, 5 December 2007, 6. 
61
 M T Gil-Bazo, 'The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the European 
Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension: the Safe Country Concept 
Revisited' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 571, 589. 
62




The Commission has presented the need for readmission agreements 
as a means to stem the flow of irregular migration across the 
Mediterranean and thus avoid the humanitarian costs.64 In this light, it 
seems that readmission agreements are presented as a confidence-building 
measure and contributing towards the governance of migration in the 
Mediterranean as a whole. Whilst it might be conceived that the EU has 
enough trust in its Mediterranean partners to regard them as ‘safe’ enough 
to send back migrants without detailed examination of their asylum 
claims, the reality of a readmission agreement is likely to be different. 
Since the bilateral agreement will only be useful for readmission of 
nationals in one direction (that is from the EU to the Partner State) then it 
appears that it may be, according to one Moroccan commentator, 
‘perceived as another tool for imposing European will on a small and weak 
country’.65 Furthermore, the nature of sending irregular migrants back to 
states in North African states where only a relatively weak administrative 
framework exists for dealing with them is a concern voiced by UNHCR. As 
part of a bilateral agreement, Italy has already been undertaking removals 
from the Italian island of Lampedusa to Libya, often without giving 
individuals the opportunity to apply for asylum, and for which is has been 
criticised by UNHCR as being essentially refoulement in all but name.66  
 Further evidence of the importance the Council places on 
readmission agreements is provided by its more general migration 
strategy. The Global Approach to Migration adopted during the UK 
Council Presidency in December 2005 focused priority action on Africa 
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and the Mediterranean and referred to the significance of readmission 
agreements.67 It may be very difficult to perceive how, in a partnership of 
‘joint ownership’, they will benefit the Partner States unless tied to very 
specific inducements in other, perhaps economic, areas. In addition, one 
reason why the Partner States may be reluctant to conclude such 
agreement is their weak institutional capacity to deal with a potentially 
large number of returnees. Partner states would be likely to prefer greater 
emphasis on the economic dimensions to EuroMed to address the 
imbalance in development between North and South, and are minded to 
the risk of diversion of funds through an emphasis on border security 
rather than the establishment of the Free Trade Area and associated 
economic benefits.68 The question of the significant sums of money 
created by remittances by regular and irregular to the Partner States is 
not an insignificant consideration too.  
In terms of the externalisation of migration policy, the enthusiasm of 
Member States for readmission agreements as expressed through the 
Council can be explained by the ‘shifting up and out’ logic explored at the 
end of chapter four. By more readily returning individuals in an irregular 
situation, Member State governments bypass domestic constraints, 
including potentially lengthy legal proceedings, as well as holding centres. 
Member States’ readiness to allow the EU institutions the competence to 
conclude readmission agreements within the context of their reluctance 
to pool sovereignty in the field of legal migration demonstrates that 
EuroMed serves as a means by which preventative and repressive policies 
can be pursued. As mixed agreements, they allow for a strong role for the 
Commission to take forward, but nevertheless resemble ‘traditional’ 
foreign policy tools in restricting the democratic oversight by other 
institutions. 
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Unilateral mechanisms: MEDA and ENPI funding 
As examined in chapter four, the funding of the EuroMed Partnership has 
evolved from a funding instrument into a means of pursuing a strategic 
plan in the Mediterranean. The two MEDA Regulations which originally 
envisaged the completion of the Free Trade Area are the primary means by 
which funding would be granted for projects under the auspices of the 
Barcelona Process. The annexes to MEDA I and MEDA II Regulations did 
not mention migration or security. 
Since 2007, MEDA has been replaced by the European 
Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Beyond the significance 
of bringing the funding mechanism with the ENP, which operates on a 
firmly bilateral basis with the Partner States, the funding has become 
subject to much more stringent strategy goals the EU wishes to pursue in 
the Mediterranean. This is clear from the ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 
2007-2013,69 where migration is listed as one of the five policy priorities of 
the EU and indeed channels the work programme for the 2007-2013 period 
into three objectives, of which ‘a common Euro-Mediterranean area of 
justice, security and migration cooperation’ is the first, and a sustainable 
economic area only second. Stating the importance of migration in the 
Mediterranean as a result of the EuroMed Ministerial Conference in 
Barcelona on 2005, followed by an express channelling of projects around 
this as a primary objective, reveals the extent to which the funding of 
EuroMed has transformed from facilitating the initial aim of creating a 
Free Trade Area to using it as a means to secure the EU’s area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. This point is underlined later in the same document, 
where it is stated that, ‘issues related to Justice and Home Affairs, border 
control, the fight against terrorism and crime have come to the forefront 
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in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’.70 The unilateral dimension to 
EuroMed has clearly been transformed and reflects an agenda based 
around the search for security and thicker borders, rather than the 
economic goals of the Barcelona Process which appeared to be dominant in 
1995. 
Operational dimensions to migration control in the 
Mediterranean: Frontex, RABITs and Extra-territorial Processing 
The twin factors of the evolution of the Freedom, Security and Justice 
policy area within the EU and dismantling of national borders in the 
Schengen Area has led to the establishment of a specialised agency 
charged with coordinating the management of the EU’s external borders. 
Frontex, which has been operational since 2005, has undertaken several 
short-term operations in the Mediterranean since its inception: Poseidon 
in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and on the Greek-Turkish land border 
(June-July 2006), Nautilus in the area around Malta and Southern Italy 
(August and October 2006) and Hera operations I, II and III in the Canary 
Islands (July and August-December 2006, February and March 2007).  
 These operations were triggered by requests from Malta (Nautilus) 
and Spain (Hera) for assistance form Frontex pursuant to Article 8 of the 
Frontex Regulation.71 Experts and personnel were seconded to Frontex 
from at least five other Member States in each case. Nautilus involved the 
surveillance of international waters around Malta, as well as the 
territorial waters of third countries from the coasts of which potential 
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immigrants depart.72 According to Frontex’s figures on Hera II, almost 
4000 irregular migrants en route from Africa to the Canary Islands were 
intercepted and prevented from making the journey.73 Although most of 
the African countries from where the migrants were departing, or 
attempting to depart, are not EuroMed Partner States, there are 
nevertheless important considerations for EuroMed. First, with the 
extension of the Hera programmes through 2006 and 2007 due in part to 
their effectiveness, irregular migrants may use alternative land routes to 
reach the Northern African coast and attempt to enter the EU by this 
means. Secondly, by preventing would-be migrants from leaving, a 
bilateral agreement is needed between the state concerned (i.e. Spain for 
the case of Hera) and the departing states (mainly Mauritania and 
Senegal). In doing so, the EU border is effectively ‘exported’, putting the 
Frontex measures into a similar category as those explored below.  
 Frontex does not have competence to conclude binding agreements 
with third states. It may, however, seek to conclude ‘working 
arrangements’ with third states. The process of doing so involves the 
granting of a mandate by the Management Board (composed of 
representatives of the border authorities of the Member States and two 
representatives of the Commission).74 The working arrangements are of a 
technical nature and are an initial step in the development of ‘sustainable 
partnerships’.75 According to the Frontex Regulation they are, however, to 
be concluded ‘in the framework of the European Union external relations 
policy’. Working arrangements have been concluded with Russia, Ukraine 
and Switzerland and mandates to agree working arrangements have been 
granted in relation to 11 other states, including four EuroMed Partner 
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States: Turkey, Morocco, Egypt and Mauritania.76 A mandate to conclude a 
working arrangement with Libya has also been granted but it is not clear 
how this fits into the Frontex Regulation Article 14 requirement of being 
with the framework of the EU’s external relations policy, since the EU has 
only a limited relationship with Libya. It is possible, however, that the 
working arrangement will serve as a confidence-building measure and, if 
agreed, will come into force if and when Libya joins EuroMed by accepting 
the Barcelona ‘acquis’ of which migration cooperation, as the fourth 
basket, is now an integral part. In return for cooperation on preventing 
irregular migration in the Mediterranean, Partner States have requested 
equipment and/or funding to invest in border management. As Frontex is 
not equipped with funding mechanism, it is limited to offering 
cooperation in research and training only.77 
In addition to the Frontex operations, multilateral cooperation 
agreements have also been effectuated since 2004 at a sub-EU level based 
on common initiatives by groups of states. The UK, France, Italy and 
Portugal carried out ‘Operation Ulysses’ in 2005 with the goal of deflecting 
migration by sea in the Northern Mediterranean; the UK has led a project 
on interception in the Turkish seas known as ‘Project Deniz’, and Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy, the UK, Cyprus and Malta have established ‘Operation 
Triton’ for the South-Eastern Mediterranean. These agreements are 
primarily intended to improve border surveillance and interdiction 
capacity. 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) were introduced by a 
Regulation, amending the previous Frontex Regulation.78 The purpose of 
RABITs is to provide logistical help to any Member State facing a sudden 
influx of migrants, with an emphasis on providing expertise, for example, 
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if large numbers of individuals are using forged documents. Frontex has 
the task of collating a pool of experts from across the EU to be used in 
‘exceptional and unusual’ situations. The first simulated RABIT exercise 
to test the capabilities of the mechanism took place in November 2007 at 
Porto Airport in Portugal as was not, therefore, designed to test the ability 
to respond to migrants arrived by sea.79  
As already stated above, these operations are conducted under 
different Regulations and were not the product of cooperation within the 
EuroMed framework, at least not in its multilateral dimensions. In order 
for the operations to be successful, however, the cooperation of EuroMed 
Partner States is necessary. The Annual Reports 2005 and 2006 and the 
2007 Work Programme of Frontex80 have, as one might expect, placed 
considerable stress on border control elements. However, Frontex has 
defined its role according to a ‘four tier model’ in which the classic border 
control mechanisms, which in this case concern the coordination and 
sharing of information between Member States, are only the first two 
levels.81 The third and fourth tiers involve cooperation with competent 
authorities and third states. In pursuit of these goals, Frontex has 
attempted to make itself, its role and its competences known to all the 
Mediterranean Partner States, Libya and the other states in Africa.82 
EuroMed is therefore a system of governance in which border and 
migration control cooperative projects can arise. There is however a 
disparity between what is envisaged through Euromed’s multilateral fora 
and what is concluded bilaterally with the Partner States. The conclusions 
on the First EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Migration in November 2007 
highlighted the possibility of a number of projects such as training 
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courses on methods for the detection of false travel documents, search 
and rescue at sea and workshops on information campaigns, but did not 
mention under what conditions ‘hard’ cooperation between Partner States 
within Frontex could arise.83 This leaves open the important questions of 
the legal status of those picked up at sea, and what happens to them when 
they are returned to a Partner States which may not be their country of 
residence. The other multilateral elements of EuroMed, in particular the 
EMPA, do not have the opportunity to discuss or have oversight of these 
operations. 
A further dimension to practical cooperation in migration control in 
EuroMed is not one which has materialised, but which has appeared on 
the agenda and may yet evolve into actual practices. The idea of extra-
territorial processing centres, whereby would be asylum 
seekers/immigrants have their applications processed before even 
reaching the territory to the EU, have been mooted since the launch of the 
Tampere programme. The UK government advocated the creation of 
centre for processing refugees outside the EU in 2003 in a leaked 
document entitled, ‘New international approaches to asylum processing 
and protection’.84 The idea seemed to gain support from the Netherlands 
and Denmark. The German government raised the issue again in 2004 
(where it was rejected) and 2005,85 though the language gradually changed 
from that of ‘transit processing centre’ to ‘safe zones’ in North Africa.86 
The rationale for such centres appears to be two-fold: by not being 
situated on the EU’s territory, there is less of a chance that people will 
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leave the centre and fall below the official radar in the Member States, 
perhaps resurfacing during a regularisation programme. Second, given the 
emphasis from a human rights perspective on better reception conditions 
for asylum seekers within the EU (where monitoring by NGOs is 
facilitated), extra-territorial processing in a third state would be more cost 
effective for Member State governments.87 Australia was a noted advocate 
of such a system, processing applications extra-territorially in the poor 
Pacific neighbouring states of Nauru, Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, 
until this was suspended in 2007.88 The Australian case illustrates that 
extra-territorial processing centres are already in existence, though there 
are two important differences. First, the EU is a supranational polity 
which raises complex legal issues in terms of competence beyond a 
bilateral agreement with a third state. Second, Australia uses the centres 
as a basis for resettlement for refugees, which is not the case for the EU. 
The implications for this are significant but beyond the scope of this 
study. The Government of Australia’s ‘Pacific Solution’ was suspended 
following a change of government in 2007. 
Although extra-territorial ‘centres’, or ‘reception in the region’89 
schemes have not yet materialised at the EU level and concrete proposals 
have not formally appeared on the institutional agenda, the idea merits 
discussion because of their specific Mediterranean focus. The common 
denominator of ideas for extra-territorial means to deal with migrants is 
that they are thought to be a ‘Mediterranean solution’ to the problem 
identified as the irregular flows of migrants across the high seas of the 
Mediterranean where no state wishes to accept responsibility.90 The legal 
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position of extra-territorial centres with regard to their compatibility with 
Geneva Convention is, at best, unclear. NGOs have voiced strong doubts 
that people seeking asylum cannot be subject to procedures in their home 
state, or state in which they are in transit, because of the potential risk of 
whatever harm or threat they are attempting to escape from.91 Some states 
(including the UK) have pointed to the lack of an express obligation in the 
Geneva Convention to process claims in the country of application and 
therefore claim that extra-territorial centres are a potentially legitimate 
avenue to pursue.92 
 In a sense, Member States of the EU are already operating a system 
of extra-territoriality, since one of the functions of the Dublin II 
Regulation is to transfer those seeking asylum to another Member State 
which, according to the criteria, is responsible for the application as the 
first EU Member State the asylum seeker reached. In the Mediterranean 
context of migrants arriving from North Africa, this would often mean 
Malta, Spain or Italy. Extra-territoriality of processing outside the EU 
would appear to be an extension of this by pushing asylum-seekers further 
from the states they had intended to reach. Yet, holding asylum seekers in 
a third country where applications are filed would not make any Member 
State ultimately responsible for them, and the EU system is currently 
insufficiently centralised to make this possible.93 It would also need 
Member States to sign up to agreements on how many processed 
applicants to accept, but this may not correlate to the actual destinations 
requested by the asylum seekers and exacerbate the problem of multiple 
applications being filed in different Member States. 
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 There is also the key issue of how the agreement between the EU 
and the ‘host state’ will cover the operational measures involved in 
running the centre and the treatment of claimants. It is unlikely, despite 
any agreement to host extra-territorial processing centres, that Partner 
States will accept processing facilities for would-be migrants on their 
territory without detaining the claimants. For those whose claims are not 
accepted, the practical dimension to resettlement or repatriation in the 
country of origin (if this can be identified) leads to further questions as to 
the powers and responsibilities to be exercised by an extra-territorial 
centre run by the EU. This is what the UNHCR terms the ‘barbed wire 
conundrum’ and may have the consequent effect of driving asylum seekers 
further into the arms of people-smugglers94 or relying on the asylum 
systems of the third state, which may be extremely weak. Potential asylum 
seekers would be held in a ‘vision of the exceptional’.95 It would be 
possible for claimants to be transferred to a centre in a state where they 
have never been in order for their claim to be assessed. Moving and 
channelling people across potentially large distances to a centre where 
their movements would be restricted whilst their claim is processed, with 
no guarantee of success, would not appear to be an ideal means to 
convince potential migrants to avoid entering the EU irregularly.96 For 
those whose applications fail, they may finish outside of the extra-
territorial centres in the host state, and many of the states in North Africa 
lack even basic legislation on asylum and refugee status, or there have 
been serious doubts expressed by UNHCR and NGOs about the 
enforcement of the legislation. Continued strong emphasis by the EU 
institutions on readmission agreements and border controls may not 
encourage Partner States to enforce the rights of those who are ‘returned’. 
Other Partner States do not have refugee legislation, and in many 
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cases UNHCR has been responsible for the determination of refugee status 
and subsequent humanitarian care. Egypt and Lebanon, for example, have 
no such legislation and granted no refuge for asylum seekers on either a 
temporary basis (Lebanon) or permanent basis (Egypt). With the demands 
on the UNCHR and its resources, it seems unlikely that it would be able to 
take on a major role in extra-territorial processing centres in the 
Mediterranean.97 An even more troubling example for NGOs is that Libya, 
which is not yet a EuroMed participant but which has a bilateral 
readmission agreement with Italy and has been discussed as a potential 
host of a transit processing centre alongside a host of other initiatives in 
controlling migration.98 UNHCR has no official presence in the country 
and is adamant that Libya ‘cannot be considered a safe country of 
asylum’.99 
Whilst no formal proposals have yet come forward for an EU extra-
territorial processing centre in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, the 
‘institutional scoreboard’ on the Hague Programme requires a study to be 
undertaken in ‘close collaboration with UNHCR’.100 Any proposal is likely 
to face strong opposition from human rights and refugees NGOs, many of 
whom take part in the EuroMed Non-Governmental Platform. For 
example, Oxfam termed the UK government idea for transit processing 
centres ‘dangerous’ and condemned its ‘legality, morality and 
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practicality’.101 Part of their fear would be that practicing an asylum policy 
outside the EU would prevent effective supervision of the respect for 
human rights by UNHCR or the NGOs themselves.102 Other commentators 
have suggested that providing the tools to the Mediterranean Partner 
States to improve their institutional capabilities in dealing with those in 
transit would be a more appropriate solution, and closer to the spirit of 
the Geneva Convention.103 Furthermore, there have been no signs that 
Mediterranean Partner States would be willing to host the kind of centres 
mooted by Germany.104 Betts reports that during an informal meeting with 
UNHCR on 29 September 2004, the North African states suggested that 
they would refuse to cooperate in the development of ‘offshore 
processing’. They seem to have been concerned by two main issues: firstly, 
the international image of a state seen as a ‘dumping ground’ for those not 
deemed worthy of entry to the EU and secondly, the unresolved legal and 
practical issues of those whose claims are rejected by the European 
authorities.105 
Against the background of these strong critiques, the process of 
deliberating and eventually creating extra-territorial reception centres 
will undoubtedly be closely monitored and contested. There are two 
general important considerations in the context of the Mediterranean 
Partner States. The first is that even if ‘camps’ or ‘processing centres’ are 
created, they are unlikely to directly concern as many individuals as the 
readmission agreements which are under negotiation or envisaged for the 
Partner States. Second, attention on extra-territorial centres leaves aside 
the connected issue of the increasingly restrictive migration policies being 
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adopted by Mediterranean Partner States.106 This could be seen as a 
natural consequence of the more stringent legal and policy frameworks 
being developed in the EU Member States, which keep those trying to 
enter the EU in the periphery of the EU’s neighbourhood. Yet, in the 
absence of humanitarian capabilities in place in many Partner States, 
adoption and enforcement of increasingly restrictive policies by Partner 
States may have an extremely repressive effect on migrants in transit 
through the Partner States. This may again have the effect of diverting 
migration routes to neighbouring states even further afield. 
In this respect, it seems likely that the EU will have a difficult task in 
lauding the importance of fundament rights and freedoms and the respect 
that the Partner States should show for international human rights 
protection in this context. EuroMed could be used a forum for discussion 
of processing centres, but given the likely opposition from some Member 
States and, in particular, civil society, this is likely to continue to be 
outside the scope of the multilateral dimensions. As a means of pushing 
the external frontier of the EU outwards, extra-territorial centres would 
appear to be the appropriate solution, but the lack of official 
documentation or concrete proposals would seem to demonstrate that the 
EU institutions or Member States would find it difficult to reconcile both a 
partnership approach across the Mediterranean with the promotion of the 
fundamental values the EU claims to base its system of governance on. 
Conclusion 
Migration is a policy area which operates across the institutional logics of 
the EU, but which has in recent years become much more prominent in 
the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Migration issues were more present in 
EuroMed that at first would appear from the text of the Barcelona 
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Declaration and early official documents in EuroMed, but migration is 
now recognised as one of the most important issues in the Partnership. 
The Mediterranean serves as both the impetus for action on migration at 
the EU level, and also the region where the impact on internal measures 
on migration (whether regulating legal or irregular migration) is likely to 
be felt the strongest. Despite the reservations of the Member States in 
granting competence to the EU to deal with migration issues, or following 
up on the promises contained in Council conclusions at Tampere and the 
Hague with strongly coordinated legislative measures, the EU institutions 
have gradually gained competence in this area. As is the case with 
EuroMed itself, the ‘pillar’ structure is of limited assistance when 
understanding where the ‘internal’ dimensions of policy-making end and 
the ‘external’ dimensions begin.  
Closer examination of the approaches to migration issues at the EU 
level insofar as they affect or involve Mediterranean Partner States reveal 
contradictions in the language used. It is not necessarily the case that 
repressive or preventative measures taken by the EU institutions or 
Member States sit in direct opposition to partnership approaches. For 
example, in attempting to prevent migrants reaching Europe by 
clandestine and irregular means, extra-territorial centres situated in 
North Africa would be a repressive and preventative solution in that they 
contribute to a thicker border of the EU in creating a protective ‘layer’ 
around the EU’s territory. But, it is also possible to employ the language of 
partnership with the Mediterranean Partner States by framing measures 
within the context of dealing with phenomena which is a problem for the 
Partner States as well as the EU. In a similar way, by facilitating technical 
cooperation such as improving the standards of North African passports 
(discussed at the EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Migration in November 
2007) the EU is emphasising a partnership approach, but with the goal of 
ensuring that Partner States play a role in preventing migrants from 
reaching the territory of the EU. Frontex, as an agency charged with tasks 
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relating to the EU’s external border, is keen to stress that as an agency it is 
responsible for coordination of measures of border ‘management’, not 
‘control’ which has more repressive overtones.107 
 Nevertheless, offering inducements in return for repressive 
measures, whether or not they are couched in such language, does not 
involve a positive spirit of a partnership of equals as the EuroMed 
documentation (particularly at the multilateral level) suggests. A system 
of governance with strong central actors in the form of the EU institutions 
and Member States brings back the imbalance in the partnership 
identified in chapter four. In using the multilateral and bilateral elements 
of EuroMed in order to fulfil security goals, and therefore the aims of the 
CFSP found in the TEU, the usefulness of the Barcelona Process is 
maintained in the eyes of the EU institutions and also the Member States. 
This would explain the UK’s enthusiasm for extra-territorial processing 
centres, which by their nature, would be located far from UK soil. With 
such (non-Mediterranean EU) states seeing the potential for EuroMed as a 
means of confronting these external threats, the achievement of 
successful solutions or effective coordination is more probable where 
concurrent national interests within the collective framework can be 
mobilised. 
 The mix of approaches once again does not signal a partnership of 
equals in EuroMed, but neither does it preclude a system of governance 
from existing. By increasing EU action in the external sphere through the 
CFSP, Member States have used non-the CFSP provisions to create an 
external dimension which draws on their experience in the multilateral 
frame of the CFSP. Foreign policy has thus become expressed in other 
policies and has even led to ‘hard’ law in the form of readmission 
agreements, which have proliferated. This contributes to a system of 
governance in EuroMed, though with the bilateral aspects more 
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significant in this respect than the multilateral. The EU’s interests in 
engaging the EuroMed Partner States in migration management, and 
particularly irregular migration management, are clear, and far from the 
joint ownership of the process the EuroMed declarations would suggest. 
As the above analysis demonstrates, ‘partnership’ carries positive 
connotations in a similar way to many uses of ‘governance’, yet using 
these terms can mask other interests and means to fulfil ‘traditional’ 
foreign policy goals. If the Mediterranean Partner States can also succeed 
in making their voices and interests heard within EuroMed, leading to a 
better, joint system of governance in EuroMed, then migration may be one 
field where cooperation could be possible.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion - Governance and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy 
‘Governance’ has become a fashionable term in recent years and academic 
literature on the subject has proliferated. This thesis has raised important 
questions about the nature of the foreign policy of the EU and asked 
whether the CFSP can be seen in terms of a system of governance, and 
what this signifies in understanding the legal effects of the CFSP beyond 
the Treaty-based instruments. 
 Recalling that ‘governance’ has become attractive in that it fits the 
multilevel nature of legal and political orders of nations states, and 
aspects of international relations, there is little doubt that it is applicable 
to the European Union, with its complex institutional framework, 
considerable powers, and wide-ranging competences which have extended 
into many areas during the course of European integration. The CFSP, 
however, appears to be rather resistant to the language of ‘governance’, 
since it has been almost universally characterised since its creation in 
1992 as an ‘intergovernmental’ forum which does not create the type of 
legal effects and outputs that are common to the Community legal order. 
The only instances where ‘governance’ has been used by scholars or policy-
makers in relation to the CFSP is where ‘good governance’ is found as an 
aim: but this usually relates to the promotion of (democratic) governance 
in third states, rather than to the characteristics of the CFSP itself. This 
use of ‘governance’ is one of the meanings identified in chapter one and 
implies positive associations with the term, even when ‘good’ is not 
affixed.  
Underlining the ‘pillar’ structure and ‘otherness’ of the CFSP within 
the constitutional order of the EU has seemingly kept the CFSP immune 
(or protected) from the spillover processes which have occurred in other 
areas of EU policy-making. New governance and new modes of governance 
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have not been discussed in relation to the CFSP because, as explained in 
chapter two, the CFSP is too often seen as the sole preserve of the Council, 
with no place for other EU institutions, including agencies, or private 
actors such as NGOs or civil society. This stems from the view that the 
CFSP respects the place of foreign policy at the core of the sovereignty and 
identity of the Member States, a view often underlined by some Member 
States when the CFSP comes under discussion during Treaty reforms. By 
consequence, despite its sui generis nature, the CFSP nevertheless appears 
to work within the paradigm of a foreign policy as a diplomatic exercise 
where states are the principle actors. 
The institutional constructivist framework of legal analysis was 
developed in chapter three as a means to understand how the CFSP works 
and how and why characterising it as a ‘system of governance’ aids our 
comprehension of it. This analytical framework is suited to seeking out 
the (legal) effects of the CFSP as a system of governance and in accounting 
for how these effects can be felt in policy areas which do not formally 
come within the legal competence of the Treaty-based provisions of the 
CFSP. Applying this framework reveals that the CFSP becomes much more 
important as a legal policy because of the input it has into the emergence 
of (legal) institutions and norms. This final chapter draws together the 
research on the CFSP, EuroMed and migration law and policy and uses the 
theoretical framework to link together the findings in terms of how this 
explains the workings of the CFSP. In doing so, this chapter offers answers 
to the research questions posed in the introduction and which help to test 
the hypothesis. Further avenues for research which could build on the 
insights made in this thesis are suggested.  
Migration and the EuroMed system of governance 
The analysis of EU migration law and policy and its interaction with 
EuroMed has demonstrated how the synergy between an issue generally 
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perceived as ‘internal’ and an expression of foreign policy can be 
understood. Since migration, broadly defined, had little or no express 
place in discussion in either the CFSP or EuroMed in the early to mid-
1990s, the key is to explain how migration has come to the forefront of 
EuroMed, as exemplified by its elevation to the status of fourth ‘basket’ of 
EuroMed in 2005. 
 Returning to the institutional framework of EuroMed, the analysis 
in chapter four demonstrated that there are multilateral, bilateral and 
unilateral features of the system of governance in EuroMed. The analysis 
of the development of migration law and policy revealed that it has come 
to be in an increasingly prominent place on the agenda of the institutions 
at the EU level as well as those of the Member States. Measures and policy-
making in migration at the EU level has begun to exhibit the kind of 
instruments one would expect to see in a national context, such as border 
control mechanisms. This suggests that the nature of migration law and 
policy-making has gradually shifted beyond the measures one might 
expect to be found within an international organisation.  
Tracing the interaction between migration and EuroMed reveals that 
the appearance of discussion of migration with the institutional 
framework of EuroMed was not the product of a ‘grand design’ of a formal 
proposal to orientate EuroMed towards discussion of this issue but rather 
an incremental process. The interaction between EuroMed and migration 
has been demonstrated as two-way. EuroMed has developed because of the 
greater emphasis on migration, which makes it an appropriate means for 
discussion or cooperation, and the migration agenda has been moved 
forward because of the embedding of certain ‘goals’ within the system of 
governance. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated that migration (and 
in particular, irregular migration) is not merely an issue for discussion 
within EuroMed but one which can lead to cooperation projects and ‘hard’ 
legal instruments, such as readmission agreements. Readmission 
agreements are a good demonstration of how the different dimensions to 
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EuroMed operate: their importance is underlined in the multilateral 
frames (particularly within the EuroMed Ministerial Conference) but their 
actual agreement is conducted bilaterally within the Association 
Agreements and the ENP Action Plans. Readmission agreements are legal 
institutions, but are dealt with on a bilateral basis: this is a preferable 
means for the Commission and Council, which can negotiate with each 
Partner State individually and tie any inducements to obligations within 
the Agreement or Action Plan. The practice of reaffirming the importance 
of the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements in both the EU’s 
general policies (including the Global Approach to Migration) and within 
the framework of EuroMed can, according to the theoretical approach 
adopted here, be seen as a legal institution in its own right. 
It is true that the Union has concluded, or is in the process of 
concluding, readmission agreements with states outside EuroMed. It is 
not suggested that the Mediterranean partners are unique in this respect. 
However, the sustained emphasis visible from documents emerging from 
the EU institutions on the need for readmission agreements with all 
Partner States help the argument that these legal instruments form part 
of a strategy by the EU to make the external borders ‘thicker’ whilst using 
the language of ‘partnership’. The logic follows that if readmission 
agreements are concluded with all neighbouring states, there will be no 
‘gap’ around the Mediterranean rim for potential migrants to use and 
avoid being returned easily. This goes some way in explaining why the EU 
is keen to conclude an agreement with Libya, which may otherwise 
become an increasingly attractive departure point for potential migrants 
attempting to reach Europe. 
The comprehensive search for blanket readmission agreements with 
all Southern neighbours has the effect of creating a system of governance 
within EuroMed strongly based around the EU institutions as the central 
actors, who are able to employ the language of partnership whilst 
pursuing their own (security based) goals. It could also be suggested that 
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discussion of migration issues is a natural consequence of the proximity 
of the Mediterranean Partner States and the EU and its Member States. 
However, this does not explain why migration measures have moved from 
the ‘internal’ sphere of governance towards the ‘external’ sphere. It can 
also be seen that a more elaborate framework for dealing with migration 
issues at the EU level was an integral part of the eventual integration of 
migration in EuroMed. Without this legislative framework in place 
following the Tampere Conclusions, it is likely that migration policy in 
the external, EuroMed context would have remained at the abstract level 
which would have made the emergence of legal institutions more difficult 
to identify. Applying the theoretical approach to the specific interaction 
between migration issues and EuroMed helps to explain how the issue has 
come to the forefront. Central to EuroMed are the consistent references in 
the documentation to joint ownership and the non-static nature of the 
Barcelona Process. Chapter four identified that ‘true’ ownership of 
EuroMed by the EU and non-EU partners is not borne out by the 
institutional practices, and that the EU institutions and Member States 
have been more successful than the Partner States in guiding the direction 
of the Barcelona Process. Yet, by emphasising the ‘partnership’ aspects of 
EuroMed, the identification of a problem (irregular migrants reaching the 
EU by clandestine means across the Mediterranean Sea) is presented as a 
common problem for the EuroMed participants which merits a common 
approach. 
The explanations provided by applying the theoretical approach here 
are twofold. First, the institutions which have been created within 
EuroMed allow for an opportunity to put forward an issue for discussion 
which can be taken advantage of by (some of) the members of the 
institution. Second, a logic of appropriateness arises which can be seen by 
the discussion of EuroMed-wide cooperation frameworks for dealing with 
(irregular) migration: if the institution is seen as influencing the 
behaviour of the members, then it becomes appropriate to raise the issue 
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within this context. Hence, cooperation and negotiation within EuroMed 
as a legal institution make it an operational entity too, capable of 
producing legal effects. Since it has been shown that the EU institutions 
and Member States are primarily responsible for setting the agenda in 
EuroMed, it appears that the institutional frameworks are used as a means 
by which the Partner States can be ‘tested’ insofar as what they are likely 
to accept. The highly politicised nature of migration between the EU 
(frequently accused of becoming a ‘fortress’) and third states means that in 
using institutional fora in this way, the EU actors must carefully balance 
the search for fulfilment of ‘internal’ goals with measures likely to be 
acceptable to the Partner States.  
The link with foreign and security policy goals that the EU 
institutions and Member States are attempting to pursue within EuroMed 
therefore becomes more visible. If an issue is not deemed ‘appropriate’ 
then the logic will not be followed, unless circumstances change or 
another factor (such as a strong inducement) arises. For example, it 
appears that in the multilateral dimensions to EuroMed, it is not 
appropriate for the EU or an EU Member State to suggest creating extra-
territorial reception centres in the Mediterranean, since there are strong 
indications that this would not conform to the norms of the institution as 
the Partner States are unlikely to accept that cooperation is possible on 
this issue. If it is going to be raised as a point for discussion, it is likely to 
be on a bilateral basis and shielded from the multilateral institutions 
within the system of governance of EuroMed. Similarly, in the reverse 
scenario, a Partner State may raise the issue of visa facilitation if they 
believe that within the institutional framework this could have an effect 
on the EU side. With the dominance of the EU actors within EuroMed, 
raising such an issue may be appropriate but would not necessarily lead to 
the emergence of an agreement which realises the aims of the Partner 
State in question. Given the dominance of EuroMed by the EU-side, the 
question may then be asked as to why the Partner States participate at all 
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if it is unlikely that they will succeed in influencing the agendas of the 
common institutions. This however highlights the nature of a system of 
governance as a thicker set of rules and practices than bilateral 
relationships alone: migration may be a key priority for the EU, but the 
Partner States’ interest in EuroMed may be found here and in other areas: 
the emphasis in the multilateral EuroMed conclusions on the creation of 
the Free Trade Area suggests that economic motivations are key. 
Furthermore, this also helps to explain why the EU institutions have not 
always been successful in seeking cooperation agreements with Partner 
States and why the Association Agreements have taken as long to 
conclude, in some cases, as the first decade of the Barcelona Process.  
 The link between migration and security also helps to explain how 
the links between migration, EuroMed and foreign policy become more 
visible. Institutions adapt to changing circumstances, and post-9/11 there 
was a more express attempt in EuroMed documents to link irregular 
migration from the Partner States with issues of security, even though 
this was shown not to originate from both sides equally, but the EU side 
only. Here again, migration and security was framed in a way which made 
it appear to be a joint concern. Irregular migration is the primary link 
made with security, but even regular migration is linked in EU documents: 
the European Pact on Immigration notes that a workable visa policy is 
required for the ‘security’ of the EU and its partners. There is little doubt 
that 9/11 has prompted an emphasis on security discussions in most states 
and internationally. The presence within the TEU of the goal of the CFSP 
‘to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways’,1 coupled with the 
introduction of external borders as a focus in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
reveals the tendency of the EU to view EuroMed as an external sphere of 
governance. It is a means by which both security and migration goals can 
be pursued, as exemplified by the pursuit of ‘thicker borders’ to secure the 
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EU’s territory. 9/11 also contributed to the EU’s ability to link migration 
with security, which justifies placing it high on the institutional agendas 
in the EuroMed system of governance as a ‘common concern’ for all 
participants. The externalisation of migration policy which has occurred 
(and which was examined at the end of chapter five) is in evidence in the 
CFSP too. That is to say, the ‘goals’ to be fulfilled in the CFSP as laid down 
in the Treaty and in the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean2 are 
moved from the intergovernmental frame provided for in the TEU towards 
supranational governance. This externalisation process of such a core-
state issue of migration control has been explained by the attractiveness 
for Member States of bypassing domestic ‘humanitarian policy frames’. A 
similar effect can be revealed here: deepened cooperation with EuroMed 
Partner States allows for the possibility of discussion of migration control 
mechanisms which can be concluded on a bilateral basis. 
The social reality of EuroMed is, despite the stated importance of 
multilateralism as the basis for the ‘partnership’ between EU and non-EU 
members, constructed on the basis of legal obligations which function in a 
more bilateral setting. This bypasses the fora in which migration 
cooperation might be more difficult to pursue and enables the actors in 
the EU to act as the strong ‘centre’ within the system of governance in 
EuroMed. Following the same logic explains why internal migration 
measures in the EU has been externalised and ‘shifted up and out’ despite 
the perceived place of migration policy at the heart of state sovereignty: 
the multilateral institutions of EuroMed are avoided so as to tie Partner 
States more stringently within bilateral agreements in order to ensure, as 
far as possible, cooperation. The same could also be said for practical 
issues in cooperation by Frontex. 
In this respect, migration exemplifies the translation of the values in 
the CFSP into social practices, which can result in ‘hard’ legal effects. 
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Values are not limited to those contained in the Treaty, but also include 
certain values associated with ‘traditional’ foreign policies (that is, of 
nation states) including the role of foreign policy as a means to deal with 
outsiders ‘at arm’s length’. The growing importance of migration issues 
within the context of the EU neighbourhood has allowed EuroMed to gain 
in salience amongst EU Member States that do not border the 
Mediterranean but see the relevance for national interests pursued 
through the prism of the EU institutions. With this pursuit of thicker 
borders and discussion of other externalised forms of migration control, 
such as extra-territorial processing centres, the link with the CFSP is 
reaffirmed, both in terms of its general aims and values and the Common 
Strategy for the Mediterranean. 
Practice and Institutional Development in EuroMed 
The theoretical framework pointed to the importance of norms and 
institutions arising from the social practices within the CFSP in 
understanding how the policy works. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership provides a rich source of emerging norms and institutions 
which shed light on how logics of appropriateness characterise the CFSP. 
It is worth recalling that EuroMed was not created by a legal instrument of 
the CFSP. There was no specific legal basis for the launch of the Barcelona 
Process, and because of its wide-ranging nature, has generally been 
characterised as a ‘cross-pillar’ project. This is also true for the ENP. The 
Mediterranean was the subject of the third Common Strategy concluded 
under the CFSP following the Treaty of Amsterdam which created this 
instrument; but this was in 2000, five years after the initial Barcelona 
Declaration. It has been suggested that the reason why EuroMed was not 
created under the CFSP was that it would have meant a rather narrower 
institutional and policy framework than was the case with the three 
EuroMed ‘baskets’. It should also be recalled that the initial advantage for 
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the Partner States to be involved with the EU was the creation of trade 
benefits through a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area to be completed 
by 2010.  
EuroMed can also be characterised as an institution and, in parallel, 
a collection of distinct institutions. EuroMed fulfils the criteria of an 
institution as established by March and Olsen: it is a relatively stable 
collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour. EuroMed 
can be said to be relatively stable. The Barcelona Process has been 
continuously disrupted by the destabilising effects of events in the Middle 
East, but it has nevertheless continued without losing the participation of 
any Partner States, and indeed growing to include new members in late 
2007 and June 2008. Where boycotts have taken place, such as the absence 
of Lebanon and Syria at the EuroMed Ministerial Conference in 2001 in 
protest at the presence of Israel in the context of renewed tension in the 
Middle East, this was of a temporary nature only and did not result in the 
disintegration of EuroMed. Partner States are minded that EuroMed 
continues to offer the potential for cooperation if the wider political 
situation allows for it. EuroMed does not have all the physical assets of an 
institution, such as a permanent secretariat, but this is not necessary for 
it to be characterised as an institution according to March and Olsen’s 
definition. 
 As well as being an institution in its own right, the constituent 
parts of EuroMed can also be classed both as individual institutions and as 
a set of institutions within which practices and rules have developed 
which influence the members. These include the general ministerial 
conferences, the bilateral meetings between the Council and each Partner 
States pursuant to the Association Agreements, and non-governmental 
bodies, such as the EuroMed Civil Forum and the Anna Lindh Foundation. 
The latter two have gained the physical presences of institutions (i.e. 
headquarters in Paris and Alexandria respectively) and the former are 
institutions because of the regular meetings which have been held with 
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increasing frequency. The social reality of EuroMed is evident in the 
increasing number of contacts within an institutionalised setting. The 
Ministerial meeting on Migration in late 2007 is evidence of a desire to 
discuss important issues for the members within this institutionalised 
setting, but which was not present in the original text of Barcelona. As 
well as making these meetings and contact identifiable as institutions, 
taken together they constitute operational entities which contribute to 
EuroMed being a socially constructed institution. 
The research in chapter four, however, shows that the best example 
here of institutional development is the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly. There was only a limited mention of 
Parliamentary dialogue within the Barcelona Declaration, but it has 
evolved into a permanent feature of the Barcelona Process, with rules of 
procedures, committee frameworks and wide-ranging resolutions passed 
on the wider direction that EuroMed should take. It has also been 
instrumental in the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the 
Dialogue of Cultures, which was similarly not foreseen in the original 
Barcelona Declaration. As an institution, it has undergone processes of 
change, both with the formal sense (the adoption of rules of procedure) 
and also the informal: the subject-matter discussed by the 
Parliamentarians avoids the overly contentious issue of the Middle East 
Peace Process and instead focuses attention on the cultural aspects of the 
Barcelona Process where it appears that their contribution could be felt 
the most. This is especially true in the committee-based work of the 
EMPA. The development of the EMPA demonstrates how processes of 
learning exist and operate within institutions, by taking advantage of 
opportunities and bypassing threats which could destabilise or destroy 
the institutions. Whilst the frequent troubles in the Middle East would 
suggest that, being the only multilateral forum involving the participation 
of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and neighbouring states, EuroMed 
would be halted. In fact the process of institutionalisation in EuroMed 
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(and more specifically the EMPA) has gone in the opposite direction. It has 
also shown resistance to being replaced or sidelined in the more recent 
ENP, which at one point was envisaged as a successor to EuroMed but 
instead is ‘complementary’ to it. This demonstrates how institutions gain 
salience, resilience and can eventually extend influence in processes of 
wider change in identities and values. 
 This institutional framework allows EuroMed to also be 
characterised as a system of governance. However, as stated in the final 
part of chapter four, this system is differentiated from the system of 
governance in the EU because of the presence of stronger central actors 
able to set the agenda of the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral 
dimensions to the system of EuroMed governance. This reinforces the 
assertion that the means by which the CFSP works in practice is 
fundamentally different from the traditional foreign policy of a state: 
EuroMed is a means by which the goals of the CFSP can be fulfilled 
through processes of institutionalisation, which play to the Union’s 
strengths. The close correlation between the documents from the Council 
and the EuroMed Ministerial Conference conclusions testify to the 
existence of this link, in addition to those in the field of migration. This 
institutionalising effect brings in the Partner States into a system of 
governance which is dominated by the EU institutions and Member 
States. This in turn allows for the pursuit of the CFSP goals which, given 
the emphasis post-Amsterdam on external borders, brings in the 
importance of migration within EuroMed. Hence, migration as an 
‘internal’ issue within the scope of the Justice and Home Affairs/Freedom, 
Security and Justice comes into contact with the aims of the CFSP. Using 
an external sphere of governance, such as EuroMed, enables us to see a 
more traditional exercise and purpose of ‘traditional’ foreign policy: 
keeping outsiders at arm’s length, in order to satisfy the ‘internal’ goals of 




Legal institutions, such as the Association Agreements, are therefore 
used to shape the behaviour of the actors involved. Since institutional 
constructivism treats law as a tool capable of changing identities, aims 
and preferences, both the multilateral and bilateral institutions in 
EuroMed can be seen as catalysts for change. The research in chapter four 
demonstrated that the Association Agreements are not merely used to 
complete the technical arrangements of an eventual free trade area in the 
Mediterranean, but also to embody values (such as the promotion of 
human rights in the Partner States) and secure cooperation in other areas, 
such as in migration. 
The logics of appropriateness within EuroMed can be seen through 
the respective multilateral, bilateral and unilateral dimensions of the 
Barcelona Process. Logics of appropriateness are important because of the 
light they shed on the EU’s values, which in turn shape the institutions. 
These can be the values laid down in the Treaty, both in the title on the 
CFSP in the TEU and in the general preamble, but they can also be hidden 
from view. The multilateral institutions in EuroMed, including the 
Ministerial Conferences, EMPA and EuroMed Civil Forum frequently 
allude to the values which the EU says that it wishes to promote in the 
EuroMed region. As demonstrated in chapter four, this is not so much the 
product of shared values between the EU, its Member States and the 
Partner States, but because of an institutional framework dominated by 
the EU institutions and Member States that are in a position to exercise 
greater control over the norms which emerge from the Barcelona Process. 
Logics of appropriateness therefore arise which define appropriate 
behaviour: in order for the Barcelona Process to continue, values 
including commitments to democracy, the rule of law and free trade 
which are based on ‘partnership’ approaches are continuously reaffirmed. 
This commits the Partner States to cooperate and suggests that the EU 




There has been an express will to include all the states in the 
Mediterranean region, but only if states agree to the terms of the 
Barcelona Declaration. The Commission and Council have been keen to 
point to the desirability of Libyan membership of the Barcelona Process, 
but only if Libya accepts the Barcelona acquis. The acquis is not defined in 
a manner comparable to the acquis required in EU enlargements 
processes, but the constructivist insights used here demonstrate that the 
values (strongly based on the values the EU wishes to promote in the 
region) form the backbone of this acquis, but under the guise of 
‘partnership’. The social practices revealed via the multilateral and 
bilateral dimensions to the Barcelona Process differ: on the multilateral 
level, documentation from the EuroMed institutions emphasises the 
stated goals of increasing prosperity through economic development and 
the rights of individuals. At the bilateral level, the EU institutions pursue 
different goals, depending on the Partner State involved. This explains 
why some Association Agreements took a great deal longer to conclude 
than others and why there are marked differences in the content of the 
Agreements and Action Plans. The widening of the participants in 
EuroMed, who in the case of Albania and Mauritania, requested 
membership rather than vice versa demonstrates that they perceive some 
benefit to be gained from membership. This could be down to specific 
individual interests but it is also because the ‘partnership’ approaches 
suggest that EuroMed is an emerging system of governance in the 
Mediterranean in which the Partner States have a role to play. 
Despite the economic focus of EuroMed in the initial Barcelona 
Declaration, it is contended here that the launch of the Barcelona Process 
would not have been possible if it were not for the creation of the CFSP in 
1992. Previous frameworks for engagement with the Mediterranean states 
had failed, and whilst the Barcelona Process has often not been 
characterised as a success it has nevertheless continued to exist for over 
10 years and it likely to continue to do so in the light of the emphasis on 
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its relaunch during the French EU Presidency in 2008. Given the stated 
aims of the CFSP in the TEU,3 EuroMed clearly serves to fulfil these aims, 
in terms of material goals (including in migration) and also in the 
promotion of values such as democratic reforms. EuroMed is therefore an 
example of the EU’s ‘normative power’, but the ability of the EU to pursue 
control or repressive measures means that ‘normative’ should not 
necessarily carry the positive associations which are also associated with 
‘governance’. 
 The existence of a system of governance in EuroMed does not 
depend on practical or visible ‘outputs’ for it to exist in the sense of, for 
example, establishing concrete projects which help overcome the 
divisions between the participating states in the Middle East. EuroMed 
has been criticised for its lack of material outputs and overall lack of 
(visible) progress towards meeting its stated goals. But it is argued here 
that by using the theoretical approach, which upgrades the importance of 
ideas, values and identities in institutions, it is possible to see EuroMed as 
a gradual confidence-building measure between the EU and the Partner 
States. The fact that it has continued to exist in a region where some of the 
world’s most complex and divisive problems exist cannot be ignored. 
EuroMed can be accurately described as a socially constructed institution 
as well as a legal institution, and both these facts contribute to it 
emerging as a system of governance. The upgrading of the importance of 
ideas, values and identities explains the eventual building of practical 
forms of cooperation. One of the key achievements of EuroMed is that it 
has incrementally developed and, even more importantly, done so with 
the continued participation of all the Partner States, including Israel and 
its neighbours. In the context of the destabilising and complex effects of 
the Middle East conflict, this is an achievement which should not be 
understated. In light of this, the constructivist insights in the theoretical 
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approach help to demonstrate that the principles of cooperation and 
shared values have emerged in EuroMed, but strictly on a long-term basis. 
The relaunch of EuroMed as the Barcelona Process: Union of the 
Mediterranean is notable for underscoring practical cooperation between 
the participants. This would not have been possible in 1995 at the outset of 
the Barcelona Process, but it is increasingly so in the more sophisticated 
system of governance that has since developed. 
Conclusion: the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a System 
of Governance 
Recognising the emergence of EuroMed as a system of governance leads to 
more generalised conclusions on how the CFSP works in practice beyond 
the Treaty-based competences, which test the hypothesis posed in this 
thesis. That the CFSP and other external policies of the Union are not 
hermetically sealed from each other is not new. The contribution of this 
thesis is to demonstrate, however, that the relationship between the 
CFSP, as a system of governance, and other institutionalised forms of 
governance is closer than previously thought. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and the issue of migration law and policy within it help to 
clarify these relationships.  
The CFSP is a policy defined by the Treaty-based competences of the 
EU, with specific instruments and actors endowed with capabilities to act, 
but it is also clearly an ‘institution’ capable of falling within March and 
Olsen’s definition. It is a stable collection of practices as well as rules, 
which define appropriate behaviour in specific situations. Guides to the 
standards of appropriate behaviour are found in Treaty articles such as 
Article 16 TEU, which obliges Member State to inform and consult each 
other within the Council ‘on any matter of foreign and security policy of 
general interest’. Guides are also found through the practices which have 
arisen during the lifetime of the CFSP, such as the habitual issuing of 
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Declarations on matters of importance by the Council Presidency.  
March and Olsen’s definition also points to the importance of values. 
The presence of shared values in the CFSP as an institution is visible in 
the Treaty-defined aims of the CFSP (for example, the objectives to 
strengthen the security of the Union, to promote international 
cooperation and to develop and consolidate democracy). Values are also 
seen in the emphasis on multilateralism, partnership and regional 
integration in the context of the Mediterranean case-study, such as the 
support for the Agadir Agreement on free trade between the Partner 
States. This can be understood as akin to the values in the CFSP which 
become shared by states joining the Union as they align themselves with 
the CFSP Declarations prior to Membership. 
  Through a combination of the Treaty dispositions and their 
practical expression, the CFSP can therefore be readily identified as an 
‘institution’. This is not merely a label, because as an institution the CFSP 
is ‘living’ and capable of creating logics of appropriateness, which 
influence behaviour and result in the creation of (legal) institutions. It is 
also important to state that the CFSP is not simply the product of the sum 
of interests of the Member States within the Council. It is not necessary 
for the practices associated with the CFSP to have legal characteristics 
that formally bind the Member States since the defining characteristics 
are the constraints on behaviour. This research demonstrates that these 
logics of appropriateness can have effects outside the realm of the CFSP as 
an institution, but move into other policy areas. 
To address the central hypothesis, given that the CFSP can be 
characterised as a system of governance the relationship between the 
CFSP and the governance of the EU and its external sphere becomes 
clearer. The CFSP is an institution which uses the Treaty-based 
instruments at its disposal, but the theoretical approach here shows that 
its ‘outputs’ are not limited to this. It was stated above that EuroMed was 
not created by the CFSP although it formed part of the EU’s strategy for 
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the Mediterranean laid down in a Common Strategy five years after the 
Barcelona Declaration. Why was this the case? One answer is that the 
initial goals sought in EuroMed were ‘economic’, i.e. the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area, which rely on the competences and experiences of the EU 
institutions (in particular the Commission) which have a less formal role 
in the CFSP. The explanation here, however, is that EuroMed only became 
possible because of the existence of an outward-looking policy on the part 
of the EU operating with a single institutional framework. The limitations 
of the CFSP and the intergovernmental nature of its provisions are usually 
blamed for the inability of the EU Member States in the Council to act 
collectively, but making the link between the CFSP and EuroMed 
demonstrates that the EU has succeeded in pursuing its foreign policy 
goals through the establishment of a system of governance in the 
Mediterranean region. Recalling that the Council has repeatedly called for 
the integration of migration goals into foreign policy, it appears that the 
CFSP has had the effect of creating the opportunity for consideration of 
foreign policy issues within a multilateral frame over a long-term period. 
As such, the CFSP becomes more readily identifiable as an integral part of 
the constitutional order of the EU and not merely a supplement to the 
‘hard’ legal effects capable of being produced through the first ‘pillar’ 
alone. 
As EuroMed is identified here as an expression of the foreign policy 
of the EU, this then leads to the wider issue of why the CFSP provisions 
have remained intergovernmental in character and resistant to 
supranationalism, in contrast to other areas (such as migration law and 
policy) which are similarly close to core state sovereignty. The answer 
offered here is in understanding how the relationship between the CFSP 
and other policies with an external dimension works in practice. By 
bypassing the legal instruments available in the CFSP and the 
intergovernmental processes associated with them, and instead using 
other instruments with different legal bases (or, in the case of EuroMed, 
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no specific basis) the Member States who resist placing the CFSP within 
the same formal legal framework as the Community can claim that ‘real’ 
foreign policy remains with them and national sovereignty is protected. 
Therefore, EU foreign policy in practice can be seen as much closer to the 
operation of the rest of the EU’s policies than is suggested by either the 
Treaty provisions or the discourse of the Member States.  
The legal institutions emerging from the migration law and policy 
framework at the EU level would not have been possible without the 
CFSP. The CFSP has created a multilateral frame within which the 
Member States have become used to dialogue and consultation with each 
other, and which has become more than a simple mechanism for issuing 
Declarations. It has become a ‘living institution’ and a fully constituent 
part of the EU’s legal order. Consequently, the CFSP cannot be seen as an 
ineffective policy which does not produce practical effects, but one which 
is expressed via links with other policy areas within the system of 
governance of the EU which are not readily visible through traditional 
legal analysis. Were it not for the CFSP providing a multilateral frame for 
discussion of foreign policy issues and an institutionalised framework for 
cooperation, it would not have been possible to begin the process of 
institutionalisation in EuroMed and pursue the stated goals in the 
Mediterranean, which have increasingly focussed on migration. The 
interaction between systems of governance in the CFSP, EuroMed and the 
EU more generally become blurred. As such, the CFSP becomes much 
more important as a legal policy because of the input it has into the 
emergence of (legal) institutions and norms.  
The nature of ‘governance’ is also revealed to differ from the common 
conception of a term which embodies positive associations of democratic 
principles and the values of the EU as a ‘normative power’, but can instead 
carry connotations of a means by which repressive or controlling 
measures can be pursued. Characterising the CFSP as a system of 
governance allows scholars, including legal scholars, to see its effects 
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beyond the competence-based instruments of the Treaty and through the 
identified links with other EU policy-areas.  
On the basis of these findings, future research possibilities in this 
area could investigate the links between the CFSP and other developing 
EU law and policy areas in terms of how institutional norms are 
internalised by the participants. For example, democracy promotion and 
development within the context of the institutional framework of the 
Cotonou Convention would be interesting because of the diverse nature of 
the third states involved and the varying extents to which security issues 
play a role in these relationships. Security issues relating to the 
environment, and specifically challenges and threats posed by climate 
change, are emerging within foreign policies at national and EU levels and 
there are potential avenues for exploring how these issues relate to 
existing political and economic relations with third countries, in 
particular with developing countries. Research could also attempt to 
understand how and under what conditions systems of governance can 
emerge within the external sphere in the absence of the elaborate 
institutional framework developed in EuroMed. This would be a 
worthwhile task in taking forward the research undertaken in this thesis 
by attempting to explain further how the CFSP’s effects can be felt beyond 
the instruments laid down in the Treaty. To do so could lead to a better 
understanding of the nature of the EU’s constitutional order and its place 
in the world of international relations. 
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• The Barcelona Process began in 1995 and recently brought in new, 
full participants (Albania and Mauritania). Is there a reason why 
these countries, which also have Western Balkans and ACP 
relations with the EU, are now integrated in the Barcelona Process? 
• Similarly, the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean has 
widened participation even further (Croatia, Bosnia etc). Was this 
because there was significant demand on the part of the partner 
states to join the Barcelona Process? Do you see any likely 
consequences on the Barcelona Process with an enlarged 
membership? 
• How has the European Neighbourhood Policy affected the 
Barcelona Process? Could the ENP and Barcelona Process be 
understood as pursuing the same goals, or do they work in 
completely different ways? Could the Barcelona Process and ENP 
eventually move closer together or even merge?  
• A CFSP Common Strategy for the Mediterranean was adopted in 
2000 and later renewed, but is now no longer in force. Is there a 
particular reason why a further renewal of the Common Strategy 
was not sought? 
• The issue of migration seemed not to be too prominent in the text 
of the Barcelona Process, but it is now a priority areas alongside the 
three ‘baskets’. Has discussion of migration (in its many forms) been 
brought to the forefront by both the EU side and the partner states? 
• Finally, EuroMed has often been criticised for lacking in progress 
since 1995. However, since no partner state has even left the 
Process, and neither ENP nor the Mediterranean Union formally 
replaced it, should the Barcelona Process be seen as a successful 
means of engaging all partner states (especially Israel and its 




Questions to Frontex 
• How much emphasis is placed within the work of Frontex on 
securing the cooperation of third states? 
• Does this cooperation focus on the technical level, i.e. with the law 
enforcement agencies of the third countries envisaged by such 
cooperation? 
• How have third countries (in particular those in the Mediterranean 
space) reacted to requests for cooperation, and have there been any 
political difficulties associated with seeking such cooperation? 
• Has Frontex begun to seek cooperation from the third countries in 
similar terms, or is a case-by-case basis still the dominant 
approach? 
• Have the third countries in question made any specific requests to 
the EU in order to cooperate with the activities of Frontex? 
• With regard to the measures taken to combat illegal migration in 
the Mediterranean (e.g. Hera, Deniz), what role has the cooperation 
of the third states involved played in the success of the project?  
• Although Frontex is a relatively new agency, has there been an 
increased emphasis on tackling the various aspects associated with 
border security, such as illegal migration, and has this changed 
both over time and towards the different geographical border 
spaces of the EU? 
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